windmill restart to make the blades in the turbines windmill at 10% N2 (turbine rotational speed). The captain did not take the necessary steps to ensure that the first officer achieved the needed airspeed or greater required for the windmill engine restart procedure and then did not demonstrate command authority by taking control of the airplane and accelerating it to at least that speed. The crew ended the descent when they had reached indicated airspeed, but neither engine core (N2) ever indicated any rotation during the entire descent. Since they were too high for an auxiliary power unit (APU) start, the ram air turbine (known as an "air-driven generator" on Bombardier products) was deployed to provide electric power for the aircraft, and the crew donned oxygen masks, as the cabin slowly depressurized due to loss of pressurization air from the engines. The crew glided for several minutes and then tried to restart engines using the APU at . This was again unsuccessful. They then declared to ATC that they had a single-engine flameout. At this point, they had four diversion airports available to them. They lost considerable altitude while continuing unsuccessfully to attempt to restart both the left engine (two times) and the right engine (two times) for over 14 minutes, using the emergency restart procedure. Despite their four auxiliary APU-assisted engine restart attempts, the pilots were unable to restart the engines because their cores had locked. Without core rotation, recovery from the double engine failure was not possible. At that point, the pilots finally declared to ATC that they had, in fact, lost both engines. The NTSB also determined from flight data recorder information that the turbofan jet engine (General Electric CF34-3B1) engine 2 turbine was operating at above the maximal redline temperature of at . Engine 1 HPT stayed below the redline. On January 9, 2007, the National Transportation Safety Board issued its final report on Flight 3701, which concluded that the probable causes of the accident were: The pilots' unprofessional behavior, deviation from standard operating procedures, and poor airmanship The pilots' failure to prepare for an emergency landing in a timely manner, including communicating with air traffic controllers immediately after the emergency about the loss of both engines and the availability of landing sites The pilots' improper management of the double engine failure checklist Aftermath Thomas Palmer, former manager of Pinnacle Airlines' training program, said about the