vulnerability reduces the incentive to produce more and advanced weapons. For example, the United States’ nuclear force exceeds the requirements of minimal deterrence, and is structured to strike numerous targets in multiple countries and to have the ability to conduct successful counterforce strikes with high confidence. In response to this, China continues to modernize its nuclear forces because its leaders are concerned about the survivability of their arsenal in the face of the United States’ advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and missile defense. One disadvantage of minimal deterrence is that it requires an accurate understanding of the level of damage an adversary finds unacceptable, especially if that understanding changes over time so that a previously credible deterrent is no longer credible. A minimal deterrence strategy must also account for the nuclear firepower that would be "lost" or "neutralized" during an adversary's counterforce strike. Additionally, a minimal deterrence capability may embolden a state when it confronts a superior nuclear power, as has been observed in the relationship between China and the United States. Finally, while pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiations allows states to make reductions without becoming vulnerable, further reductions may be undesirable once minimal deterrence is reached because they will increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to secretly expand its nuclear arsenal. See also Nuclear peace Deterrence Notes References Blair, Dennis C. "Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence." Office of the Director of National Intelligence. February 12, 2009. Accessed August 1, 2010. Feickert, Andrew, and K Alan Kronstadt. "Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia." Congressional Research Service. October 17, 2003. Accessed August 1, 2010. Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 3rd Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Kristensen, Hans M, Robert S Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. "From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons." Federation of American Scientists. April 2009. Accessed July 31, 2010. Lieber, Keir A, and Daryl G Press. "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy." International Security 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 7-44. McVadon, Eric A. "Recent Trends in China’s Military Modernization." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. September 15, 2005. Accessed August 1, 2010. Nalebuff, Barry. "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence." Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 3 (September 1988): 411–425. Ross, Robert S. "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: