C.T., consisting of 351ª, 360ª and 378ª Squadrons, commanded by Maggiore Luigi Bianchi, arrived in Libya. Caught up in the chaotic retreat of the Italian Army during the winter of 1940–41, however, the G.50s saw relatively little actual action. One of the few initial claims of enemy aircraft being downed by Freccia pilots occurred on 9 April 1941, when Tenente Pilota Carlo Cugnasca (an expert pilot, and the first to deliver a G.50 to Finland), attacked a flight of three British Hurricane Mk Is from No. 73 Squadron and claimed to have downed one, although this loss was not confirmed. On his return, he was forced to crash-land his G.50, flipping the aircraft over on the airstrip but remaining unharmed. At low level, the aerial clashes were often confused and had unpredictable effects. Tactical surprise was often a decisive factor in a given engagement, as shown on 14 April when a formation of 66 Axis aircraft, including eight G.50s from 351ª Squadriglia, attacked British forces stationed in the vicinity of Tobruk. The RAF defenders of No. 73 Squadron were outnumbered in this engagement, resulting in the Hurricanes, which were only marginally faster than the G.50, having to ignore the Axis fighters and concentrate their efforts upon attacking incoming bombers, which posed the greatest threat. Flying their G.50s, both Cugnasca and Marinelli attacked H.G. Webster's Hurricane while he was shooting at a Stuka dive bomber, resulting in Webster being finally shot down and killed over Tobruk. A Canadian pilot, ace Flight Lieutenant James Duncan ‘Smudger’ Smith (P2652), saw the engagement and subsequently shot down and killed both Cugnasca and Marinelli as well as damaging another G.50 before being shot down himself by the 351ª Squadriglia commander, Capitano Angelo Fanello. On 27 May, 20° Gruppo was reinforced by 151ª Squadriglia, which was equipped with the new Fiat G.50 bis. This new version had almost two hours of flight endurance, due to the addition of an extra fuel tank in the internal fuselage section (which had been originally configured as a bomb bay). The normal tactic with the G.50 was to dive from , but they never flew very high over North Africa, usually not exceeding . The aircraft still lacked radio sets and, despite their air filters, the desert sand could reduce the engine's lifespan to only 70–80 hours. Although the G.50s were mainly outperformed by Desert Air Force fighters, their pilots