Roughly 1300 IP addresses within Amazon Web Services space, dedicated to Amazon Route 53, were hijacked by eNet (or a customer thereof), an ISP in Columbus, Ohio. Several peering partners, such as Hurricane Electric, blindly propagated the announcements. July 2018: Iran Telecommunication Company (AS58224) originated 10 prefixes of Telegram Messenger. November 2018: US-based China Telecom site originated Google addresses. May 2019: Traffic to a public DNS run by Taiwan Network Information Center (TWNIC) was rerouted to an entity in Brazil (AS268869). June 2019: Large European mobile traffic was rerouted through China Telecom (AS4134) "This route leak began when [Swiss] SafeHost (AS21217) announced more than forty-thousand IPv4 routes that had been learned from other peers and providers to its provider China Telecom (AS 4134). …In turn, China Telecom accepted these routes and propagated them…" February 2021: Initially reported that Cablevision Mexico (AS28548) leaked 282 prefixes creating conflicts for 763 ASNs in 80 countries, with the main impact in Mexico. Data from the Isolario MRT dump suggested that 7,200 IPv4 prefixes were announced and leaked to AS1874 impacting more than 1290 ASNs from over 100 countries. April 2021: Large BGP routing leak out of India: over 30,000 BGP prefixes hijacked via Vodafone Idea Ltd (AS55410) causing 13X spike in inbound traffic. Prefixes were from around the globe but mostly US including Google, Microsoft, Akamai, and Cloudflare. February 2022: Attackers hijacked BGP prefixes that belonged to a South Korean cryptocurrency platform, and then issued a certificate on the domain via ZeroSSL to serve a malicious JavaScript file, stealing $1.9 million worth of cryptocurrency. March 2022: RTComm hijacked a prefix used by Twitter. See also Bogon filtering Border Gateway Protocol Resource Public Key Infrastructure Internet outage References External links Qrator.Radar: A real-time BGP connectivity and security monitoring system. BGPmon.net: A BGP specific monitoring system to detect prefix hijacks, route leakage and instability. Cyclops: A BGP network audit tool (prefix hijack, route leakage) by UCLA NetViews: A Real Time BGP Topology visualization and IP Hijacking Detection tool by University of Memphis. AS-CRED: A service of reputation-based trust management and real-time alert (prefix hijacking, unstable prefix announcement), for inter-domain routing by University of Pennsylvania. Is BGP safe yet?: List of ISPs that implement Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). Internet security Routing