1 of the Theft Act 1968 does not require that there has been no gift, but merely that there has been an appropriation. Such an approach would be inconsistent with the cases of Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1972] A.C. 626 and R v. Gomez [1993] A.C. 442. The state of mind of the donor is irrelevant, as per Lord Browne-Wilkinson (with whom Lord Jauncey agreed) in R v. Gomez [1993] A.C. 442. It was said that the authorities maintain a strong distinction between the separate ingredients of dishonesty and appropriation. The defendant appealed to the House of Lords. Ruling The court ruled by a majority of 3–2 in favour of the respondent; namely, that the acquisition of an indefeasible title to property is capable of amounting to an appropriation of property belonging to another for the purposes of the Theft Act 1968. Lord Steyn gave the sole substantive judgment for the majority (with whom Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle agreed). Lord Hutton and Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough gave dissenting judgments. Lord Steyn Lord Steyn stated that the starting point must be the words of the Theft Act 1968, as interpreted by the House of Lords in previous decisions. He cited three House of Lords cases: Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1972] A.C. 626, which held that in a prosecution for theft it is unnecessary to prove that the taking was without the owner's consent. R v Morris [1984] A.C. 320, in which Lord Roskill's judgment conflicted with that of Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Commissioner. He stated that "the concept of appropriation in my view involves not an act expressly or impliedly authorised by the owner but an act by way of adverse interference with or usurpation of those rights." This disparity was resolved in the following case: R v Gomez [1993] A.C. 442, where the court held by a majority (Lord Lowry dissenting) that there can be an appropriation where that which is alleged to be stolen passes to the defendant with the consent of the owner, but that consent has been obtained by a false representation. The court added that such a passing of property need not involve an element of adverse interference with, or usurpation of, some right of the owner. Lord Roskill's comments in R v Morris (cited above) were disapproved. His Lordship noted that the case law interprets section 3(1) of