the Knights led to the Battle of Basra which lasted from 25 to 31 March. Although the lack of planning resulted in some confusion, the Coalition did support the Iraqi action with land and air assets. By the end of March the Iraqi Government forces had negotiated a ceasefire with Muqtada al-Sadr. With the militias melting away, Iraqi Government forces were able to claim control of Basra. While recognizing that Operation Charge of the Knights had been far from perfect, Stirrup judged it to be a success as the Iraqis were taking responsibility for their own security. After the conclusion of Operation Charge of the Knights the British were involved in helping to rebuild those Iraq Army units which had suffered from poor cohesion, or even dissolved. In hindsight, Stirrup took the view that the British forces would have been usefully employed in mentoring the Iraq Army to greater extent earlier in the campaign. In late April 2009, most British military operations in Iraq came to an end; and by 28 July 2009 all British forces had left Iraq and were all redeployed to Kuwait. Operations in Afghanistan After his appointment as CDS, Stirrup travelled to Helmand Province in May 2006. At that stage, the British effort consisted of a small tented base at Camp Bastion, an operating base at Lashkar Gah and several isolated platoon houses in the north of Helmand. Much of the rest of the Province was not under British or other ISAF control. At that time the insurgency was starting to gain strength and although by 2009 the British Armed Forces and the United States Marine Corps had greatly expanded their role and were providing security for over 50% of Helmand, speaking in 2009 Stirrup conceded that in some areas security had worsened. While, highlighting the inadequate force levels provided by NATO and the competing demands on Coalition political and military resources that Iraq had posed until 2008, Stirrup believed that by 2009 NATO forces were successfully taking the fight to the insurgents, driving them out of towns and villages and thereby allowing governance to improve which would lead to the defeat of the insurgency. Speaking generally on operations in Afghanistan, Stirrup has noted that whilst "the military is a key, an essential element in dealing with those problems, but by and large these problems can only be resolved politically" and that he favoured a pragmatic