discusses the case of a movie actor who fails to appear at a certain theater at a certain date and concludes that the theater owners cannot force the actor to recompense them for the publicity and expenses incurred in anticipation of his appearance. However, if the actor received an advance payment from the theater owners, he must return it. Rothbard proposes that a solution to these issues is to require a performance bond in the original agreement, which evolved as a voluntary penalty or penal bond during the Middle Ages and the early modern period. Then, Rothbard discusses the enforceability of gift-contracts. If title to alienable property has been transferred, the agreement is enforceable because a failure to deliver the transferred property is theft. But if it is a mere promise that has not transferred title to property, it may be morally binding but cannot be legally binding on the promissor. The chapter applies these theories to a pure gift agreement, and the author concludes that the grandson has no right to the grandfather's property unless the grandfather transferred title. The chapter also states that fraud would be legally actionable as it is a failure to fulfill a voluntarily agreed upon transfer of property and is implicit theft. Finally, Rothbard discusses voluntary forgiveness of debts, which is a legitimate way of dealing with the problem of defaulting debtors. He highlights that in a libertarian system that defends property rights, each creditor may forgive only his own debt and there can be no legal situation in which a majority of creditors compel a minority to forgive their claims. Forgiveness of debts may occur after the fact of default or be incorporated into the original debt contract, which takes on the legal-philosophical status of a gift by the creditor to the debtor. Rothbard also asserts that a person should be able to sell not only the full title of ownership to property but also part of that property, retaining the rest for himself or others. He also rules out entail as an enforceable right, stating that property rights must only be accorded to and can only be enjoyed by the living. Finally, he argues that the title-transfer theory immediately tosses out of court all variants of the "social contract" theory as a justification for the State. "Lifeboat" situations, and animal rights Chapter 20, "Lifeboat Situations", discusses the issue of "lifeboat" situations where