the protection of the environment, in the guise of health protection, was a valid criminal law purpose, however, he disagreed that the Act was for the purpose of protecting the environment. Lamer stated that the purpose of the Act was to regulate environmental pollution. He points to several provisions that suggest the Act is regulatory in nature. Sections 34 and 35, he notes, attempts to regulate environment and do not establish any prohibition that characterizes criminal law. The Act allows the Minister of the Environment discretion to prohibit certain substances from time to time, which Lamer finds to be a very odd way of enacting criminal law. As well, the provinces can be exempt from the Act if they have regulated their own similar law, even though provinces cannot enact criminal law. Lamer then considered whether the law would fall under "national dimension" of the federal peace, order and good government power. To apply the law must concern a "new" subject "must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern and a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the Constitution" Lamer held that the definition of "toxic substances" was too broad to meet this test. It included not just substances that would cross boundaries, but also those that would not. Consequently, the matter could be regulated by the province and would fail the "provincial inability test" from R. v. Crown Zellerbach. See also List of Supreme Court of Canada cases (Lamer Court) External links Canadian constitutional case law Supreme Court of Canada cases 1997 in Canadian case law 1997 in the environment Canadian environmental case law Hydro-Québec Canadian federalism case law Canadian federal government litigation Water pollution in Canada Canadian criminal procedure case law Quebec case law