against dangerous individuals". A preventative law such as this was considered to be a valid part of criminal law, which the exclusive authority of the federal government. The majority felt it was important to note that the legislative provisions dealt with supervision of the person, not treatment of the person, and the focus was on what was in the interests of the public. In their concurring judgments, Wilson and Gonthier JJ. agreed with the majority's decision. Although dissenting in other areas, L'Heureux-Dubé J. agreed with the majority on this point. Constitutionality of automatic detention The majority found that the legislative provisions gave no discretion to the trial judge. Instead, the provisions required the judge to order the person's detention without any hearing on the issue of the person's mental state. Subsequent hearings cannot change that fact. Since the detention is automatic with no standards or criteria that can be applied, the majority found that the law was arbitrarily detaining individuals, and violated section nine of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The majority went on to find that the legislation failed the Oakes test for a justified limitation of the Charter under section one of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically, although all the parties agreed that the objective was substantial (detaining individuals who may be dangerous due to their mental health), and that there is a rational connection between the objective and the means, it was not minimally intrusive. The majority noted that there was no minimum time before the Lieutenant Governor was required to make their decision known. In fact, the legislation does not require the Lieutenant Governor to ever make an order. The majority felt that minimally intrusiveness required that a person be held no longer than necessary to determine their mental state. In her concurring judgment, Wilson J. agreed with the majority's conclusion, but disagreed with a comment made by the majority that there is a presumption that discretion conferred by statute would be exercised in a manner that is in compliance with the Charter. In his concurring judgment, Gonthier J. agreed with the majority. In her dissenting decision, L'Heureux-Dubé J. found that the legislative scheme was constitutional. Disposition As a result of the majority's findings, Swain's finding of not guilty by reason of insanity was overturned. While normally a new trial should be ordered, the specific circumstances in this case did not