fluids for protection, and they do not use type II. The board stated that tests have shown that both fluids do flow off the wings of a treated airplane in significant amounts during the initial takeoff ground run. The NTSB stated: There are a number of views on the potential uses of type I and II fluids. The use of type I fluid raises concern because its holdover time is shorter than the holdover time for type II fluid under certain conditions. Both fluids are under scrutiny for their environmental impacts, and it is uncertain if type II fluid diminishes the runway coefficient of friction since the fluid rolls off the airplane during the takeoff roll. Also, the use of either type fluid may result in a temporary degradation in the airplane's aerodynamic performance, a reduced stall margin, and an increase in drag. Safety card errors While it was not named as a cause of the accident, investigators also found that the passenger safety briefing cards in the airplane showed two types of galley service doors. However, only one door is installed on a particular Fokker F28 model at any one time. The examination also showed that the safety card did not show how to operate either of the two types of galley service doors in the emergency mode if the normal opening mode failed. However, the final report stated that this "did not contribute to the fatalities in the accident." Conclusion The final report, published by the NTSB, cited the probable cause of the accident to be: ... the failure of the airline industry and the Federal Aviation Administration to provide flight crews with procedures, requirements, and criteria compatible with departure delays in conditions conducive to airframe icing and the decision by the flight crew to take off without positive assurance that the airplane's wings were free of ice accumulation after 35 minutes of exposure to precipitation following deicing. The ice contamination on the wings resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control after lift-off. Contributing to the cause of the accident were the inappropriate procedures used by, and inadequate coordination between, the flight crew that led to a takeoff rotation at a lower than prescribed air speed. Aftermath NTSB recommendations The NTSB made several recommendations to the FAA, including requiring that "flight crew members and appropriate ground personnel responsible for the inspection of transport-category airplanes for wing