belief) was ultimately caused by epistemically irresponsible behavior, such as wishful thinking. That seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that it can be destroyed by one's mere reflecting on one's seemings and speculating about their possible causes. In addition, as a form of foundationalism, PC is open to some of the common objections to that doctrine. Annotated bibliography Huemer, Michael. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). Source of the doctrine of phenomenal conservatism. BonJour, Laurence. "In Search of Direct Realism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 349-67. Criticism of Huemer 2001. Huemer, Michael. "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74 no. 1 (2007): 30-55. Response to BonJour 2004, reformulation of the self-defeat argument. Markie, Peter. "The Mystery of Perceptual Justification," Philosophical Studies, forthcoming. Objects that PC is too liberal and enables beliefs caused by epistemically irresponsible behavior to be justified. Steup, Matthias. "Internalist Reliabilism," Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 403-25. Makes the objection that PC is too liberal. Huemer, Michael."Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74 (2007): 30–55. Huemer's weaker formulation of phenomenal conservatism. Hanna, Nathan. "Against Phenomenal Conservatism," Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221. Argues that PC delivers the wrong verdicts by allowing beliefs to justify themselves. Hasan, Ali. "Phenomenal conservatism, classical foundationalism, and internalist justification" Philosophical Studies, forthcoming. Argues that the self-defeat argument for PC fails and that alternative internalist accounts of justification are preferable to PC. Littlejohn, Clayton. "Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism," Analytic Philosophy 52 (2011): 35-48. Argues that the self-defeat argument fails and that the internalist intuition that motivates PC can be used to support abhorrent moral views. Tucker, Christopher. "Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology," In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press. Appeals to PC to offer an account of justified religious belief. Moretti, Luca. "Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness,"American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2018): 167-180. Argues that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that it can be destroyed by one's mere reflecting on one's seemings and speculating about their possible causes. External links Huemer's original statement of PC Michael Tooley's discussion and criticism of PC Epistemological theories