direction, and frankly, if I were in the chair of most people around this room, I would dissent." Even if unemployment were "unacceptably high," he suggested that he would vote against the program continuing if inflation inched up a bit: "if inflation were to move up and were to be broadly consistent with the implicit inflation target [2%] in different people's minds around this room, even if unemployment were unacceptably high, I think that would be time to stop this program. If inflation expectations were to move out of the range that they have been in for a long time, that would be a reason to end this program, even if unemployment were exceptionally high and GDP were well below what we think the economy is ultimately capable of." The Federal Reserve has a legal dual mandate to pursue maximum employment as well as to ensure price stability. He elaborated on his opposition to the program: "I think we are removing much of the burden from those that could actually help reach these objectives, particular the growth and employment objectives, and we are putting that onus strangely on ourselves rather than letting it rest where it should lie. We are too accepting of dangerous policies from others that have been long in the making, and we should put the burden on them." While Federal Reserve officials routinely offer their views on non-monetary questions such as taxes, spending and regulations, it is unusual for a Federal Reserve official to suggest that monetary support should be withheld in order to compel other branches of government to enact the Federal Reserve's favored policies. Warsh worried about the efficacy of continuing extraordinary monetary policy accommodation. Bernanke would write of Warsh's views in the debate over QE2, "Kevin Warsh had substantial reservations. He was one of my closest advisers and confidants, and his help, especially during the height of the crisis in the fall of 2008, had been invaluable. He had supported the first round of securities purchases, begun in the midst of the crisis. Now that financial markets were functioning more normally, he believed that monetary policy was reaching its limits, that additional purchases could pose risks to inflation and financial stability, and that it was time for others in Washington to take on some of the policy burden. . . . As he had promised, Kevin voted in favor but, the following week