a "bank teller" or (b) a "bank teller and active in the feminist movement." A majority chose answer (b). This error (mathematically, answer (b) cannot be more likely than answer (a)) is an example of the "conjunction fallacy"; Tversky and Kahneman argued that respondents chose (b) because it seemed more "representative" or typical of persons who might fit the description of Linda. The representativeness heuristic may lead to errors such as activating stereotypes and inaccurate judgments of others (Haselton et al., 2005, p. 726). Critics of Kahneman and Tversky, such as Gerd Gigerenzer, alternatively argued that heuristics should not lead us to conceive of human thinking as riddled with irrational cognitive biases. They should rather conceive rationality as an adaptive tool, not identical to the rules of formal logic or the probability calculus. Nevertheless, experiments such as the "Linda problem" grew into heuristics and biases research programs, which spread beyond academic psychology into other disciplines including medicine and political science. Types Biases can be distinguished on a number of dimensions. For a more complete list, see list of cognitive biases. Examples of cognitive biases include: Biases specific to groups (such as the risky shift) versus biases at the individual level. Biases that affect decision-making, where the desirability of options has to be considered (e.g., sunk costs fallacy). Biases, such as illusory correlation, that affect judgment of how likely something is or whether one thing is the cause of another. Biases that affect memory, such as consistency bias (remembering one's past attitudes and behavior as more similar to one's present attitudes). Biases that reflect a subject's motivation, for example, the desire for a positive self-image leading to egocentric bias and the avoidance of unpleasant cognitive dissonance. Other biases are due to the particular way the brain perceives, forms memories and makes judgments. This distinction is sometimes described as "hot cognition" versus "cold cognition", as motivated reasoning can involve a state of arousal. Among the "cold" biases, some are due to ignoring relevant information (e.g., neglect of probability), some involve a decision or judgment being affected by irrelevant information (for example the framing effect where the same problem receives different responses depending on how it is described; or the distinction bias where choices presented together have different outcomes than those presented separately), and others give excessive weight to an unimportant but salient feature of the problem (e.g., anchoring). The fact that some