damaged. Of those damaged, many were stranded in North Africa and never repaired. Three P-47 Thunderbolts of the 56th Fighter Group and two RAF Spitfires were shot down attempting to protect the Schweinfurt force. Spitfire pilots claimed 13 German fighters shot down and P-47 pilots claimed 19. Gunners on the bombers claimed 288 fighters shot down, but Luftwaffe records showed only 25 to 27 were lost. In Regensburg, all six main workshops of the Messerschmitt factory were destroyed or severely damaged, as were many supporting structures including the final assembly shop. In Schweinfurt, the destruction was less severe but still extensive. The two largest factories, Kugelfischer & Company and Vereinigte Kugellager Fabrik I, suffered 80 direct hits. 35,000 m2 (380,000 square feet) of buildings in the five factories were destroyed, and more than 100,000 m2 (1,000,000 square feet) suffered fire damage. All the factories except Kugelfischer had extensive fire damage to machinery when incendiaries ignited the machine oil used in the manufacturing process. Albert Speer reported an immediate 34 percent loss of production, but both the production shortfall and the actual loss of bearings were made up for by extensive surpluses found throughout Germany in the aftermath of the raid. The industry's infrastructure, while vulnerable to a sustained campaign, was not vulnerable to destruction by a single raid. Speer indicated that the two major flaws made by the USAAF in the August strike were first in dividing their force instead of all striking the ball-bearing plants, and second, failing to follow up the first strike with repeated attacks. 203 civilians were also killed in the strike. While the battle resulted in a German victory, the scale and range of the American operation, along with the British-led Operation Hydra (1943) in the same day, shocked the German air command; the stress contributed to the suicide of Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Hans Jeschonnek the next day. The Schweinfurt mission in particular foretold the failure of deep penetration raids of Germany without adequate long-range escort. The 1st Bomb Wing was over German-occupied territory for three hours and thirty minutes, of which two hours and ten minutes, including all of the time spent over Germany itself, saw no fighter support whatsoever. When the second attack on Schweinfurt came on October 14, the loss of more than 20% of the attacking force (60 out of 291 B-17s) resulted in the suspension of deep raids for