the people in my culture think it is right" is both a moral relativist (because what is right and wrong depends on who is doing it), and an ethical subjectivist (because what is right and wrong is determined by mental states, i.e. what people think is right and wrong). However, someone who thinks that what is right and wrong is whatever a deity thinks is right or wrong would be a subjectivist (morality is based on mental states), but not a relativist (morality is the same for everyone). In contrast, someone who claims that to act ethically you must follow the laws of your country would be a relativist (morality is dependent on who you are), but not a subjectivist (morality is based on facts about the world, not mental states). Moral relativism vs moral anti-realism Depending on how a moral relativist position is constructed, it may or may not be independent of moral realism. Moral realists are committed to some version of the following three claims: Semantic thesis: Moral statements have meaning, they express propositions, or are the kind of things that can be true or false. Alethic thesis: Some moral propositions are true. Metaphysical thesis: The metaphysical status of moral facts is robust and ordinary, not importantly different from other facts about the world. While many moral relativists deny one or more of these claims, and therefore could be moral anti-realists, a denial is not required. A moral relativist who claims that you should act according to the laws in whatever country you are a citizen of, accepts all three claims: moral facts express propositions that can be true or false (you can see if a given action is against the law or not), some moral propositions are true (some actions abide by the laws in someone's country), and moral facts are ordinary (laws are not mental states, they are physical objects in the world). However, this view is a relativist one as it is dependent on the country you are a citizen of. See also References Bibliography Guy Ankerl, Global Communication without Universal Civilization. vol I: Coexisting Contemporary Civilizations: Arabo-Muslim, Bharati, Chinese, and Western. (Geneva, INUPRESS, 2000. ) Joxe Azurmendi 1998: "The violence and the search for new values" in Euskal Herria krisian, (Elkar, 1999), pp. 11–116. Kurt Baier, "Difficulties in the Emotive-Imperative Theory" in Paul W Taylor (editor): The Moral Judgement: Readings in Contemporary Meta-Ethics Englewood