rearguards cratered roads, planted mines and booby-traps and managed to conduct several skilful ambushes, which slowed the British pursuit. Beda Fomm 5 February At Benghazi and Beda Fomm, the Babini Group had almost a hundred M13/40 tanks. During the retreat from Benghazi, commanded by Lieutenant-General Annibale Bergonzoli (commander of XXIII Corps) the first convoy reached the area of Beda Fomm, ran into a minefield planted across the road and was engaged by the artillery, anti-tank guns and armoured cars of Combeforce, whose ambush threw the column into confusion. Part of the 10th tried to advance down the road and others on the flanks. (Combeforce had reached Antelat during the morning and by had observers overlooking the west of Beda Fomm and Sidi Saleh, about south-west of Antelat and north of Ajedabia, the rest of the force following on south of the Jebel Akhdar.) The attack of the had little effect, being unsupported by artillery, most of which was with the rearguard to the north. The vanguard of the Italian retreat had no tanks, few front-line infantry which were prevented by the ambush from manoeuvring and to fight where they stood. Italian rear-area personnel and civilians tried to escape by driving west off the road into the sand dunes and bogged down. Lorries carrying petrol caught fire and lit the dusk, illuminating targets for the British gunners and giving the tanks en route a mark to drive on. The British artillery was not needed and the crews took about Tellera, commanding the rearguard, had to retain part of the Babini Group, rather than send all of it south to reinforce Bergonzoli for the attempts to break through the British blocking position and continue the retreat to Agedabia. The fort at Sceleidima had been garrisoned by the Bignami Group of the 10th , to block the route towards the north end of the Italian column on the and Tellera detached another thirty tanks from the Babini Group as reinforcement. The breakthrough attempts to the south could not be fully reinforced and the Italians could not expect to be undisturbed by British attacks along the convoy or the Australian advance down the , towards the tail of the column. When the rest of the Babini Group arrived at Beda Fomm, only improvised artillery and infantry groups could support it and without reconnaissance its personnel had little idea of British dispositions. 6 February The