the crew with a red indicator and aural warning because of a software discrepancy that lowered the sensitivity while the flaps were in transit from 40 to 15 degrees during the go-around procedure. A Honeywell engineer stated that the pilots should have received a warning eight to nine seconds before impact. Crash At 18:42 EDT, the DC-9 touched down in a field within the airport boundary, about from the threshold of Runway 18R. It then crashed through the airport fence and impacted several trees, breaking apart while skidding down a residential street that was on the airport boundary. The plane broke into four major sections, and the front , including the cockpit and the unoccupied first class passenger cabin, came to rest in the middle of Wallace Neel Road. The rear section of the fuselage, including the tail and the rear-mounted engines, came to rest in the carport of a house. Of the 52 passengers, 37 died from blunt force trauma, burns from the fire or carbon monoxide inhalation. An additional 14 passengers suffered serious injuries, and one had minor injuries. Of the five crew members, both pilots suffered minor injuries, two flight attendants were seriously injured and the remaining flight attendant sustained minor injuries. No one on the ground was injured. The airport's previous, and still (2022) deadliest, major incident occurred on September 11, 1974, when Eastern Air Lines Flight 212, also a DC-9, crashed during approach, killing 72. Investigation and response The NTSB immediately dispatched an investigation team, which recovered the CVR and FDR from the plane's wreckage. After a lengthy investigation, the NTSB concluded that a microburst generated by the thunderstorm over the airport at the time of the crash was the probable cause of the accident. The NTSB listed these contributing factors: The flight crew's decision to continue an approach to an area where a microburst was likely. The failure of the flight crew to recognize wind shear quickly (exacerbated by an error in the wind shear alert software; the wind shear alert system should have warned them about 8–9 seconds prior to impact) The failure of the flight crew to establish proper pitch and engine power that would have brought them out of the wind shear The lack of timely weather information by air traffic control to the crew of Flight 1016 In the media The Flight 1016 crash is discussed in a Mayday (Air