The Demountable Rack Offload and Pickup System (DROPS) is a family of logistics vehicles operated by the British Army, which consists of two vehicle types: Leyland DAF medium mobility load carrier (MMLC) Foden improved medium mobility load carrier (IMMLC) Both are able to transport 15-tonne flatracks or containers configured to ISO 20 feet standard and to load and offload them autonomously. Both may be supported with side rail transfer equipment (SRTE) for loading and unloading railway wagons. The DROP system was designed to meet the very high intensity battles in Central Europe in the last decade of the Cold War. However it entered service after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact but nevertheless proved a versatile vehicle system on operations completely different from those originally envisaged. Operational requirement The DROP system developed from the revaluation of readiness and firepower requirements of British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) in the mid-1970s. This was driven by three principal developments in the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, Group Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). These were: The capability for rapid mobilisation and deployment brought about by increased mechanisation and enhanced communications in the Soviet Army. This was linked to a doctrine of much more rapid and decisive attack designed to dislocate NATO defences by highly concentrated and massive penetration. The development of improved tank designs such as the T-72 (and later the T-80) that were to all intents and purposes impervious to 105mm artillery fire but could be affected by 155mm calibre. To counter these developments a decision was made to make all divisional artillery 155mm and phase out the 105mm Abbot. The Corps Barrier Plan, a major structure of obstacles, including a huge minefield made up of anti-tank bar mines and Ranger anti-personnel mines was also strengthened to blunt such tactics. Finally two parallel studies: the Battle Attrition Study (BAS) and Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales (RARS) worked through the implications to the British Army of the predicted new style of Soviet aggression. The BAS confirmed that 1 (BR) Corps could resist and contain a Soviet attack of the type predicted but that over eight days of high-intensity warfare would suffer massive casualties. However it was imperative for a follow-on capability to exist and there should be sufficient manpower, materiel and ammunition for 1 (BR) Corps to fight on at 40% of mobilisation strength for a further two days. This became known