collapse of the ARVN may well have been inevitable, but the end would have been much bloodier and much longer in coming had the PAVN chosen a more direct, conventional plan of attack. In fact, the most damaging blow of the entire PAVN campaign may have been the crushing psychological blow their skillful and unexpected strategy dealt to the mind of the ARVN's commander-in-chief. First steps Phước Long Phước Long was the northernmost provincial capital in III Corps, approximately northeast of Saigon. At the end of December 1974, the North Vietnamese CT-7 and 3rd Divisions, an independent infantry regiment, and armored, anti-aircraft, and heavy artillery support moved out of Cambodia to attack. The province was defended by five Regional Force battalions, 48 Popular Force platoons and four territorial artillery sections. From his headquarters at Biên Hòa, Lieutenant General Dư Quốc Đống, the III Corps commander, augmented this force by sending in the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division, two artillery sections, and three reconnaissance companies. The battle for the province began on 13 December when PAVN forces began to isolate Phước Long City's overland communications and eliminating static outposts. They then began to bombard Phước Long accurately with heavy artillery and launched a concerted armor/infantry ground attack on the 27th. Any counterattack or relief effort contemplated by the South Vietnamese was doomed by the thousands of refugees that took to the roads in order to escape the fighting. Desertion among ARVN units became common, as soldiers began disappearing from the ranks in search of family members. This pattern was to become too common as the offensive continued, not just among the territorial forces, but among the regular troops. On 2 January an emergency meeting was held at the Independence Palace in Saigon between President Thiệu, the Joint General Staff, and General Đống. At the meeting, Đống presented a plan for the relief of Phước Long that would have utilized either an infantry division or the Airborne Division. The plan was turned down for three reasons: first, there were simply no reserve forces of sufficient size available anywhere in the country for the task; second, with all overland routes in enemy hands, all movements and logistics would have to depend entirely on airlift, a capability that no longer existed; and third, despite advantageous defensive positions, the forces at Phước Long could not hold off two PAVN divisions long