and black strips been displayed by the primary flight display. As the stall warning immediately sounded during the first 5 seconds of take-off, along with the activation of the master warning, the supposed information on the strips didn't appear on the flight display. While Flight 431 was descending towards the sea, the flight crew were not aware of this. The radio altimeter callouts should have made the crew to be aware on the situation. As it began to reach a very low altitude with a threat of impact with the sea, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) should have warned the crew on the impending collision. However, the warning immediately ceased and had only able to sound for just 50 milliseconds (a mere "Whoop-") as the stall warning and the overspeed warning took priority over the GPWS warning. Investigators concluded that First Officer Mulli's action was caused by several reasons; the unexpected type of warning (in this case a stall warning) during the phase of the flight, the aural warning and the stick shaker activation combined with the lack of visual reference on board as the flight took off towards the sea in night time condition, and the continued activation of the stick shaker despite his actions. Conclusion The final report was published approximately 2 years after the crash. The investigation concluded the cause of the crash as follows: The Commission of Inquiry concluded that the cause of the accident to flight KQ 431 on 30 January 2000 was a collision with the sea that resulted from the pilot flying applying one part of the procedure, by pushing forward on the control column to stop the stick shaker, following the initiation of a stall warning on rotation, while the airplane was not in a true stall situation. The following elements contributed to the accident: the pilot flying's action on the control column put the airplane into a descent without the crew realizing it, despite the radio altimeter callouts; the GPWS warnings that could have alerted the crew to an imminent contact with the sea were masked by the priority stall and overspeed warnings, in accordance with the rules on the prioritization of warnings; the conditions for a takeoff performed towards the sea and at night provided no external visual references that would have allowed the crew to be aware of the direct proximity of the sea. In the aftermath of