the first year of the war. Instead, the division was dispersed around London to protect strategically important locations, known as vulnerable points, including the London Docks. C. Northcote Parkinson, author of the Royal Fusiliers history of the Second World War, wrote that the 11th Battalion fired "some of the first shots of the war", a "hair-triggered" reaction to intruders near the Waltham Abbey explosives factory, which it was assigned to guard. At the end of the year, the division moved to Hertfordshire to conduct training exercises. In May 1940, the majority of the division's men were relocated to Cambridgeshire, leaving two battalions to defend London. In Cambridgeshire, the division was made Eastern Command's reserve formation, which was to be used as a counterattack force against any German airborne landings. Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, General Walter Kirke, believing the East of England was under threat of invasion as a result of the German operations in mainland Europe, transferred several divisions to defend the coast. Part of this effort involved temporarily splitting the division into two brigade groups. One moved to the Suffolk coastline, to supplement the 55th (West Lancashire) Motor Division on the east coast. The other remained in Cambridgeshire, with troops assigned to varying duties that included the protection of vulnerable points, construction of defensive positions, and defending Royal Air Force (RAF) airfields. On paper, an infantry division was to have seventy-two 25-pounder field guns. On 31 May, the division had eight-such modern guns, four First World War-vintage 18-pounder field guns, and eight howitzers of similar vintage. The division lacked the motor vehicles it needed to fulfil its motor division role and had to rely heavily on commandeered civilian transport. As a result of the German victory in the Battle of France and the return of the BEF following the Dunkirk evacuation, the division was not deployed overseas per the original TA deployment timeline. As soon as the Battle of France ended, the British Army began implementing lessons learnt from the campaign; this included basing the standard division around three brigades and the abandonment of the motor-division concept. This process involved the break-up of four second-line territorial divisions to reinforce depleted formations and helping change the Army's five motor divisions – each of which consisted of two brigades – into infantry divisions made up of three brigades. As part of this process, the 12th (Eastern) Infantry Division was disbanded and