able to hit his target, say a moose, with precision and accuracy, but the shot must have been one that the hunter should have taken. For another figure in reliabilist virtue epistemology, John Greco, knowledge and justified belief "are grounded in stable and reliable cognitive character. Such character may include both a person's natural cognitive faculties as well as her acquired habits of thought.... So long as such habits are both stable and successful, they make up the kind of character that gives rise to knowledge." This characterization of virtue reliabilism can be construed as more inclusive than Sosa's, eschewing the focus on memorial or sensory experience and instead locating virtue in an agent's stable and reliable dispositions to generate successful cognition. In doing so, Greco can be seen as making room for the inclusion of the intellectual virtues as typically construed by the responsibilist camp of virtue epistemology, since many of these virtues can be thought of as stable, reliable dispositions of character. Virtue responsibilism In virtue responsibilism, the emphasis is not on faculties such as perception and memory. Instead, certain intellectual character traits are valued as more virtuous than others. These can be creativity, inquisitiveness, rational rigor, honesty, or a number of other possibilities. Generally, these theories are normative in nature. A few different approaches are taken. Some, such as Lorraine Code, think that intellectual virtues involve having the correct cognitive character and epistemic relation to the world rooted in a social context. She sees the acquisition of correct knowledge about the world as the primary "good", and the end towards which our intellectual efforts should be oriented, with the desire for truth as the primary motivating factor for our epistemological virtues. James Montmarquet's theory of intellectual virtue is similar to Code's, but specifically defines additional intellectual virtues in order to defuse the potential dogmatism or fanaticism that is compatible with Code's desire for truth. The primary virtue is conscientiousness, which focuses on the correct end of intellectual living. In order to obtain conscientiousness, it is important to maintain impartiality, sobriety, and courage. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski has proposed a neo-Aristotelian model of virtue epistemology, emphasizing the role of phronesis (practical wisdom) as an architectonic virtue unifying moral and intellectual virtues even more radically than Aristotle proposed. As delineated in her model, the virtues are "a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to