be appointed for him. On the following morning, before he had an opportunity to consult with counsel, two police officers obtained another statement from Jackson to "confirm" that he was the person who had shot the victim. As was true of the prearraignment statements, the questioning was preceded by advice of his Miranda rights and Jackson's agreement to proceed without counsel being present. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that Jackson's later statement was properly received in evidence. Accordingly, it affirmed Jackson's conviction of murder, although it set aside the conspiracy conviction on unrelated grounds. Michigan Supreme Court The Michigan Supreme Court held that the postarraignment statements in both cases should have been suppressed. The U.S. Supreme Court had held previously in Edwards v. Arizona, , that an accused person in custody who has, expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. The Court of Appeals had distinguished the Edwards rule on the ground that Jackson's request for an attorney had been made at his arraignment, whereas Edwards' request had been made during a custodial interrogation by the police. Noting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the time of the arraignments, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the Edwards rule, applies by analogy to those situations where an accused requests counsel before the arraigning magistrate. Once this request occurs, the police may not conduct further interrogations until counsel has been made available to the accused, unless the accused initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. . . . The police cannot simply ignore a defendant's unequivocal request for counsel. United States Supreme Court decision The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and affirmed the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in a 6 to 3 decision. Majority and concurrence Justice Stevens wrote for the majority and was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun. The Court had held previously that the "Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State." Maine v. Moulton, at 176. The Court found that therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a postarraignment interrogation required at least