scientists James Conant and Vannevar Bush, the director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which controlled the Manhattan Project, and John McCloy, and General Leslie R. Groves, who had been the military officer in charge of the Manhattan Project. Acheson decided that the committee needed technical advice, so he appointed a board of consultants with David Lilienthal, the well-regarded chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, as chairman. He also appointed J. Robert Oppenheimer, scientific leader of the Manhattan Project, who provided influential advice. Oppenheimer’s contribution lay in an idea to police the production of atomic weapons from monitoring source mines for uranium. Overview of the report On March 16, 1946, the committee's report was presented to the State Department, which released it to the public on March 28. The Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy soon became known as the Acheson–Lilienthal Report. The primary message of the report was that control of atomic energy through inspections and policing operations was unlikely to succeed. Instead, the report proposed that all fissile material be owned by an international agency to be called the Atomic Development Authority, which would release small amounts to individual nations for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. In the first years of the atomic era, it was generally believed that the great obstacle facing a would-be developer of an atomic bomb was the acquisition of sufficient fissile material. In response, the Acheson–Lilienthal Report proposed that the complete path from the uranium and thorium mines to post production be under international ownership. In addition, the report proposed that the United States abandon its monopoly on atomic weapons, revealing what it knew to the Soviet Union, in exchange for a mutual agreement against the development of additional atomic bombs. This was to prove too controversial. Although Truman accepted the report in general, his appointment of financier Bernard Baruch to carry the proposal forward in the United Nations led to demands for punishment for violations, and that those penalties could not be vetoed by the United Nations Security Council, as well as unrestricted inspections within the USSR, whilst still insisting that the USSR should agree not to develop the bomb. These were modifications that neither Acheson nor Lilienthal accepted. This, combined with U.S. continued insistence on retaining the bomb until they were satisfied with the effectiveness of international control, ultimately led to the plan's rejection