Millers' property. The defendants appealed against the injunction, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed for an increase in the award of damages. Michael Kempster QC and James N. Harper appeared as counsel for the club; James Chadwin QC and Frederick Such as counsel for the Millers at a two-day hearing on 31 March and 1 April 1977. Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal delivered its judgment on 6 April 1977. Geoffrey Lane and Cumming-Bruce LJJ held that there was a foreseeable risk of injury to the plaintiffs and their property from the cricket balls and the club could not prevent accidents from happening. The club was guilty of negligence "on each occasion when a ball comes over the fence and causes damage to the plaintiffs". The repeated interference with their property was also held to be an actionable nuisance. Following Sturges v. Bridgman, the fact that the Millers had "come to the nuisance" was no defence. On that basis, the Millers were awarded damages. Lord Denning MR dissented from the finding of negligence and nuisance, holding that "the public interest should prevail over the private interest". However, on the basis that the club had agreed to pay for any damage, Lord Denning was "content that there should be an award of £400 to cover any past or future damage". Geoffrey Lane LJ would have upheld the injunction. However, Lord Denning MR and Cumming-Bruce LJ held that damages were a sufficient remedy, holding that the discretionary equitable remedy of an injunction was not necessary. In the words of Cumming-Bruce LJ, the court had to "strike a fair balance between the right of the plaintiffs to have quiet enjoyment of their house and garden without exposure to cricket balls occasionally falling like thunderbolts from the heavens, and the opportunity of the inhabitants of the village in which they live to continue to enjoy the manly sport which constitutes a summer recreation for adults and young persons". The Millers had bought a house with the benefit of an open space adjacent to their land, and had to accept that the innocent and lawful use of the open land could restrict the enjoyment of their garden. It is notable that the court did not hold that holding cricket matches on the ground was negligent, per se; rather, there were separate negligent acts each time a ball left the ground. Not long after the case, the