The was a period of economic stagnation in Japan caused by the asset price bubble's collapse in late 1991. The term originally referred to the 1990s, but the 2000s (Lost 20 Years, 失われた20年) and the 2010s (Lost 30 Years, 失われた30年) have been included by commentators as the phenomenon continued. From 1991 to 2003, the Japanese economy, as measured by GDP, grew only 1.14% annually, while average real growth rate between 2000 to 2010 was about 1%, both well below other industrialized nations. Debt levels continued to rise in response to the Global Financial Crisis in Great Recession in 2008, the Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami and Fukushima Nuclear Disaster in 2011, and with the COVID-19 pandemic, the subsequent recession in 2020 further damaged the Japanese economy. Broadly impacting the entire Japanese economy, over the period of 1995 to 2007, GDP fell from $5.33 trillion to $4.36 trillion in nominal terms, real wages fell around 5%, while the country experienced a stagnant price level. While there is some debate on the extent and measurement of Japan's setbacks, the economic effect of the Lost Decades is well established, and Japanese policymakers continue to grapple with its consequences. Causes Japan's economic miracle in the second half of the 20th century ended abruptly at the start of the 1990s. The United States led several initiatives in the 1980’s to curtail Japan’s economy. One initiative was called the Semiconductor Accord of 1986, in which market-leading Japanese semiconductor companies were forced to share their IP as well as face US tariffs and penalties. The Plaza Accord of 1985 allowed the US dollar to depreciate significantly, increasing the competitiveness of US products for global trade, while the Japanese Yen quickly rose, making its products less competitive. Congressional use of Section 301 further pursued the threat of sanctions and the opening of Japanese markets for US companies. By the late 1980s, the Japanese economy experienced an asset price bubble of a massive scale. The bubble was caused by the excessive loan growth quotas dictated on the banks by Japan's central bank, the Bank of Japan, through a policy mechanism known as the "window guidance". As economist Paul Krugman explained, "Japan's banks lent more, with less regard for quality of the borrower, than anyone else's. In doing so they helped inflate the bubble economy to grotesque proportions." Economist Richard Werner writes that external pressures such as the Plaza Accord and