be restored. Depreciated currencies, reparations, war debts, were the great shadows of the inter-war period – all imaginary things, divorced from the realities of mine and factory. Taylor also claimed that Mantoux's book refuted Keynes' thesis. Albrecht-Carrié in 1965 argued that Keynes was overall prescient in his long-term analysis of the impact of the Treaty. The historian Ruth Henig wrote in 1995 that "most historians of the Paris peace conference now take the view that, in economic terms, the treaty was not unduly harsh on Germany and that, while obligations and damages were inevitably much stressed in the debates at Paris to satisfy electors reading the daily newspapers, the intention was quietly to give Germany substantial help towards paying her bills, and to meet many of the German objections by amendments to the way the reparations schedule was in practice carried out". Sally Marks claimed in 2013 that for "nearly forty years, historians of twentieth-century diplomacy have argued that the Versailles treaty was more reasonable than its reputation suggests and that it did not of itself cause the Depression, the rise of Hitler, or World War II". Marks also claimed that Keynes' book was a "brilliant but warped polemic" that is "long discredited by scholars" and which Keynes regretted writing. Some scholars have portrayed the Treaty as less harsh than it was seen to be in the immediate aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference. Gideon Rose, for instance, sees it as "more balanced" than it seemed at the time, and "a mixture of discordant elements that was neither Carthaginian nor Metternichian", while Max Hastings calls the peace treaty "clumsy" but writes that "[I]f the Germans had instead been dictating the terms as victors, European freedom, justice and democracy would have paid a dreadful forfeit.". David Stevenson argues that neither the Armistice nor the Peace Treaty made World War II inevitable – as claimed by many scholars – and that "the peacemakers have had an undeservedly bad press. ... [T]hey were feeling their way in unprecedented circumstances, but the settlement that was constructed was more flexible than its critics acknowledged, and could either have accommodated a lasting reconciliation with the new Republican regime in Germany or ensured that it remained militarily harmless. The real tragedy of the inter-war years is that it did neither... The Treaty could have stopped another bloodbath if it had been upheld." This, of course, is antithetical