They argued that if it were, it would have been worded like other transitional provisions, including the usual phrase "until Parliament otherwise provides". The issue of section 41 had been considered, but not resolved, by the High Court in the earlier case of King v Jones, (that case was decided on a different basis, and it was unnecessary to reach a definite answer to this question). The four people argued that the obiter dicta in that case supported their interpretation of section 41, that it was a guarantee rather than a transitional provision. The Commonwealth electoral officers, who were represented by the Solicitor-General of Australia Sir Maurice Byers, and William Gummow (a future Justice of the High Court), argued that section 41 was indeed intended to be a transitional provision. They linked it with section 8, and section 30 of the Constitution of Australia, which provide that until the federal parliament made laws on the matter, the qualification of electors for the Senate (section 8) and the House of Representatives (section 30) would be determined by state laws. Sir Maurice said: "Section 41 refers to adult persons who had a right to vote in State elections at the establishment of the Commonwealth, and those who acquired such a right under State law before the establishment of the federal franchise. Pending that establishment, the right to vote was defined in ss 8 and 30 of the Constitution by reference to electors' qualifications from the more numerous State House. These sections speak of circumstances existing at the establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter until the commencement of a federal law. They envisage the displacement of the Constitutional suffrage by a federal suffrage established by Parliament." Thus, their argument was that only rights existing before the passing of the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (the first federal law to deal with the federal franchise) would be protected by section 41. Judgment Only a week after the hearings, on 24 February, the High Court reached its decision. Three judgments were delivered, Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Mason and Wilson delivered one judgment, Justices Brennan, Deane and Dawson delivering a second, concurring judgment. The six majority judges decided that section 41 was indeed a transitional provision, which only operated as a restraint on the first law that the Parliament of Australia passed concerning the federal franchise, the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902. That is, section 41 only