allowing the oil to be discharged even if the probability or risk of fire was low. A reasonable person, the Council held, would only neglect a risk of such a potentially great magnitude if he or she had a reason to do so, e.g. if it were cost prohibitive. Lord Reid said at 718–719, The words "real risk" are the requirement of remoteness of damage but the test of foreseeability does not depend upon the actual risk of occurrence. The test is really whether the engineer ought to have foreseen the outbreak of fire, i.e. the type of consequence ought to have been foreseen. Significance This idea of a balance between magnitude and seriousness of risk is similar to that proposed by Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) on the subject of legal causation. Such a formulation of the issue has struck some in the field as an argument along the lines typically made in the Law & Economics camp usually seen to be represented by the American Judge Richard Posner. The holding in this case was harshly criticized for its "overloading of the foreseeability concept" by renowned torts scholar Leon A. Green. See also Re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560 List of Judicial Committee of the Privy Council cases References Judicial Committee of the Privy Council cases on appeal from Australia English tort case law 1966 in Australian law 1966 in case law