The Ault Report, or more formally the Air-to-Air Missile System Capability Review, was a sweeping study of US Navy air-to-air missile performance during the period of 1965 to 1968, conducted by Navy Captain Frank Ault. The study was initiated at the behest of Admiral Tom Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), who had taken office in August 1967. He was disturbed by the dismal performance of Navy air-to-air missiles in engagements with North Vietnamese fighter jets. Admiral Moorer tasked the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) to conduct "an in-depth examination of the entire process by which Air-to-Air missile systems are acquired and employed" and further directed that Ault be placed in charge of the effort. Background Following the Korean War the United States military adopted the view that airborne radar and air-to-air missiles made guns and dogfighting obsolete. The radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow would destroy enemy aircraft beyond visual range, while the radar-guided/infrared AIM-4 Falcon (United States Air Force (USAF) only) and infrared AIM-9 Sidewinder would destroy enemy aircraft at close range. Guns were eliminated on new aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom II and the Navy disestablished its last Fleet Air Gunnery Unit in 1960. During Operation Rolling Thunder, the performance of air-to-air missiles was found to be disappointing with kill rates of 9.2% for the AIM-4, 9.2% for the AIM-7 and 18% for the AIM-9. Meanwhile the Vietnam People's Air Force's agile MiG-17, MiG-19 and Mig-21s successfully outmanoeuvred air-to-air missiles and used hit and run tactics and/or greater manoeuvrability to shoot down the heavier and less agile F-4s and USAF F-105s with guns and infrared AA-2 missiles. Ault Report study scope Ault directed a team of five experts who addressed five basic questions to be addressed by the study: Is industry delivering to the Navy a high quality product, designed and built to specifications? Are Fleet support organizations delivering a high quality product to the CVA’s (aircraft carriers) and to forward sites ashore? Do shipboard and squadron organizations (afloat and ashore) launch an optimally ready combat aircraft-missile system? Does the combat aircrew fully understand and exploit the capabilities of the aircraft-missile system? (Corollary question: Is the aircraft-missile system properly designed and configured for the air-to-air mission?) Is the air-to-air missile system (aircraft/fire control system/missile) repair and rework program returning a quality product to the Fleet? Creation of the Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) Among the many findings of the