an army led by Rosas, who fled to the United Kingdom, thus ending the war. Caxias spent 17 January aboard the frigate Dom Afonso alongside John Pascoe Grenfell, taking stock of the port area of Buenos Aires, the Argentine capital, selecting the best place to launch an amphibious attack. His plan was aborted once the news of the victory at Caseros arrived. As a reward for his role in the victory, Caxias was promoted to lieutenant general on 3 March, and raised to marquis on 26 June. Conciliation Cabinet Caxias's father died in December 1853. For years, father and son had clashed, taking opposite sides. The marquis ultimately prevailed, adhering closely to his grandfather José Joaquim de Lima's steadfast loyalty to the Crown and respect for the law. By the time of his death, Francisco de Lima, a senator in his own right, had long since lost his former influence and had not held any office of importance for years. Nevertheless, Caxias and Francisco de Lima maintained a loving and respectful relationship to the very end, as may be seen in the few surviving letters between them. His relationship with other family members, however, was marred by resentment, as he told his wife years later: "We are placed in the foreground of our society, causing even envy to your relatives and to mine as well." Around 1853 (and certainly by 1855), the old Party of Order had become more widely known as the Conservative Party. On 14 June 1855, the marquis accepted the portfolio of Minister of War and joined the "Conciliation Cabinet" headed by Honório Hermeto (now Marquis of Paraná). Caxias and Paraná had known each other since 1831 and had formed a deep friendship and strong bond based on trust and views in common. Paraná had been facing overwhelming opposition in parliament from members of his, and Caxias's, own party. Under the guise of correcting flaws in elections so that all parties would have legitimate access to representation in parliament, Paraná attempted to pass electoral reforms that would, in practice, allot cabinets even more influence to meddle in elections through coercion and patronage. The saquaremas understood the threat: it would undermine their own party (or in fact any party) by strengthening the executive branch to the detriment of the legislative. In search of broader support, Paraná appointed as ministers politicians who had few, or no, links to the