would do after'' the rebellion. Their future governing structure thus remained vague until the end of 1991, when Chávez and others decided to delineate an initial legal framework for their government's operation. Several assorted coup dates were proposed by Chávez's associates. Indeed, many junior captains threatened to launch their own early coup, which would be independent of that waged by their higher ranked commanders. They threatened this action if Chávez refused to pick a date that they considered soon enough. Yet Chávez refused to budge on a December 1991 attempt. He stated that nothing was to be attempted without his involvement. The captains thus waited for Chávez's chosen date. Yet one aspect of the planned coup remained clear throughout: Chávez's demand that it maintain a primarily military focus and character. The leftist ex-guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo—who fought in the 1960s and 1970s—also regularly met Chávez. These meetings took place during the years leading up to the coup and without the knowledge of other key MBR-200 officers. Bravo recounted that Chávez did not trust civilians enough to afford them a role in his bloody intrigue. According to him, it was for this reason that what was initially planned as a civilian-military rebellion was pared down by Chávez to one fought solely by soldiers; Bravo and his leftist civilian cohorts were turfed out of logistical considerations, preparations, and planning just days before the coup. Yet, towards the end of January 1992, Chávez realized that the Movement's window of opportunity was to close. Chávez received notification that he faced imminent transferral on 14 February—to a small village on the frontier with war-ravaged Colombia. Chávez realized that this posting would jeopardize his participation in the MBR-200 coup, as the town was far from the major cities and power centers of Venezuela's northern coastal strip. Alarmed at this prospect, Chávez and other Movement members held one final meeting. There, they determined to act before Chávez's transfer. They would quicken preparations and wait until President Pérez—who was just then abroad on a trip to the 1992 World Economic Forum, held in Switzerland—returned to Venezuela. All the while, MBR-200 rebel forces built up their numbers. Eventually, 5 lieutenant colonels, 14 majors, 54 captains, 67 first and second lieutenants, 65 warrant officers and technical non-commissioned personnel, 101 sergeants and senior non-commissioned officers and 2,056 corporals and enlisted servicemen were involved in the conspiracy; thus Chávez and other rebel