Rapacki and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in February 1958, which ended in favor of a nuclear-free zone as delineated in the plan. Later in March 1958, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said in his speech at the Twenty-First Party Congress that the Soviet Union supported implementing the plan and creating an “atom-free zone” in Europe. Other Socialist states gave favorable responses in agreement with the plan as well. United States The Eisenhower Administration was unfavorable to any disarmament proposals in Europe and were suspicious of the intentions of Eastern Europe during the Cold War. With American nuclear armaments out of West Germany providing a counterpoint to the Soviet Union, it would leave the Soviets with military superiority in Europe. A spokesperson representing the Eisenhower administration expressed that the plan only served to benefit the Soviet Union. The plan would also hinder NATO’s plans for enhancing the weapons systems and air force for nuclear armaments in the Federal Republic of Germany. According to some scholars, this would have disadvantaged the U.S in their short range nuclear weapons protection plan for Western Europe. On January 10, 1958, John Foster Dulles held a press conference expressing antagonism against a nuclear-free zone in Western Europe, suggesting that neutralization of Germany would significantly hurt NATO. Dean Acheson, a former Secretary of State, would also come out against the Rapacki Plan two days later in the New York Times. On May 3rd 1958, United States Ambassador to Poland, Jacob D. Beam sent an official rejection to the plan based on the limitations of the plan in preventing nuclear war. Some scholars argue that the U.S government believed that acceptance of the plan would ultimately usurp the balance of power in Europe. However, former American diplomat George Kennan, who also previously was against the establishment of NATO, contrary to the American politicians at the time, thought that the unification and disarmament of Germany would satisfy both the Germans and the concerns of the Soviet Union. Kennan also saw the plan as a starting point to ease disarmament in Germany. East Germany The East German government informed the UN that they were willing to sign an agreement with West Germany contingent on their renunciation of producing nuclear weapons based on the Polish proposal. West Germany West German responses were generally negative to the plan and were highly suspicious of the