of the SPD had issued a Reich execution () – an intervention against an individual state led by the central government to enforce national law – during 1923's German October. In the face of democratically elected left-wing governments in Saxony and Thuringia that included the Communist Party of Germany, the forcible removal of the governments had been justified by the fact that peace and order were endangered in the two states. There had also been concern about an attempt at a communist revolution – one that was in fact ordered by the Comintern in Moscow. After the government of Saxony refused to disarm illegally established workers' militias, a Reich execution had been imposed and carried out. Only in Hamburg had the Comintern's order for revolution been fulfilled to any extent. There a minor communist uprising that involved fatalities took place, but it was put down by the police. Papen found an analogous justification for Prussia in the clashes culminating in the Altona Bloody Sunday of 17 July 1932. It involved on one side the Nazi SA, which had just had the ban against it lifted by the Papen government, and on the other the Communists and Social Democrats. The deadly confrontations and ensuing police action differed markedly from the Reich execution against Saxony in 1923. Then there had indeed been doubts about the loyalty of Saxony's left-wing government to the constitution and its willingness to take police action, but there was no question of this in Prussia's case. Three days earlier, on July 14, Reich President Paul von Hindenburg had signed an undated emergency decree pursuant to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution at the request of Papen, who had visited him at his home in Neudeck along with Interior Minister Wilhelm von Gayl. By means of the decree Hindenburg authorized the Reich Chancellor to become Reich Commissioner for Prussia and enabled him to remove the caretaker Prussian government from office. By not dating the decree, Hindenburg left to Papen the choice of the time at which to make use of the power. Papen chose July 20. The third option, which would have consisted of waiting and leaving Prussia's caretaker minority government in office and trusting that it would get the situation under control even without a parliamentary majority, was one that Papen from the outset did not consider. Course of the coup On 20 July 1932 Prussia's Deputy Prime