failed the Oakes test for a justified limitation of the Charter under section one of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically, although the objective justified the limitation (avoiding convicting a person who was insane at the time of the offence but refuses to raise the issue, and protecting the public from mentally ill people who require treatment), and there was a rational connection between the objective and the means to carry out that objective, the means was not minimally intrusive of the Charter right being violated. As a result, the majority created a new common law rule that was minimally intrusive. The new rule only allows two instances of when the Crown can lead evidence of insanity. The first instance is when the trier of fact has concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is otherwise guilty of the charges before the court (as it will no longer interfere with the accused's other defences). The second instance is if the accused's own defence has put his or her mental capacity for criminal intent at issue. The majority also concluded that the new common law rule would not infringe section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the equality section). This was because the new rule would not treat the mentally ill unequal in the courts, and would not create new burdens on the mentally ill. In her concurring judgment, Wilson J. reached a similar reasoning with the majority, and agreed with the new common law rule. In his concurring judgment, Gonthier J. agreed with the majority's conclusions and the new rule, but disagreed with some of the alternatives considered by the majority. In her dissenting judgement, L'Heureux-Dubé J. found that the old common law rule did not infringe sections 7 or 15 of the Charter, and in fact was reflective of the principles of fundamental justice. Federalism In Canadian law, the federal and provincial governments have exclusive authority to legislate in certain areas (see Canadian federalism). Since the Criminal Code is a federal statute, an issue was whether the provision requiring the automatic detention by a person found not guilty by reason of insanity - until released by the Lieutenant Governor - was outside the federal government's authority to legislate, or whether it fell within provincial jurisdiction over health matters. The majority found that the pith and substance of the provision was "to protect society