the French committed two brigades (6000 men) to this charge. Battle First attack The Prussians, coming under heavy French artillery fire, withdrew all bar 13 companies of infantry (1,200 men) from the village and awaited the assault. Opening fire at 200 paces, the French assaults were halted at the edge of the village, its roads now protected by barricades. The most successful attack was made by the 3rd Zouave Regiment which left 700 dead and wounded men on the field before breaking. Every one of General Crouzat's staff officers were killed or wounded whilst encouraging the attack. Second attack A second attack was sent at 1.30pm with the Prussians running low on ammunition. The defenders held their fire until the French were almost upon them, unleashing a volley which was followed by half an hour of frenzied close combat before the French were repulsed once more. The remaining Prussian forces, including all of the artillery which had pulled back from the village, were reformed at nearby Romainville where they joined with reinforcements from Alvenleben's unit under Wolf Louis Anton Ferdinand von Stülpnagel and attacked the French on the eastern side of the village, finally driving the attackers off. Third attack Crouzat, determined to take the village, ordered one more attack after dark. This attack was delivered straight along the road into the village and came close to breaching the outer defences but was again driven back by the concentrated volleys of Prussian fire. The French had lost heart for the battle and the majority of the men refused their officers' orders to close with the enemy, discharged their rifles at the enemy and ran away. Aftermath Analysis Military analysts were shocked at the news of the defeat of 60,000 men by 9,000 and many attempts were made to explain why it could have happened. The low morale of the French forces is often cited; the majority were recent conscripts of the Garde Mobile and had seen a string of defeats, German occupation of their land and the siege of the capital. Aurelle was known to be a harsh commander who, for the twenty days preceding the battle, did not permit his troops to be billeted in towns or villages, instead forcing them to bivouac and live off the land. This was intended to improve discipline and harden up the troops but simply reduced their morale. It is cited as one