(8th Regiment). Throughout April Task Force 8 conducted raid and sweeping operations near PAVN/VC bases, but the ARVN were disappointed again as the PAVN/VC melted away without putting up significant resistance. On 25 May the PAVN 5th and 7th Divisions began encircling Task Force 8 positions. For the next five days the PAVN assaulted the besieged Task Force 8, but they could not destroy the main formation because of diversionary attacks conducted by the ARVN on the night of 29 May, which led PAVN commanders to believe that Task Force 8 would attack them from the north. The PAVN subsequently deployed their anti-aircraft units to the north, and left their units in the south of Snuol exposed to the firepower of the U.S 17th Air Cavalry. Massed formations from the regular PAVN divisions placed immense pressure on the ARVN's movements, and without any air support or rescue, Task Force 8 was on the brink of collapse. At that point, General Nguyễn Văn Hiếu decided to execute his withdrawal plan which occurred over three stages. Despite the encirclement, the ARVN were able to fight their way out under extreme duress and made it home. Aftermath When the battle had ended ARVN casualties included 37 killed, 167 wounded and 74 missing, 1,043 PAVN/VC were claimed to have been killed throughout the battle. The PAVN claim to have eliminated 14,000 ARVN and 6,000 Khmer National Army troops, destroyed over 1,500 vehicles (including 369 tanks and armored vehicles) and 169 artillery pieces and shot down 200 aircraft and captured 700 prisoners, 1,800 weapons, 34 vehicles and other ammunition and supplies during the operation. On 2 June 1971, North Vietnamese propaganda claimed that "over three hours' fierce engagement with Saigon troops on May 30, wiped out the 8th Infantry Multi-Battalion Unit, the 1st Armoured Regiment, and a mixed artillery battalion, killing or wounding 1,500 troops and capturing 300 others, and inflicting other losses on the enemy". The battle rendered the ARVN 5th Division combat ineffective in the estimation of its American advisers. According to II Field Force, Vietnam commander Michael S. Davison, the 5th Division troops were close to mutiny. When Toan Thang 01/71 ended early in June, Maj. Gen. Jack J. Wagstaff, Davison’s replacement as senior US adviser to III Corps, declared that it had failed to attain two of its objectives, stopping enemy supply movement across Highway 7 and cleaning out the caches