attempt to give a strict "proof" of the greatest-happiness principle. Like Bentham, Mill believed that ultimate ends and first principles cannot be demonstrated, since they lie at the foundation of everything else that we know and believe. Nevertheless, he claims, "[c]onsiderations may be presented capable of determining the intellect," which amount to something close to a proof of the principle of utility. Chapter 2 In the second chapter, Mill formulates a single ethical principle, the principle of utility or greatest-happiness principle, from which he says all utilitarian ethical principles are derived: "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure." Mill then spends the bulk of Chapter 2 responding to a number of common criticisms of utilitarianism. These include charges that utilitarianism: is a doctrine worthy only of swine (for holding that pleasure is the only thing that is desirable for its own sake) (p. 17) fails to recognize that happiness is unobtainable (p. 23) is too demanding (for claiming that it is always our duty to create the greatest possible happiness in the world) (p. 29) makes people cold and unsympathetic (by focusing solely on the consequences of actions, rather than on features such as motives and character, which require a more sensitive and empathetic response) (p. 31) is a godless ethics (by failing to recognize that ethics is rooted in God's commands or will) (p. 33) confuses goodness with expediency (p. 34) fails to recognize that in making ethical decisions there usually isn't time to calculate future consequences (p. 35) tempts people to disobey ordinary moral rules (by inviting them to ignore such rules when they appear to conflict with the general happiness) (p. 37) In response to the charge that utilitarianism is a doctrine fit only for swine, Mill abandons Bentham's view that pleasures differ only in quantity, not quality. He notes that most people who have experienced both physical and intellectual pleasures tend to greatly prefer the latter. Few people, he claims, would choose to trade places with an animal, a fool, or an ignoramus for any amount of bodily pleasure they might thereby acquire. And since "the sole