read a document penned by Chelmsford and circulated ‘for the consideration of officers commanding columns when entering Zululand,’ which recommended a deployment very similar to that effected by Pulleine. Ultimately, even Pulleine's flawed line held the Zulus in check until ammunition ran low, and units began to lose cohesion as they retreated and were set upon by the Zulus in close combat. Pulleine's greatest failing as a commander, though he was by no means alone in this, was an abiding underestimation of his foe. The leisurely attitude of the British officers, including Pulleine, in the period immediately preceding the final engagement, demonstrate the complacency which permeated the thinking of the officer corps in the initial phase of the Anglo-Zulu war. For most of 22 January, Pulleine and his colleagues did not seriously think that the Zulus would attack the camp, so that when the Impis did strike, normal precautions such as the striking of tents and suspension of routine camp activities had not taken place. The former was of particular significance since it would have provided a much clearer signal to Chelmsford that the camp was in real trouble, and may have induced him to hurry back in time to rescue the situation. Finally, the decisive action needed to avoid disaster was prevented by the confused command situation precipitated by Crealock's vague orders, which failed to confirm Durnford in command, or to give him any specific instructions. Chelmsford later attempted to lay the blame for the defeat on Durnford, suggesting that he had disobeyed Chelmsford's order to ‘take command,’ and thus be bound by the earlier instruction to Pulleine to defend the camp. This is however unfair, since Chelmsford's original order, recovered from Crealock's order book on the field, contains no specific reference to ‘taking command.’ Because of this, Durnford acted with considerable freedom in making what was ultimately a mistaken decision to go on the offensive, and in this regard Pulleine's reluctance to commit any of the 24th's infantry companies to Durnford's advance was sound. See also Battle of Isandlwana Rorke's Drift Zulu (film) Zulu Dawn Notes References 30th Regiment of Foot officers South Wales Borderers officers 1879 deaths British Army personnel of the Anglo-Zulu War British military personnel killed in the Anglo-Zulu War Graduates of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst 1838 births