reflection on the tanks. It was the armoured car regiments, who had been kept out of all these casualties, kept in the rear [at Alamein], fresh, full of enthusiasm, who broke through. And Monty should have kept some tanks out for that purpose, in my view". Kirkman believed that a single division, or even a brigade, may well have brought Erwin Rommel's retreat to a halt. "You didn't want a whole lot of troops. You wanted at most a division − I'd almost say a brigade − it was all that was required. The place was cluttered up with too many people trying to get through. All that was wanted was one division under a determined commander − that's essential − that's all you wanted. You didn't want a whole Corps de Chasse. It didn't need to be an armoured division either, merely mobile. Might have been Tuker [Commander 4th Indian Division], might have been Bernard Freyberg [Commander 2nd New Zealand Division], might have been John Harding [Commander 7th Armoured Division]". Kirkman recalled, in particular, one incident, when he found Major General Alexander Gatehouse, commanding the 10th Armoured Division, who found himself spearheading the Eighth Army's advance. "Now I thought: in the First World War an empty road always worried me − because you always worried who was in possession: sometimes they were your property or the Boches'. I was always cautious about empty roads. I didn't go motoring on, I remained with those tanks, and eventually I found out they were the leading tanks of Eighth Army." Kirkman continued as BRA Eighth Army until 19 February 1943 when, as part of a new policy to transfer experienced personnel from the Eighth Army to the 18th Army Group, commanded by General Sir Harold Alexander. He was not there long, however, as, upon Montgomery's recommendation he was promoted to the acting rank of major general on 14 April 1943, and appointed as General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, succeeding Major General John Nichols, who had lost Montgomery's confidence following the Mareth Line offensive. The division − understrength with only two infantry brigades (69th and 151st) instead of the usual three − was a first line TA formation with extensive experience and was then engaged in the final stages of the Tunisian Campaign, serving in the Eighth Army's X Corps, then commanded by Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks, who