people to recognize the right of others to act autonomously and means that, as moral laws must be universalizable, what is required of one person is required of all. Kingdom of Ends Another formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative is the Kingdom of Ends: This formulation requires that actions be considered as if their maxim is to provide a law for a hypothetical Kingdom of Ends. Accordingly, people have an obligation to act upon principles that a community of rational agents would accept as laws. In such a community, each individual would only accept maxims that can govern every member of the community without treating any member merely as a means to an end. Although the Kingdom of Ends is an ideal—the actions of other people and events of nature ensure that actions with good intentions sometimes result in harm—we are still required to act categorically, as legislators of this ideal kingdom. The Metaphysics of Morals As Kant explains in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (and as its title directly indicates), that short 1785 text is "nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality." Kant further states, just because moral laws are to hold for every rational being as such, to derive them from the universal concept of a rational being as such, and in this way to set forth completely the whole of morals, [a metaphysics of morals] needs anthropology for its application to human beings.Gregor, Mary J. (1996) "Introduction." In Practical Philosophy. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, p. 361. His promised Metaphysics of Morals, however, was much delayed and did not appear until its two parts, The Doctrine of Right and The Doctrine of Virtue, were published separately in 1797 and 1798. In the twelve years between the Groundwork and The Doctrine of Right, Kant decided that the metaphysics of morals and its application should, after all, be integrated (though still as distinct from practical anthropology). The distinction between its groundwork (or foundation) and the metaphysics of morals itself, however, continues to apply. Moreover, the account provided in the latter Metaphysics of Morals provides "a very different account of ordinary moral reasoning" than the one suggested by the Groundwork. The Doctrine of Right deals with juridical duties, which are "concerned only with protecting the external freedom of individuals" and indifferent to incentives. (Although we do have a