travelled to Japan to work in labour camps endured 46 days on the hellship Dainichi Maruand Tofuku Maru. Most casualties were aboard these hellships – with many suffering from disease after disembarking at Moji. In Japan, those who had been transported on the Tofuku Maru were moved by train to Hiraoka where they were held at the Tokyo #2 Detached (Mitsushima) POW Camp. There, they worked to build the Hiraoka Dam. In April 1944, most of the gunners were sent by train to the Tokyo #16 (Showa Denko) POW Camp in Kanose to stoke furnaces in the carbide factory. Those gunners who disembarked the Dainichi Maru joined the Fukuoka #1 POW Camp. This group was later split up and relocated to camps in Moji, Kumamoto, Orio, Ube, Omine and Bibai. Many died from disease or accidents in labour camps on the Siam-Burma Railway, in Sumatra, Japan, Java, Borneo, and Changi Prison. Later in the war, 120 died when their hellships were sunk by United States Navy submarine en route to Japan from Singapore. Aftermath The Sparrow Force guerrillas would become associated with the phrase "you alone do not surrender to us", which were contained in a message to the men of Sparrow Force by the Japanese commander on Timor, Lieutenant General Yuichi Tsuchihashi. Winston Churchill later stated: "they alone did not surrender." The 2/2nd Independent Company was renamed the 2/2 Commando Squadron and fought in New Guinea and New Britain, ending the war in Rabaul. Of the 81 members of the 2/40th Infantry Battalion evacuated, many soldiers reinforced the Tasmania/Queensland-raised 2/12th Infantry Battalion in the Australian 7th Division, which later fought in the Salamaua-Lae campaign, the Finisterre Range campaign and the Borneo campaign. By the end of the war, "2/2 Commando Squadron could claim to have spent longer in contact with the enemy than any other unit of the Australian Army". Overall, while the campaign on Timor had little strategic value, the Australian commandos had prevented an entire Japanese division from being used in the earlier phases of the New Guinea campaign while at the same time inflicting a disproportionate level of casualties on them. In contrast to those in Java, Ambon or Rabaul, Australian operations in Timor had been far more successful, even if it was also largely a token effort in the face of overwhelming Japanese strength. Likewise, they had proved that in favorable circumstances, unconventional operations could