Victorian Horse Artillery the following year, commanding the Rupertswood Battery. He received his majority in 1891 and then served in the field artillery from 1897 until undertaking a staff role in Melbourne after. In 1901, he was achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel, and assumed command of the 11th Light Horse Regiment in 1903. He was promoted to colonel in 1906, and placed in command of the 4th Light Horse Brigade. In 1909, Hughes took up an appointment the Governor-General's aide de camp. In 1912, the 4th Light Horse Brigade was re-designated as the 7th Light Horse Brigade. First World War Following the outbreak of the First World War, Hughes volunteered for overseas service and was appointed Australian Imperial Force as a colonel on 17 October 1914. At this time, he assumed command of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade; he was assigned Lieutenant Colonel John Antill, a regular officer, as his brigade major. Hughes came to depend heavily upon Antill, although the latter was described as "well respected, if prickly". Hughes' brigade departed for Egypt in February and March 1915 where it continued training. In May, the light horse formations were dispatched to Gallipoli as reinforcements, serving in a dismounted role. The brigade arrived at Anzac Cove on 20 May 1915, and was assigned as corps troops to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. There were concerns about Hughes' age, and the corps commander, Lieutenant General William Birdwood, had "grave doubts about Hughes' capacity". Initially, Hughes held the rank of full colonel, but in July was promoted to brigadier general as all Australian brigade commanders were regraded to achieve parity with the British Army. Hughes' brigade undertook defensive duties initially, holding an area around Walker's Ridge and Russell's Top. In an effort to break the deadlock they were committed to the August Offensive. Major General Alexander Godley, in command of the offensive, ordered Hughes to launch a dawn attack the Turkish positions at the Nek on 7 August 1915 with a bayonet charge as a diversion to support the attack on Chunuk Bair. From the outset the effort went awry. Efforts to destroy machine guns enfilading the attack failed, and the supporting artillery barrage stopped seven minutes early due to a failure to synchronise watches, which allowed the defenders were able to reoccupy their firing positions before the attack. In the desperate battle that followed, four waves of light