necessity could not be argued even though this decision came only after the defence had argued it. It was also claimed the judge had misled the jury into thinking that they could influence the length of the sentence. Since many in the jury wished for a lighter sentence than that prescribed by the Criminal Code, it was argued the jury might have resorted to jury nullification had they known they could not decide the length of the sentence. Ruling The decision upholding the ten-year sentence was unanimous and was written by the court. Defence of necessity The court first held that not only was the defence of necessity unable to justify Latimer's actions but also the inapplicability of the defence should have been so obvious that his lawyers should have anticipated its rejection, and therefore the fact that judge rejected it only after the defence was argued was not unfair. The court first cited precedent that the defence of necessity is invoked only where "true 'involuntariness' is present". This involves being confronted with a serious danger, no other options but to commit a crime to avoid that danger, and "proportionality between the harm inflicted and the harm avoided." While the court acknowledged that the individual's subjective views in measuring approaching dangers and other options could be taken into account, along with an objective assessment (this was called a "modified objective test"), in this case the defence of necessity failed. First, the claimed danger being avoided, the surgery, threatened not Mr. Latimer but his daughter. Moreover, the court wrote that "ongoing pain did not constitute an emergency in this case". The court believed Mr. Latimer should have been able to understand this, especially since there were alternatives to surgery, such as the feeding tube. The court went on to find that Latimer had other alternatives to killing his daughter, namely that "he could have struggled on", albeit "with what was unquestionably a difficult situation". The court also ruled that subjective views could not influence an assessment whether the crime is worse, equal or lesser than the threatened danger to the criminal, since "fundamental principles of the criminal law" would be sacrificed. In this case, the rights of the disabled, based in section 15 of the Charter, were considered to be the important factor in considering how serious the crime was. The court had difficulties in deciding whether any type of emergency