in the Philippines, evacuated in early January 1942, was operating in Melbourne. They were responsible for channeling all SIGINT information to OP-20-G in Washington. Brigadier General Spencer B. Akin, MacArthur's Chief Signals Officer held discussions with Major General Colin Simpson. They agreed that a Research and Control Centre to handle Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) was needed. MacArthur subsequently issued orders for the formation of two complementary groups: An intercept organisation known initially as No. 5 Wireless Section A research and control centre known as the Central Bureau. Initially Central Bureau was made up of 50% American, 25% Australian Army and 25% RAAF personnel. Hence the Central Bureau was an unusual cryptographic organisation, coming under the direct command of an area commander (MacArthur) rather than reporting to a central cryptographic organisation; as confirmed by Marshall's reply. This decision led to periodic ructions in the American military establishment about MacArthur's command having its own cryptographic service under his command; a privilege that he jealously guarded. Liaison with FRUMEL MacArthur was not happy to depend on the Navy's discretion in handling his SIGINT requirements. He felt he had experienced problems with such an arrangement when he was in Manila. MacArthur's Intelligence Officer (G-2) was Major General Charles A. Willoughby. In Australia the rules laid down by Cmdr Rudy Fabian the head of FRUMEL (through Admiral Leary) for receiving FRUMEL briefings said that Fabian or his representative were to brief MacArthur and his chief of staff Richard K. Sutherland at 1400 each day, but could not copy or distribute the material. The representative was not to be kept waiting. Only MacArthur and Sutherland were to be present; Willoughby, his G2 was excluded. Once Fabian burnt a document in front of Willoughby on his way out and dropped the ashes in his bin to demonstrate that he was not allowed to see it! A message on 9 April 1942 indicated that the "RZP Campaign" against Port Moresby was to be an invasion not an air raid and which would isolate Australia from America. Fabian at FRUMEL briefed MacArthur who was "incredulous" as he expected the target would be New Caledonia, so Fabian explained the (JN-25) code-breaking process and showed him the Japanese commander’s intercepted message with the objectives to restrict enemy fleet movements and attack the north coast of Australia. So a transport due to leave the next day for New Caledonia was sent to Port