sign" may turn out to be impossible, by contrast, in the case of positional goods, we have a problem of over-provision, because all agents may try to consume positive amounts of these goods, neglecting to consider the externality on others. For public goods, an undersupply, for positional goods, it signifies an over-supply. In other words, in positional competitions, people work harder to compete and consume more than they would under optimal conditions. Some economists, such as Robert Frank, argue that positional goods create externalities and that "positional arms races" can result for goods that might boost one's social status relative to others. This phenomenon, Frank argues, is clearly bad for society, and thus government can improve social welfare by imposing a high luxury tax on certain luxury goods to correct for the externality and mitigate the posited social waste. However, in some cases it may be less clear that such government intervention is warranted in response to these externalities. For example, in certain cases, such government actions can potentially impede improvements in living standards and innovation. Technological advance itself is possible in part because wealthy individuals are willing to be first purchasers of new and untested goods (e.g., early cellphone models in the early 1990s). There is a certain experimentation and risk that accompany luxury goods, and if they are found to be useful they may eventually be mass-produced and made affordable to the common person: one era's luxuries are another's commonplace goods. In short, the negative positional externality can be compensated by the public goods of infant industry effects and research and development. In his response to the cited article by Kashdan and Klein, Robert Frank wrote the following: In the short run, the tax would not change the total level of spending. Rather, it would shift the composition of spending in favor of investment. Innovation is hardly confined to the consumption sector. Producers of capital goods also have strong incentives to come up with useful innovations. And with the greater aggregate investment spending caused by a consumption tax, more resources than before would be available for research and development. There is thus no reason to expect innovation to slow down, even in the short run. In the long run, which is what really counts for the point Kashdan and Klein are attempting to make, their argument collapses completely. Higher rates of investment mean a higher rate of income