it did not hold more than 50% of the investment. Following the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan undertook major changes in terms of its ODA. As the international community had started to recognize Japan as a developed country, it had to start bearing the accompanying responsibilities. After the US's withdrawal from the region, Japan had to replace America's presence with an expansion of aid and trade networks in the region. For that purpose Japan undertook to increase ODA in 1978, announcing a plan to double its ODA in three years in the First Medium-Term Target of ODA. In that spirit, Japan's ODA dramatically grew in magnitude from the late 1970s throughout the 1980s. In 1983 it became the third largest donor country among the DAC members and the second largest in 1986. Over 30% of the total Japanese ODA by 1980 was directed to Southeast Asia, with the main recipient being Indonesia, followed by Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia. In addition to this rapid expansion of the amount of ODA, Japan launched another major change. Due to the growing criticisms by industrial nations of the commercial orientation of Japanese aid and its vast foreign trade surplus, combined with US pressure to eliminate tied ODA loans, in 1978 Japan decided to start untying its aid. It issued a joint communiqué with the US, announcing these intentions. The move was going to make the Japanese development projects accessible to other companies, especially allowing US companies to compete for Japanese aid-funded contracts. The process of untying continued during the 1980s and 1990s with the levels of untied loans increasing from 65.2% in 1980 to 97.7 in 1995. In regards to the shaping of “special” relationship with ASEAN, Japan engaged with the organization in many ways, including negotiations to establish the Common Fund, the International Tin Agreement, rubber and sugar agreements. In the 1977 Second Japan-ASEAN Forum various agreements were reached - such as providing 1 billion to ASEAN industrial projects; further study of STABEX (export stabilization) by a joint committee of Japanese and ASEAN experts; reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers and improvement of the generalized preference system for ASEAN products within the framework of the Tokyo Round; establishment of cultural exchange programs. And although all of these agreements were implemented in the following years (except STABEX), economic cooperation between Japan and ASEAN did not progress significantly, leading to ASEAN's dissatisfaction. Even after Japan's reduction of