not originally assigned to work the STS-51-L mission, which was scheduled to launch a mere ten days after the landing of STS-61-C. Due to staffing issues, he was pulled from STS-61-C and reassigned as ascent flight director for STS-51-L. As flight director, Greene was involved in discussion (although by his own recollection, "not a lot") about concerns with the cold weather and ice on the morning of the launch. These concerns had been worked primarily during the shift preceding his, and their conclusion had been that the freezing weather was not a reason to call off the launch as far as the orbiter was concerned. While he did have the authority to halt the countdown, he chose to report 'GO' to the KSC Launch Director. In the minutes following the loss of Challenger, Greene's responsibilities as flight director centered on ensuring that data from the accident was properly recorded and preserved, and that incident reports were written up. NASA adopted a policy of minimum engagement with the press in the immediate aftermath of the accident. On the following day, the New York Times noted that "neither Jay Greene, flight director for the ascent, nor any other person in the control room, was made available to the press by the space agency". He did, however, appear at a press conference later that day, where he answered questions about the accident. All the data received at Mission Control up to the time of Challenger'''s disintegration appeared normal, he reported, and he was not able to shed light on the accident's cause. Managerial positions After Challenger, Greene retired as a flight director. In October 1987, after a short period working with a study group on lunar exploration, he was appointed head of NASA's safety division. The division had been created after the Challenger accident at the recommendation of the Rogers Commission, which saw its establishment as key in creating a new, more vigorous "safety culture" at NASA. However, Greene feared that too much introspection by NASA engineers could lead to a damaging loss of confidence. In an interview a year later, he said that NASA had been on "a fantastic guilt trip," adding that "I believe NASA has been overly eager to defend itself against all critics. Any time you have an independent panel, you ought to be able to name a defense attorney for the status quo." In the following years he