conclude the existence of anything external, therefore nothing external exists, only the appearance of it. One reason for the lack of support of this philosophical position is how strange it would be for a solipsist to preach solipsism – as if to convince everyone around them that they are purely a figment of the author's own imagination. The very idea of communicating philosophical ideas would be arbitrary to a true solipsist, as according to them, there is no other mind with whom they would communicate their beliefs. Russell commented, on the same theme: "As against solipsism, it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician, this surprised me. The fact that I cannot believe something does not prove that it is false, but it does prove that I am insincere and frivolous if I pretend to believe it." (Russell, p. 180).This criticism commits the fallacy of argumentum ad lapidem by suggesting that solipsism, being absurd, should be dismissed. It does not take into account the possibility that the concept of self is a product of the imagination, which could explain the desire to advocate for solipsism. See also Actual idealism Brain in a vat Cartesian skepticism Epistemological solipsism Methodological solipsism References Angeles, Peter A. (1992), Harper Collins Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition, Harper Perennial, New York, NY. Runes, Dagobert D. (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy, Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ, 1962. Russell, B., Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948. Wood, Ledger (1962), "Solipsism", p. 295 in Runes (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ. Metaphysical theories Self Idealism Theory of mind Metaphysics of mind