as chief of the general staff in 1948 wrote: "The most regrettable feature arising out of the inadequate training and equipping was the effect on the morale and fighting efficiency of the Canadian troops, which unfortunately was interpreted by their British superiors as a lack of courage, willingness to fight and even in some cases cowardice. On the other hand this has caused in the minds of Canadian troops bitterness, lack of confidence and resentment in the British superiors". A number of British historians such as Oliver Lindsay in the first edition of The Lasting Honor (1978), Tim Carew in The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation (1963), Philip Snow in The Fall of Hong Kong (2003), and Andrew Whitfield in Hong Kong, Empire and the Anglo-American Alliance at War (2003) have portrayed C Force as a cowardly and undisciplined with the implication that Hong Kong could have held out longer if only C Force had fought better. Such criticism had its origins in a report in 1948 by Matlby. In Canada, such criticism of C Force has been echoed by historians such as Carl Vincent in No Reason Why: The Canadian Hong Kong Tragedy, An Examination (1981) and by the McKenna brothers who produced a documentary in 1992 The Valor and the Horror that portrayed C Force in an unflattering light. By contrast, historians such as Terry Copp in his article "The Defence of Hong Kong, December 1941" (2001) in the journal Canadian Military History, Tony Banham in his book Not the Slightest Chance: The Defence of Hong Kong 1941 (2003) and Oliver Lindsay in the second edition of his book The Lasting Honor have largely defended the performance of C Force. The Canadian historian David Franco Marci wrote that the C Force was outnumbered and outgunned, but: "...acquitted themselves well. They too fought with determination, and in the end are deserving of greater praise instead of the scorn that has been frequently expressed". Marci also criticised Maltby's report, writing that as the British GOC (General Officer Commanding) of Hong Kong, he had a vested interest in portraying his defeat as no fault of his own, and like many a defeated general before him blamed his troops for letting him down. In a study deeply critical of the Canadian Army's performance in World War Two, the Canadian historian Colonel John English wrote that during the