any obstacles by Schneider, the CIA hired retired General Robert Viaux, active General Camilo Valenzuela, and Admiral Hugo Tirado to kidnap René Schneider. This kidnapping was part of a longer plan by the CIA which includes: Kidnapping General René Schneider Secretly flying Schneider to Argentina Replacing Schneider with a coup supporter Military would declare that kidnapping was the doing of Allende supporters Declare martial law Sweep through majority-lower-class areas where Allende’s supporters resided, wiping out opposition Declaring elections null Attached to this plan was a request for $50,000 to pay the three individuals who were going to kidnap Schneider. It is worth noting that there was no plan by the CIA to conduct a subsequent democratic election after this plan took place. On October 22, the group of CIA-hired individuals attempted to kidnap the general, but instead ended up shooting him. He was taken to the military hospital in Santiago where he succumbed to his wounds three days later. Chilean reaction The Chilean people were shocked by the attempted kidnapping and subsequent killing of General Schneider. This was used as a motivating force for the Chilean public to overwhelmingly support Chilean constitutionalism, and thus support the election of Allende on 3 November 1970. Continued US operations In the face of overwhelming discontent from Chileans for the assassination of Shneider, the three hired to go through with the coup backed out. Two of three of these individuals were arrested in conspiracy, and the other, Hugo Tirado, was paid $35,000. After the failure of Project FUBELT to create a coup before the election of Allende, the US State Department suggested that the US should accept Allende’s election and work toward his defeat in the 1976 election. Nixon’s national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, instead encouraged a more forceful reaction by the US. Kissinger justifies this by claiming that Allende will try to swindle the US, saying that Allende wants to “...Be internationally respectable, move cautiously and pragmatically, avoid immediate confrontation with [the US], move slowly in formalizing relations with Cuba and other socialist countries...”. Kissinger is also quoted telling Nixon, “The election of Allende poses one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere, and your decision as to what to do may be the most historic and difficult foreign policy decision you will have to make this year”. Covert Operation Program for Chile In response to Kissinger’s forceful approach to