Helles bridgehead, which the Royal Navy had wanted to retain as a base and which some (e.g. Balfour, Hankey) had wanted to retain for the sake of British prestige in the Middle East (abandonment of the other Gallipoli bridgehead at Suvla/Anzac, too narrow to defend against enemy artillery, had already been decided on 7 December). On his first day as CIGS Robertson also demanded a defensive policy in Mesopotamia, with reinforcements drawn only from India – this was agreed on 29 February 1916, over the objections of Balfour and Lloyd George. Robertson also insisted that Mesopotamian operations (and eventually logistics as well) be brought under his control rather than that of the India Office. Townshend, besieged in Kut, was not initially thought to be in danger, but eventually surrendered in April 1916 after three failed relief attempts. Another early act as CIGS (27 December 1915) was to press Kitchener for an extra 18 divisions for the BEF. Conscription of bachelors – for which Robertson lobbied – was enacted in early 1916. CIGS: 1916 Strategic debates Robertson was a strong supporter of BEF commander Douglas Haig and was committed to a Western Front strategy focusing on Germany and was against what he saw as peripheral operations on other fronts. Having seen politicians like Lloyd George and Churchill run rings around Kitchener, Robertson's policy was to present his professional advice and keep on repeating it, flatly refusing to enter into debate, arguing that the government should accept his advice or else find another adviser. However, Robertson reduced the government's freedom of action by cultivating the press, much of which argued that the professional leadership of Haig and Robertson was preferable to civilian interference which had led to disasters like Gallipoli and Kut. He was particularly close to H. A. Gwynne and Charles Repington, who worked for the Northcliffe Press until it ceased to support the generals late in 1917, and advised Haig to cultivate journalists also. Robertson communicated by secret letters and "R" telegrams to generals in the field, including Milne, whom he discouraged from offensive operations at Salonika, and Maude who may have "consciously or unconsciously" ignored his secret orders from Robertson not to attempt to take Baghdad. In a 12 February 1916 paper Robertson urged that the Allies offer a separate peace to Turkey, or else offer Turkish territory to Bulgaria to encourage Bulgaria to make peace. In reply, Grey