in defensive positions at Kleve and Goch. 7th Parachute Division (Erdmann) Elements in reserve at Geldern, as a result of Schlemm's expectation of an offensive through the Reichswald. 47th Panzer Corps (General Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz) Army Group H's armoured reserve, at Dülken, south-east of Venlo. After the fighting in the Ardennes, its two divisions, the 116th Panzer and the 15th Panzer Grenadier, were at just over 50 per cent strength with no more than 90 tanks between them. 15th Panzer Grenadier Division (Wolfgang Maucke) A possible reserve formation, according to Allied assessments, that might be in place within six hours of the assault. 346th Division (Steinmueller) Terrain The Allied advance was from Groesbeek (captured during Operation Market Garden) eastwards to Kleve and Goch, turning south eastwards along the Rhine to Xanten and the US advance. The whole battle area was between the Rhine and Maas rivers, initially through the Reichswald and then across rolling agricultural country. The Reichswald is a forest close to the Dutch/Deutsche border. The Rhine flood plain, wide (and which, at the time of the operation, had been allowed to flood after a wet winter), is the northern boundary of the area and the Maas flood plain is the southern boundary. The Reichswald ridge is a glacial remnant which, when wet, easily turns to mud. At the time of the operation, the ground had thawed and was largely unsuitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles. These conditions caused breakdowns to a significant number of tanks. Routes through the forest were a problem for the Allies, both during their advance through the forest and later for supply and reinforcements. The only main roads passed to the north (Nijmegen to Kleve) and south (Mook to Goch) of the forest - no east–west metalled route passed through it. There were three north–south routes: two radiating from Hekkens to Kranenburg (between two and five kilometres behind the German frontline) and to Kleve; and Kleve to Goch, along the eastern edge of the Reichswald. The lack of suitable roads was made worse by the soft ground conditions and the deliberate flooding of the flood plains, which necessitated the use of amphibious vehicles. The few good roads were rapidly damaged and broken up by the constant heavy traffic that they had to carry during the assaults. The Germans had built three defence lines. The first was from Wyler to the Maas along the