to be captured when accepting client orders, ensuring that a firm is acting in a client's best interests and as to how orders from different clients may be aggregated. Pre-trade transparency MiFID 1 requires that operators of continuous order-matching systems must make aggregated order information on "liquid shares" available at the five best price levels on the buy and sell-side; for quote-driven markets, the best bids and offers of market makers must be made available. (Note consideration is being given to extending these requirements to other financial instruments. Under Article 65(1) of MiFID 1, the European Commission is due to submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on extending pre and post-trade transparency requirements to transactions in financial instruments other than shares by October 2007.) Post-trade transparency MiFID 1 requires firms to publish the price, volume ,and time of all trades in listed shares, even if executed outside of a regulated market, unless certain requirements are met to allow for deferred publication. (Note see comment above regarding extension of these requirements to other financial instruments). Inducements and investment research One of the most controversial aspects of MiFID 2 is that it severely restricts asset managers' ability to obtain investment research with client commissions. Best execution Directive 2014/65/EU requires that firms take all sufficient steps to obtain the best possible result in the execution of an order for a client. The best possible result is not limited to execution price but also includes cost, speed, the likelihood of execution and likelihood of settlement and any other factors deemed relevant. MiFID 2's "all sufficient steps" test sets a somewhat higher standard than the previous "all reasonable steps" standard in MiFID 1. Systematic Internaliser A Systematic Internaliser is a firm that executes orders from its clients against its own book or against orders from other clients. MiFID 2 will treat Systematic Internalisers as mini-exchanges, hence, for example, they will be subject to pre-trade and post-trade transparency requirements (see above). Market fragmentation Although MiFID 2 was intended to increase transparency for prices, the fragmentation of trading venues has had an unanticipated effect. Where once a financial institution was able to see information from just one or two exchanges, they now have the possibility (and in some cases the obligation) to collect information from a multitude of multilateral trading facilities, Systematic Internalisers and other exchanges from around the European Economic Area