cognitive criterion (pramāṇa) is reflected by Akalaṅka, who points to the following paradox such a materialist would have to face: ‘As a result of the absence of cognitive criteria (pramāṇa) [the materialist] cannot ascertain that perception, and nothing else, is the only one [cognitive criterion], or [ascertain] the essence of cognoscible objects. Since, when other cognitive criteria are negated, a [proper] definition of perception becomes inexplicable, what [cognoscible objects] by what [cognitive criteria] could be established or negated, on account of which [one could maintain that] the world is composed of the four elements?’ (SVi 4.12, p. 272.3–5). Of significance is that Vidyānanda puts Jayarāśi on par with the Buddhist doctrine of Emptiness (śūnya-vāda), as represented by Nāgārjuna, and with Vedāntic idealists (brahma-vāda), as three kinds of self-refuting theories (TŚVA 80.22–81.14; 195.14–16). This might theoretically be taken as evidence that all three represented scepticism. However, since there is no hint that Vedāntic idealists were sceptics at all at that time, and we have strong evidence that Jayarāśi was not a sceptic, what Mills (2018) takes to be the three pillars of skepticism in classical India, namely Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi and Śriharṣa, represented here by a forerunner, cannot be classified as sceptics, despite their commonalities, as noticed by Vidyānanda. Jayarāśi can be therefore taken as a genuine representative of an offshoot of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata tradition, primarily because he himself thought he was a follower of Bṛhaspati’s materialist tradition, and probably because he had originally been trained in the materialist system. It also seems very likely that the representatives of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata system occasionally had sceptical inclinations prior to Jayarāśi, which helped him to abandon typically materialist claims and undertake his sceptical project. However, neither he nor his work can be taken as typical representatives of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata school or a first-hand source of information about that tradition. Despite this, the work remains the only authentic, albeit not ‘orthodox’ treatise of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata tradition that has come down to us. Notes Bibliography Balcerowicz, Piotr, "Jayarāśi", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011). Narayan Campawat, "Jayarasi Bhatta", in Great Thinkers of the Eastern World, Ian McGready, ed., New York: Harper Collins, 1995, pp. 202–206. review: Karel Werner, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (1995) Saṁghavī, Sukhlāljī; Pārīkh, Rasiklāl C. (eds.): Tattvopaplavasimha of Shri Jayarasi Bhatta. Edited with an introduction and indices.