The Capture of Schwaben Redoubt () was a tactical incident in the Battle of the Somme, 1916 during the First World War. The redoubt was a German strong point long and wide, built in stages since 1915, near the village of Thiepval and overlooking the River Ancre. It formed part of the German defensive system in the Somme sector of the Western Front during the First World War and consisting of a mass of machine-gun emplacements, trenches and dug-outs. The redoubt was defended by the 26th Reserve Division, from Swabia in south-west Germany, which had arrived in the area during the First Battle of Albert in 1914. Troops of the 36th (Ulster) Division captured the redoubt on 1 July 1916, until forced out by German artillery-fire and counter-attacks after dark. The British kept the area of the redoubt under bombardment until 3 September, when the 49th (West Riding) Division attacked the area from the west, in a morning fog. The 36th (Ulster) Division infantry got across no man's land but were defeated when German artillery and machine gun-fire swept the Irish troops as German infantry counter-attacked from the flanks, using hand grenades. In late September, the British gained a footing in the redoubt during the Battle of Thiepval Ridge Attack and counter-attack followed until 14 October, when troops of the 39th Division, captured the last German foothold in the redoubt and repulsed German counter-attacks from The site of the redoubt lies between the Thiepval Memorial and the Ulster Tower. Background Somme front, 1914–1915 The 26th (Württemberg) Reserve Division ( [Major-General] Franz von Soden) of the XIV Reserve Corps ( [Lieutenant-General] Hermann von Stein), arrived on the Somme in late September 1914, attempting to advance westwards towards Amiens. By 7 October, the advance had ended; any cover had been occupied and temporary scrapes improvised. Fighting in the area from the Somme northwards to the Ancre, subsided into minor line-straightening attacks by both sides. The primacy of artillery had been established during the fighting of 1914 and the exploitation of artillery fire power in defensive fighting, required means of communication between the front line and artillery positions in the rear. The command of artillery needed to be centralised to make sure that all guns in range engaged targets. In late December 1915, Major Bornemann, commander of the 26th Division field artillery, wrote a report in which he described failures of communication, which