a team sport where "very good arguments do exist for the indulgence of restraints on individual players." The Court reversed. After reiterating Shusters holding that Toolson was limited to baseball and did not automatically extend to any other business despite any apparent similarities, Justice Tom C. Clark wrote for a majority of six that "the volume of interstate business involved in organized professional football places it within the provisions of the Act". He admitted that "were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate, we would have no doubts." Frankfurter again dissented. "[T]he most conscientious probing of the text and the interstices of the Sherman Law fails to disclose that Congress, whose will we are enforcing, excluded baseball—the conditions under which that sport is carried on—from the scope of the Sherman Law, but included football", he wrote. Newer justices John Marshall Harlan II and William J. Brennan Jr., who had replaced Minton, also dissented. "What was foreshadowed by International Boxing has now come to pass", Harlan lamented. "The Court, in holding that professional football is subject to the antitrust laws, now says in effect that professional baseball is sui generis so far as those laws are concerned." State v. Milwaukee Braves Within a decade, a case would be brought alleging MLB came under state antitrust laws when Wisconsin sought to block the Braves' move from Milwaukee to Atlanta. The state alleged that baseball had exercised its monopoly power in an unreasonable way that had a substantially negative effect on business within the state, and sought to either have the move prevented or an expansion team be located in Milwaukee. A lower court agreed, and granted an injunction that delayed the Braves' move until their appeal, arguing that federal preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause put baseball out of reach of Wisconsin's antitrust laws, could be heard by the state's Supreme Court. A narrowly divided court lifted the injunction. After reviewing the Supreme Court's precedents at length, Justice Thomas E. Fairchild wrote for the four-justice majority that while baseball's antitrust exemption might not cover all the businesses a baseball team could and did engage in, "it does seem clear that the exemption at least covers the agreements and rules which provide for the structure of the organization and the decisions which are necessary steps in maintaining it." Since Congress had not explicitly barred the states