peaceful solution to world problems and avoiding conflict with the Soviet Union." However, historian William Taubman suggests that Khrushchev merely felt he could "push Kennedy around." In addition to conveying U.S. reluctance to defend the full rights of Berlin's citizens, Kennedy ignored his own cabinet officials' advice to avoid ideological debate with Khrushchev. Khrushchev outmatched Kennedy in this debate and came away believing he had triumphed in the summit over a weak and inexperienced leader. Observing Kennedy's morose expression at the end of the summit, Khrushchev believed Kennedy "looked not only anxious, but deeply upset.... I hadn't meant to upset him. I would have liked very much for us to part in a different mood. But there was nothing I could do to help him.... Politics is a merciless business." After the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, then Kennedy believed that another failure on the part of the United States to gain control and stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S. credibility with its allies and his own reputation. He was thus determined to "draw a line in the sand" and prevent a communist victory in the Vietnam War. He told Reston, "Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place." See also List of Soviet Union–United States summits (1943 to 1991) References External links Vienna Summit at Historycentral.com at U.S. Department of State "The Kennedy-Johnson, Scott W, Khrushchev Conference for Dummies: Remedial history for Barack Obama", Weekly Standard – 28 May 2008 @ 12:00:00 AM 1961 conferences 1961 in Austria 1961 in international relations 1961 in military history 1961 in politics 1961 in the Soviet Union 1961 in the United States Summit Diplomatic conferences in Austria June 1961 events in Europe Soviet Union–United States diplomatic conferences