alarm whistle in the cab and opening an air valve on the brake pipes, thus clearing the vacuum and applying the automatic vacuum brakes. This alone could have prevented the disaster. It was undoubtedly clear that the disaster was caused due to Want and Aldington Overrunning the Signal but LMS management shared some responsibility for not quickening the pace of the conversion of lighting in trains (which the Ministry Of Transport declared must occur after the train crash at Ais Gill in 1913 and that the driver of the LMS goods train from Washwood Heath also shared a minor role in the accident, as he had chosen to take water in Charfield after being shunted there to allow the parcels train through, without telling Button. Had he chosen to take water at the scheduled point, then the GWR goods train would not be delayed and be forced to shunt again for the mail train at Charfield. References External links The Railways Archive summary of this accident See Backtrack 1990 Volume 4 Number 1 Letter.46 two views-on the 2 unknowns-one is that they were two survivors and another 10 October 1999 Volume 13 Number 10 is that the two unknowns were identifiable remains in two small boxes at 1928 in England Railway accidents in 1928 Railway accidents and incidents in Gloucestershire Railway accidents involving fog 20th century in Gloucestershire Railway accidents involving a signal passed at danger Derailments in England Accidents and incidents involving Bristol and Gloucester Railway Accidents and incidents involving Great Western Railway Accidents and incidents involving London, Midland and Scottish Railway 1928 disasters in the United Kingdom Train collisions in England Rail accidents caused by a driver's error Train and rapid transit fires October 1928 events