Operation Unthinkable was the name given to two related possible future war plans by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee against the Soviet Union in 1945. The plans were never implemented. The creation of the plans was ordered by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in May 1945 and developed by the British Armed Forces' Joint Planning Staff in May 1945 at the end of World War II in Europe. One plan assumed a surprise attack on the Soviet forces stationed in Germany to impose "the will of the United States and British Empire" on the Soviets. "The will" was qualified as "a square deal for Poland", which probably meant enforcing the recently-signed Yalta Agreement. The planners decided that without American help, Britain would probably fail. The assessment, signed by the Chief of Army Staff on 9 June 1945, concluded: "It would be beyond our power to win a quick but limited success and we would be committed to a protracted war against heavy odds". The code name was now reused instead for a second plan, which was a defensive scenario in which the British were to defend against a Soviet drive towards the North Sea and the Atlantic after the withdrawal of the American forces from the Continent. When the Labour Party came to power in the 1945 general election, it ignored the draft plan. The study became the first Cold War-era contingency plan for war against the Soviet Union. Both plans were highly secret and were not made public until 1998 although a British spy for the Soviets, Guy Burgess, had passed on some details at the time. Operations Offensive The initial primary goal of the operation was declared as "to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and the British Empire. Even though 'the will' of these two countries may be defined as no more than a square deal for Poland, that does not necessarily limit the military commitment". (The Soviet Union is referred to as "Russia" throughout the document, a metonym that was common in the West throughout the Cold War.) The chiefs of staff were concerned that both the enormous size of the Soviet forces deployed in Europe at the end of the war and the perception that Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was unreliable caused a Soviet threat to exist in Western Europe. The Soviet Union had yet to launch its attack on Japanese