involved continued to invest increasing sums of money for lesser returns. Every new issue of bank stocks further destabilized them, since more of the capital was invested in maintaining the adjustment regime instead of profitable loans. Also, as the market share of bank stocks grew, the adjustments became weaker, as every cent (agora, actually) invested by the banks became a smaller part of the total invested capital. The real return (i.e. over and above the Consumer Price Index) on investment in the banks' stocks diminished, from a 41% return in 1980, to 34% in 1981, to 28% in 1982. Other investment options, especially purchasing U.S. dollars became more appealing, and the banks had to transfer more and more funds from their offshore tax havens to keep maintaining the illusion of safety of investing in their stocks. Crisis In early 1983, share prices across all non-financial stocks on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange suffered from weakness. The banks invested heavily in all issues, hoping to maintain liquidity in the market. From January through March, some regulators, among them Finance Minister Aridor and Bank of Israel Governor Moshe Mendelbaum, approached the banks several times, trying to get them to gradually reduce their adjustments. Although some bank managers realized they could not continue this for long, they did not stop. Fearing a market collapse, Finance Ministry officials kept knowledge of this from the public. Failing to stop the banks, Finance Ministry officials wished to execute a large devaluation of the Shekel as an excuse to stop the adjustments. However, the 8% devaluation in August was far too small to accomplish the purpose. Additionally, the supplies in the stock market grew steadily, and reached new heights in September. The public unrelentingly sold bank stocks, and purchased U.S. dollars. Bank stocks remained under pressure. On October 2, the first trading day after the Sukkot holiday, the public sold more bank stocks than in the entire month of September. On October 4, the Minister of Finance appeared on television saying, "We will not let the public dictate our moves," to say the large supplies would not bring about a devaluation or change of policy. During those years the public's trust in the Finance Minister's promises was non-existent. Most of the public assumed the minister would lie at any time, and paid no attention to his statements. Most of all, Aridor's denial made it clear that at