moments of significant emotional intensity between the pilots that were mixed with the reading of the flight checklist, resulting in the omission of the part of the procedures where flaps for take-off are to be extended. Personal, family, or economic problems or other issues of both pilots that interfered with their operational manner. Insufficient psychological screening, resulting in the inability to detect when the pilots were suffering from personal problems that influenced their ability as pilots. Knowledge and discussion of very personal and non-work-related affairs among the pilots and with the flight crew that fostered an atmosphere lacking in the necessary focus and concentration for operational tasks. Aggravation of the captain's previous negative in-flight behaviour by his personal situation and interactions within the cockpit before and during the emergency. Previous negative flight characteristics of the first officer that manifested themselves during the reading of the list of control procedures, all occurring in a cockpit whose occupants had their attention on personal issues unrelated to the flight. Lack of immediate recognition or corroboration by the pilots of the relationship between the type of audible alarm and the improper take-off configuration, and the failure to employ the flaps correctly for take-off. Design of the alarm system in the Boeing 737 that did not ensure that the crew respond to the information it was feeding them and allowing them to continue with take-off regardless. Casualties The following table shows the casualties incurred by the accident as reported by JIAAC: Criminal proceedings After the accident, the criminal case remained in the hands of Federal Judge Gustavo Literas, who, during the first months received the preliminary report of the JIAAC and took testimony from dozens of LAPA mechanics. At the beginning of March 2000, the judge called 540 people to testify, most of them LAPA pilots, copilots, and flight attendants. From this point the investigation centered on the theory that, in addition to pilot error, the ultimate cause of the accident was structural problems in the management of flight operations. During the first two weeks of March, testimony was taken from some 140 people and by this time almost all the survivors had also given testimony. On 14 May 2000, Judge Carlos Liporaci, who replaced Judge Literas (who was on leave) ordered a search of LAPA headquarters and their operations room at Aeroparque, seizing the files of the company's pilots. The court secretary, Pablo Bertussi,