Duelfer is that Saddam sent out different signals to different people in order to keep them confused and help stay in power. Documents since captured inside Iraq by coalition forces are reported to reveal Saddam's frustration with weapon inspections. Meeting transcripts record him saying to senior aides: "We don't have anything hidden!" In another, he remarks: "When is this going to end?" And another: "Don't think for a minute that we still have WMD. We have nothing." Hans Blix from the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission said in his early 2004 book, Disarming Iraq, that Saddam had successfully been deterred from keeping WMD stockpiles by outside pressure. In regards to why he appeared so unsuccessful in convincing others that Iraq had no stockpiles (allowing for sanctions that crippled Iraq's economy), Blix pointed out several reasons: The United States had repeatedly made it clear to Saddam that only him disappearing from the stage would solve the issue. He did not expect the inspectors to go away. Saddam was often noted as being very proud of his country, and may have been against allowing other countries' observers to just enter several of Iraq's most important facilities. Iraq did repeatedly tell the UN that it had followed their obligations and that they had eliminated all prohibited weapons, but they might have considered deliberate ambiguity to be advantageous. Iraq may have wanted to keep their conventional weaponry secret. Some inspectors had close connections with the military and intelligence of countries that were bombing Iraq. Saddam did not know there were no stockpiles According to The Guardian in late 2003, British officials in Whitehall began circulating a theory that Saddam Hussein and his senior advisers "may have been hoodwinked" by lower-ranking officers "into believing that Iraq really did possess weapons of mass destruction." And as most of the informers for British intelligence were the same high-level advisers close to Saddam, the British were also fooled. The paper adds that this hypothesis "is open to the interpretation that the government is searching for an excuse, however implausible, for failure to discover any WMD in Iraq." Commenting on the findings of the Butler intelligence review six months later, USA Today reported that Britain's Secret Intelligence Service had "shockingly few reliable human sources inside Saddam's regime." Stockpiles transported to another country Rumors abounded of possible transportation of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to foreign countries, namely Syria, Lebanon