bondage of anyone who is aware of their own desires, but ignorant of the causes that determined them. However, the free or virtuous person becomes capable, through reason and knowledge, to be genuinely free, even as they are being "determined". For the Dutch philosopher, acting out of one's own internal necessity is genuine freedom while being driven by exterior determinations is akin to bondage. Spinoza's thoughts on human servitude and liberty are respectively detailed in the fourth and fifth volumes of his work Ethics. The standard argument against free will, according to philosopher J. J. C. Smart, focuses on the implications of determinism for free will. He suggests free will is denied whether determinism is true or not. He says that if determinism is true, all actions are predicted and no one is assumed to be free; however, if determinism is false, all actions are presumed to be random and as such no one seems free because they have no part in controlling what happens. With the soul Some determinists argue that materialism does not present a complete understanding of the universe, because while it can describe determinate interactions among material things, it ignores the minds or souls of conscious beings. A number of positions can be delineated: Immaterial souls are all that exist (idealism). Immaterial souls exist and exert a non-deterministic causal influence on bodies (traditional free-will, interactionist dualism). Immaterial souls exist but are part of a deterministic framework. Immaterial souls exist, but exert no causal influence, free or determined (epiphenomenalism, occasionalism) Immaterial souls do not exist – there is no mind-body dichotomy, and there is a materialistic explanation for intuitions to the contrary. With ethics and morality Another topic of debate is the implication that determinism has on morality. Philosopher and incompatibilist Peter van Inwagen introduced this thesis, when arguments that free will is required for moral judgments, as such: The moral judgment that X should not have been done implies that something else should have been done instead. That something else should have been done instead implies that there was something else to do. That there was something else to do, implies that something else could have been done. That something else could have been done implies that there is free will. If there is no free will to have done other than X we cannot make the moral judgment that X should not have been done.