no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor them." On September 14, 2001, Congress passed legislation titled Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, authorizing military force against al-Qaeda and its supporters. President Bush addressed Congress on September 20 and demanded the Taliban deliver bin Laden and al-Qaeda or face war. On the same day, a grand council of 300 or 700 Muslim clerics across Afghanistan, who had convened to decide bin Laden's fate, issued a fatwa recommending that the Islamic Emirate ask bin Laden to leave their country. The fatwa went on to warn that should the United States invade Afghanistan, jihad would become obligatory until the invaders were expelled. On September 21, Mullah Omar rejected both Bush's demands and the advice of the council, again denying that bin Laden was responsible for 9/11. Simultaneously, Mullah Omar authorized his deputy Akhtar Mohammad Osmani to negotiate with Robert Grenier, the CIA's chief of station in Pakistan, to discuss giving up bin Laden. The two met in Quetta on September 15 and October 2 but failed to reach an agreement. On October 4 the British government released a document summarizing the evidence linking bin Laden to the attacks. That same day, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in its history; Article V states that an attack on one member of the alliance is to be considered an attack on all members. On October 7, as the US aerial bombing campaign began, President Bush stated, "Full warning has been given, and time is running out." Planning In 2001, the Defense Department did not have a pre-existing plan for an invasion of Afghanistan. Therefore, the plan approved by Bush was devised by the CIA, reusing elements of the agency's previous contingency plans for collaboration with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Bush met with his cabinet at Camp David on September 15 for a war planning session. The military presented three options for military action in Afghanistan: The first was a cruise missile strike, the second was a combined cruise missile and bombing campaign lasting 3–10 days, and the third called for cruise missile and bomber strikes as well as ground forces operating inside Afghanistan. The CIA also presented its war plan, which involved inserting paramilitary teams to work with the Northern Alliance and, eventually, American