149(1) of the Constitution, which protects the validity of anti-subversion laws notwithstanding inconsistencies with specified fundamental liberties, did not cover inconsistencies with Article 12. Also, the Court noted that adopting the objective test would be consistent with Article 93 of the Constitution, which vests judicial power in the courts. It did not, however, directly address the argument by counsel that the subjective test, in conferring arbitrary powers of detention, would be inconsistent with Article 93. Further, the Court rejected the subjective test on the basis that "the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule of law". The rule of law requires the courts to examine the exercise of discretionary power and ensure that executive power is exercised within its legal limits. The Court of Appeal also held that legal precedents from other Commonwealth jurisdictions supported a rejection of the subjective test in favour of the objective test. The subjective test was applied in Liversidge v. Anderson (1941) and subsequently affirmed in Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1941). However, these decisions had been departed from in subsequent decisions by the Privy Council and House of Lords. These courts had rejected the subjective test applied by the majority in Liversidge, preferring the objective test applied by Lord Atkin in his dissenting judgment. In the light of these developments, the Malaysian case of Karam Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (Minister for Home Affairs), Malaysia (1969), which had applied the test in Liversidge and which the respondents' counsel had relied on in support of the subjective test, could no longer be considered good law. Additionally, Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor (1978) decided by the Privy Council on appeal from Malaysia, was referred to by the Court in support of the objective test. The case concerned the exercise of discretionary power under the Malaysian Internal Security Act, which the ISA of Singapore is derived from. Although sections 8 and 10 of the ISA concern matters of national security, the Court held that this concern does not preclude the objective review of executive discretion. Following the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (1983), the Court of Appeal decided that it is up to the courts to determine whether a decision is in fact based on grounds of national security. Similarly, it should also be within the court's purview