Handler Chayes, his wife and co-author, sought to understand what states, international organizations, officials, and other actors do when they implement, or try to implement, regulatory treaties. These collaborative efforts, taking place within a complex web of norms, rules, and practices, attempt to raise levels of party compliance to acceptable levels. Although treaties are sometimes equipped with sanctioning provisions, “teeth” to enforce treaty compliance, Chayes argued that these coercive economic sanctions reflect an easy but incorrect analogy to domestic legal systems, where the coercive power of the state is thought to play an influential role in enforcing national laws. He believed economic sanctions are costly, not only the state that is believed to be defying its treaty obligations, but also on the sanctioning state. Not only are the intended results of economic sanctioning slow and not conducive to altering state behavior, but the political investment required to mobilize and maintain an economic effort in a system without any recognized hierarchy of authority is dangerously high. Alternatively, Chayes noted that unilateral enforcement is not workable because an unduly burdensome obligation would fall on this “policing state,” most likely the United States. Before proposing an alternative framework that would replace the ineffective economic sanctioning model of compliance, Chayes discussed reasons for noncompliance. He stated that the principal source of noncompliance is not willful disobedience, but instead comes from the lack of clarity, capacity, and priority. First, in an effort to formulate rules that govern future conduct for a variety of players, treaties often result in ambiguous language that does not provide determinate answers to disputed questions of interpretation. Second, states have inherent limitations on the capacity to comply. For example, although a state might have enacted implementing legislation, it will still need to create an effective regulatory enforcement system to ensure the laws are being followed. Additionally, other limitations of scientific and technical judgments, bureaucratic capability, and fiscal resources come into play. Lastly, regulatory treaties often require significant changes in economic or social systems that, by its very nature, take time and can lead to a deceptive picture of state noncompliance. Chayes cites to examples including global efforts to protect human rights by international agreements. As against this enforcement model, Chayes proposed an alternative managerial model of compliance, relying on a problem-solving, cooperative approach instead of a coercive one. He suggests an array of activities to ensure compliance. First, Chayes highlighted the