these, 97 aircraft were available to perform front line duties while others were either in maintenance or awaiting delivery. The majority of these were assigned to 51° Stormo, (group) which was based at Ciampino Airport (just outside Rome) and at Pontedera, with 22° Gruppo (wing) of 52° Stormo. On 10 June 1940, when Italy issued its declaration of war against both France and Great Britain, the G.50s of 22° Gruppo went into action, followed by the 48 aircraft of 20° Gruppo. Operations during the first few days were sporadic and varied, often serving as escorts for Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 bombers on attack missions against harbours and airfields on the island of Corsica. These operations were quickly brought to an end when France signed the Armistice of 22 June 1940, officially capitulating to the Axis powers. Belgian deployment and the Battle of Britain During September 1940, the 20° Gruppo (351/352/353 Squadrons), commanded by Maggiore Bonzano and equipped with Fiat G.50, was part of 56° Stormo, formed to operate during the Battle of Britain as part of the Corpo Aereo Italiano (Italian Air Corps, CAI) based in Belgium, together with the 18° Gruppo flying Fiat CR.42s. According to Cattaneo, the Italian government had decided to participate in the German air offensive against the British mainland due to political opportunism and in pursuit of prestige; he alleged that the Air Staff would have rather directed those aircraft towards other fronts where they would have stood a better chance of making a meaningful contribution. In this theatre, the G.50 was normally hampered by its relatively slow speed, open cockpits and short range. Cattaneo also noted that the presence of poor weather conditions and the use of relatively unprepared personnel were additional factors that undermined the fighter's effectiveness. Those G.50s that were deployed were early models and thus furnished with an open canopy, which was useful in a typical Mediterranean climate but led to the pilots suffer heavily in the colder weather of northern Europe. The aircraft was also under-equipped, provided with a mediocre radio set (powered by batteries that were prone to freeze at altitude) and lacking any armour protection. The experiences of the early G.50s over Britain soon showed their inadequacies in combat. Their operations were considered to be next to useless during the campaign, in part because they were too short-ranged and stationed too far from enemy territory. The G.50 possessed relatively limited