their own propositional attitude events of judging, deciding, and so forth. We think of ourselves as knowing our own thought processes immediately, without having to interpret ourselves (in the way that we do need to interpret the behavior and circumstances of other people if we are to know what they are thinking). In a series of recent papers Peter Carruthers has argued that this introspective intuition is illusory. While allowing that we do have introspective access to our own experiences, including imagistic experiences of the sort that occur during "inner speech", he draws on evidence from across the cognitive sciences to argue that our knowledge of our own judgments and decisions results from us turning our interpretative skills upon ourselves. He also argues that while inner speech plays important roles in human cognition, it never plays the right sort of role to constitute a judgment, or a decision. The latter processes always occur below the surface of consciousness, Carruthers claims. Selected publications The Animals Issue. Moral Theory in Practice (1992). Cambridge University Press: . Theories of Theories of Mind. Co-editor (with Peter K Smith), (1996). Cambridge University Press. . Language and Thought: interdisciplinary themes. Co-editor (with Jill Boucher), (1998). Cambridge University Press. . Evolution and the Human Mind: modularity, language and meta-cognition. Co-editor (with Andrew Chamberlain), (2000). Cambridge University Press. The Cognitive Basis of Science. Co-editor (with Stephen Stich and Michael Siegal), (2002). Cambridge University Press. The Innate Mind: volume 1 structure and contents. Co-editor (with Stephen Laurence and Stephen Stich), (2005). Oxford University Press. . The Innate Mind: volume 2: culture and cognition. Co-editor (with Stephen Laurence and Stephen Stich), (2006). Oxford University Press. . The Innate Mind: volume 3: foundations and the future. Co-editor (with Stephen Laurence and Stephen Stich), (2007). Oxford University Press. . Language, Thought and Consciousness: an essay in philosophical psychology (1996). Cambridge University Press: . The Philosophy of Psychology (1999). Cambridge University Press: . Phenomenal Consciousness: a naturalistic theory (2000). Cambridge University Press: . The Nature of the Mind: an introduction (2004). Routledge: (paperback) (hardcover) Consciousness: essays from a higher-order perspective (2005). Oxford University Press.: The Architecture of the Mind: massive modularity and the flexibility of thought (2006). Oxford University Press: The Opacity of Mind: an integrative theory of self-knowledge (2011). Oxford University Press: . The Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory Shows Us About the Nature of Human Thought (2015). Oxford