The Second Battle of Kiev was a part of a much wider Soviet offensive in Ukraine known as the Battle of the Dnieper involving three strategic operations by the Soviet Red Army and one operational counterattack by the Wehrmacht, which took place between 3 November and 22 December 1943. Following the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army launched the Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive Operation, pushing Erich von Manstein's Army Group South back towards the Dnieper River. Stavka, the Soviet high command, ordered the Central Front and the Voronezh Front to force crossings of the Dnieper. When this was unsuccessful in October, the effort was handed over to the 1st Ukrainian Front, with some support from the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 1st Ukrainian Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin, was able to secure bridgeheads north and south of Kiev (Kyiv). Strategy The structure of the strategic operations from the Soviet planning point of view was: Kiev Strategic Offensive Operation (October) (1–24 October 1943) by the Central and Voronezh Fronts Chernobyl-Radomysl Offensive Operation (1–4 October 1943) Chernobyl-Gornostaipol Defensive Operation (3–8 October 1943) Lyutezh Offensive Operation (11–24 October 1943) Bukrin Offensive Operation (12–15 October 1943) Bukrin Offensive Operation (21–24 October 1943) Kiev Strategic Offensive Operation (November) (3–13 November 1943) Rauss' November 1943 counterattack Kiev Strategic Defensive Operation (1943) (13 November 1943–22 December 1943) Soviet preparations In October 1943, several of Vatutin's armies were having serious trouble trying to break out of the rugged terrain of the Bukrin bend, the southern bridgehead. The 24th Panzer Corps of Walther Nehring, in an effective defensive position, had the opposing Soviet forces squeezed in. As a result, Vatutin decided to concentrate his strength at the northern bridgehead at Lyutezh. The 3rd Guards Tank Army, commanded by Pavel Rybalko, moved northwards toward the Lyutezh bridgehead under cover of darkness and diversionary attacks out of the Bukrin bend. The Soviet preparations were considerable, including the installation of 26 bridges and 87 ferries. Many of the Soviet bridges were built underwater, making them difficult to detect. Feint attacks and the construction of fake bridges may have fooled the Germans for a short while. Fire support was provided by 7,000 guns and mortars and 700 combat aircraft. The 27th and 40th Armies launched the Soviet diversionary attack at Bukrin on 1 November, two days ahead of schedule, but advanced only 1.5 kilometers before being driven back. Soviet historians claimed complete success for the Red