Under Madero, 1911-1913 Although the revolutionaries supporting Francisco I. Madero had shown the weakness of the Federal Army and forced Díaz to resign and go into exile, by the Treaty of Ciudad Juárez in May 1911, Madero retained the Federal Army and called for the demobilization of the revolutionaries who had enabled the victory of his cause. Revolutionary Pascual Orozco rebelled against Madero in 1912, and Madero sent the Federal Army to quash his burgeoning rebellion. Madero also sent troops to fight Emiliano Zapata, whose revolutionary forces had never demobilized and remained in rebellion until 1920. Shortly after Madero was elected president, Zapata and others issued the Plan of Ayala, declaring themselves in rebellion against Madero, since he had not moved on land reform. Madero sent the Federal Army to Morelos. In February 1912, the Federal army consisted of 32,594 regulars and 15,550 irregulars. This was far below the official number of 80,000 as stated by the army executive. By September of the same year the official strength of the army was 85,000 men. In addition there were 16,000 Rurales, 4,000 Urban Police and 16,200 Militia, rural guards and other pro-government men under arms. Under Huerta, 1913-14 In April 1914 Huerta claimed his army had reached the size of 250,000 men, with 31 regiments of Rurales and 31,000 Militia. A more realistic assessment of his men by that July was 71,000, while U.S. observers said it was closer to 40,000. Specific numbers aside, the rapid expansion of the army had led to a deterioration in the quality of the average recruit, or more accurately, conscript. Huerta made an attempt to increase the size of the army by ordering a mass conscription (leva), of men on the streets by his press-gangs. Press-gangs would capture men as they left church or pull them from cinemas. Very few of the men under his command were volunteers and many deserted the army. Huerta tried improving morale by increasing pay in May 1913 by 50%. At the same time 382 military cadets were given commissions and attempts were made to increase the number of cadets in training. Federal army generals were often corrupt and guilty of undermining morale with poor leadership. Some were so corrupt their dealings extended as far as selling ammunition, food and uniforms to the enemy. Also guilty of this corruption were Huerta's two sons, Victoriano Jr. and Jorge, both of whom