Adj*||Soviet DefenseInflation Adj* |- style="text-align:center;" | align="left"|1933||0.62||4.03||0.91||2.46 |- style="text-align:center;" | align="left"|1934||4.09||5.40||5.7||2.82 |- style="text-align:center;" | align="left"|1935||5.49||8.20||7.40||3.39 |- style="text-align:center;" | align="left"|1936||10.27||14.80||13.53||5.05 |- style="text-align:center;" | align="left"|1937||10.96||17.48||14.19||5.54 |- style="text-align:center;" | align="left"|1938||17.25||22.37||27.04||7.66 |- style="text-align:center;" | align="left"|1939||38.00||40.88||38.6||10.25 |- |colspan="13"|*Inflation adj. uses Wholesale Price Indices (1929 base) - Note: German deflation |} Stalin viewed a coming war as occurring between imperialist powers, and in the late 1920s, had even predicted a massive war between the United States and Britain. The Soviet military experienced almost proportionately identical massive increases nominally as that of Germany for military equipment and weapon designs to strengthen a Red Army and Red Navy weakened by purges. While in the face of massive Soviet inflation in the 1930s, military spending increases were still enormous, the differences grow considerably when adjusted for inflation (Germany actually experienced deflation). From 1931 to 1934, the Soviet had purposefully published figures for military spending below actual levels. Because of League of Nations publications requirements, the Soviets began more accurate defense spending publications by 1936. The Soviet Third Five Year Plan required massive new infusions of technology and industrial equipment. After Stalin's shock at the poor performance of Soviet aircraft in the Spanish Civil War and the "backwardness" of the Soviet Air Force in 1938, emphasis was put on military production, including that of large naval ships. By 1937, 17% of Soviet gross national product was spent on defense, while over 20% of industrial investment went to defense industries. At the same time, military personnel increased from 562,000 in 1931 to just over 1.5 million in 1938. Meanwhile, the Soviet transportation network was woefully underdeveloped, with roads approaching non-existence and rail lines already stretched to their limits. The ambitious objectives of the Third Five Year Plan hinged upon the Soviet economy's importing large amounts of technology from the United States, which then supplied over 60% of Soviet machines and equipment. Late 1930s German raw materials crunch By the late 1930s, foreign trade became difficult because Germany lacked the gold or foreign exchange needed to finance any balance of payment deficit. Further damaging foreign trade, Germany had already heavily regulated exports and imports, requiring licenses and approval for all trades so that it could favor the raw materials imports that it desperately need. Additional trading difficulties were caused by a boycott of German goods following Kristallnacht in November 1938. Because an autarkic economic approach or an alliance with Britain were impossible,