weapons. Weaker actors may have powerful allies. Stronger actors are unable to make threats credible. The demands of a stronger actor are extreme. The weaker actor must consider its regional rivals when responding to threats from powerful actors. Second, if "power", as generally understood, leads to victory in war, then there must be an explanation for why the "weak" are able to defeat the "strong." Key explanations include: Strategic interaction. Willingness of the weak to suffer more or bear higher costs. External support of weak actors. Reluctance to escalate violence on the part of strong actors. Internal group dynamics. Inflated strong actor war aims. Evolution of asymmetric rivals' attitudes towards time. Asymmetric conflicts include both interstate and civil wars, and over the past two hundred years have generally been won by strong actors. Since 1950, however, weak actors have won a majority of all asymmetric conflicts. According to the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, "Asymmetric warfare is a type and method of combat which is geared to disrupt the pace of the enemy's operations and the enemy's attempts to make snap decisions in the midst of battle." Strategic basis In most conventional warfare, the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type and the outcome can be predicted by the quantity or quality of the opposing forces, for example better command and control of their forces (c2). There are times where this is the case and conventional forces are not easily compared, making it difficult for opposing sides to engage. An example of this is the standoff between the continental land forces of the French Army and the maritime forces of the United Kingdom's Royal Navy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. In the words of Admiral Jervis during the campaigns of 1801, "I do not say, my Lords, that the French will not come. I say only they will not come by sea", and a confrontation that Napoleon Bonaparte described as that between the elephant and the whale. Tactical basis The tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following assumptions: One side can have a technological advantage that outweighs the numerical advantage of the enemy; the decisive English longbow at the Battle of Crécy is an example. Technological superiority usually is canceled by more vulnerable infrastructure which can be targeted with devastating results. Destruction of multiple electric lines, roads, or water supply systems