clauses of the Treaty but without further specifying. However, in a note published in the Portuguese translation of Schneider's work (1902), the Brazilian diplomat José Maria da Silva Paranhos qualified that assertion as follows: There only was not approved by the Argentine Congress the clause relating to the fortifications, and this lack of approbation, kept secret, was only communicated to Brazil long after the war. That had already been acknowledged in 1872 by the future Argentine diplomat Estanislao Zeballos, who noted that the Protocol (concerning fortifications) had not been submitted for ratification by the Argentine Congress as required by the Argentine constitution What was objectionable, for Argentina, was not that the Humaitá fortifications should be demolished, but the stipulation that no similar ones should be built even after the overthrow of López. Argentina's refusal to ratify the Protocol came to light when it and Brazil were disputing the meaning and effect of the treaty, and the Brazilian government published some of the correspondence. (See Conflict between Argentina and Brazil, below.) It was never determined whether the Argentine legislature's refusal to ratify Article 1 of the Protocol was effective according to the law of nations or whether it was ineffective because it was not communicated to Brazil in a timely manner. Specific articles To this day, South America continues to debate the merits (or lack thereof) of specific treaty articles. In particular, Articles III, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XIV, and XVIII. Article III By this article the Allies agreed to confer the overall command of the land forces on President Bartolomé Mitre of Argentina initially, even though the Brazilian military resources were much larger, mainly because the initial campaign would have to take place in Argentine territory, and then in Paraguayan territory adjoining Argentina. Because Brazil had incomparably the biggest navy, however, they agreed that command of the naval forces should be conferred initially on the Brazilian Admiral Tamandaré. The decisions, however, caused a lot of friction and dissension with the Uruguayans accusing President Mitre of being overcautious and the Argentines accusing Brazil's navy of failing to cooperate with the army. It is discussed in the article Passage of Humaitá. The third indent of Article III led to the creation of the Army of the Vanguard led by the fierce Uruguayan gaucho Venancio Flores, whose function was to hurry ahead through the eastern part of the province of Corrientes, as described