'straw charter' in order to justify transfer of Czech sterling funds to Sweden." According to both the UK and the US Embassy in London, Dean did not hold control over the charter, but rather an "agent for Czekofracht, the state transport monopoly". Another deception was the falsification of the ship's bill of lading which declared that the cargo was composed entirely of items such as shovels, nails, machine tools, laboratory glass, etc., rather than the estimated 2,000 tons of weaponry and munitions that were its principal components. Alfhem delivered 2,000 tons of arms and ammunition, more than all Central America had received in the previous 30 years. According to the 1954 Time magazine account, the weapons allegedly worth $10 million, were thought to be from Czechoslovakia's famous Škoda munitions works and were believed to be primarily rifles, automatic arms, mortars and light artillery. Described in the ship's manifest as "steel rods, optical glass and laboratory supplies", the weapons were packed in 15,000 cases. Under the supervision of the country's Defense Minister, the weapons were unloaded from Alfhem and loaded onto freight cars on the-US controlled International Railways of Central America (IRCA) for shipment to the capital away. Protected by armed guards, the weapons made their way to their destination. Rebel and US reaction Anti-government rebels tried to stop the arms shipment by dynamiting a railway trestle just as the munitions train crossed. However, a downpour of rain drenched the fuses and the dynamite did not detonate as planned. A gun battle followed in which one government soldier and one rebel were killed. The CIA's chief of clandestine operations, Frank Wisner, was annoyed that the U.S. Navy failed to intercept Alfhem – that is, "until he realized that the shipment of... weaponry was just the excuse the United States needed to intervene." The US Joint Chiefs of Staff held an emergency session to discuss whether or not to deploy US troops to Honduras to assist if the country were attacked by Guatemala. The 21 May 1954 minutes from the Pentagon meeting illustrate how the then US Army chief of staff, Gen. Matthew Ridgway opposed this plan and recommended instead that Nicaraguan Gen. Anastasio Somoza García's national guard be sent to Guatemala. One state department official objected, noting that Somoza had told US diplomats that his own armed forces were simply an internal police force and therefore "incompetent." to carry out an