War II borders. Thus, it was believed that the Soviet Union should be cautious in its foreign engagement in an attempt to prevent any political instability from reaching Europe. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union became allies with Egypt and Syria due to the "Anglo-French debacle at Suez, the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the use of the Soviet rouble." Later Egypt and Syria developed a defense treaty, in which if one of them declared war on Israel the other would get involved. Soviet Relations with Israel had declined since Israel's declaration of independence in 1948. When Levi Eshkol became the Israeli prime minister in 1963, Moscow was nervous, because they weren't sure what direction Eshkol would take in his foreign policy, specifically Soviet-Israeli relations. Initially things seemed to be going better with representatives from Soviet and Israeli governments meeting in June 1965 and January 1966. However, relations soon fell apart. On February 23, 1966, Syria had a military coup, in which the new regime Neo-Ba’ath took a more radical position towards Israel, both in rhetoric and action, supporting Palestinian guerilla activity against Israel. Disagreements about Israel led to the development of tensions in the Soviet–Syrian relationship, eventually leading to the Soviets' delaying their arms shipments to Syria, and slowing down on the previously promised Euphrates dam loan. In the 1960s, there were numerous clashes between the Syrians and Israelis on the Syria–Israel border. In October 1966 Palestinian guerilla operation against Israel intensified. One of the most serious of these incidents occurred on April 7, 1967, when Israel destroyed seven of Syria's modern Soviet MIG planes. Although the Soviets provided the Syrian army with weapons, they made it clear that they wanted to avoid war. After several more Palestinian guerilla operations, Soviet foreign ministry adopted a "two pronged approach", demanding that Israel stop its aggressive policy toward the Arab countries and telling Iraq, Jordan and Syria that a warning had been sent out and explaining that the Soviet government disproved of any Chinese involvement in the Middle East and the actions of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations. As tensions between Israel and Syria increased, Israel felt the threat of force was the only deterrent left. On May 12, the Politburo was told that the IDF had formulated a large-scale attack on Syria and was simply waiting for a good time to begin it. A day later, on May 13, 1967, the Soviet's gave