October 1943, the last Japanese naval victory of the war (on Shigure) Battle of Empress Augusta Bay, 1–2 November 1943, a heavy Japanese defeat (on Shigure) Operation Ten-Go, 7 April 1945, a crushing Japanese defeat (on Yahagi) List of Victories: , US submarine damaged by Hara's destroyer Amatsukaze on 1 March 1942, and which was later sunk by other Japanese destroyers on 3 March 1942, Java Sea. , US destroyer sunk by Amatsukaze in torpedo attack during the Battle of Guadalcanal, 12 November 1942. , US light cruiser damaged by a torpedo from Amatsukaze, and sunk the next day by submarine I-26 as Juneau limped back to base. Battle of Guadalcanal, 13 November 1942. , US destroyer severely damaged and put out of action for six months by torpedoes fired by destroyers Shigure and Samidare under Hara's command. Battle of Vella LaVella, 6–7 October 1943. Approximately ten US, British, and Australian aircraft were shot down by the destroyer Shigure and light cruiser Yahagi while under Hara's command, though not all of these claims are verified by Allied sources. Later life and memoirs Postwar Hara commanded merchant ships which transported salt. Hara was the only IJN destroyer captain at the start of World War II who survived the war. This left him the sole surviving witness to several important meetings and conferences which he recounted in his memoirs. Hara's memoirs were translated into English and French and became an important reference for the Japanese perspective for historians writing about the Pacific Campaign of World War II. In his memoir, Hara objects to compulsory suicide as official doctrine, which he saw as a violation of bushido values. His personal doctrines demonstrate why he survived the war and the Japanese lost it —- they were inflexible, and he was not. His doctrines were "Never ever do the same thing twice" and "If he hits you high, then hit him low; if he hits you low, then hit him high," the latter was also a maxim of Douglas MacArthur's. Hara criticizes his superiors for using cavalry tactics to fight naval battles; never understanding the implications of air power; dividing their forces in the face of enemy forces of unknown strength; basing tactics on what they thought their enemy would do; failing to appreciate the speed with which the enemy could develop new weapons and accepting a war of attrition with a foe more capable