as the Polish government, advised in this by the British and French governments, constantly hoped that the war could be resolved (at least for the time being) through diplomatic channels. Less than half of the Polish armed forces had been mobilized by 1 September, and only one-quarter (250,000) were fully equipped and in assigned positions when hostilities commenced. Thus many soldiers, mobilised after 1 September, failed to reach the designated staging areas and, together with normal civilians, sustained significant casualties when public transport (trains and roads filled with refugees) became targets of the German Air Force. Poland possessed numerically inferior armoured forces, and they were dispersed within the infantry and unable to effectively engage in any major armoured battles. The Germans opposing them had close to 3,000 tanks organised into independent divisions under blitzkrieg doctrine. In terms of equipment, the Poles had 132 of their own 7TP tanks, which were capable of destroying any German armour, including their heaviest Panzer IV, and had a few relatively modern imported designs, such as 50 Renault R35 tanks and 38 Vickers E tanks. Of the 700 odd tanks remaining, 102 were obsolete First World War Renault FT tanks and, not much better than armoured cars, 300 TK-3 and 274 TKS tankettes. In addition to tanks, Poland successfully used 10 regular armoured trains against German forces, which were unprepared to face this kind of combat vehicle considered in 1939 so obsolete by German planners to be given any serious consideration. Although the trains proved indeed vulnerable to air attack, losses incurred against Polish trains ("Śmiały" Armored Train destroyed nearly 100 German tanks during the battles around Mokra village) convinced the Germans to reintroduce this type of vehicle into their own army after the September Campaign. Experience in the Polish-Soviet War (1919–1921), the only recent, major conflict the independent Second Polish Republic took part in, shaped Polish Army organisational and operational doctrine. Unlike the First World War, this was a conflict in which the cavalry's mobility played a decisive role. Thus the Polish high command drew a lesson different from both the Western Allies and Germany with their western front experience. With their victory in the First World War, France and Britain remained conservative and expected the new conflict to be another of trench warfare. German military theories were based upon the notion that successful offenses would be based on new inventions—tanks and planes. Poland