attack continued with two regiments from the brigade of Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble, but they could not advance beyond the swamp, falling with about 20% casualties. Porter was starting to receive reinforcements from Slocum's division and he brought forward troops to feed into gaps in his line. However, despite telegrams from Porter for more assistance, General McClellan gave no thought to the advantages of a counterattack. He asked his corps commanders south of the river whether they had any troops they could spare. When no one volunteered, he directed Sumner of the II Corps to send two brigades—about one tenth of the army—across the river, but because of the distances involved they would not reach the scene for another three hours. When Stonewall Jackson finally reached Old Cold Harbor, weary from the marching and counter-marching, he began to arrange his troops and those of D.H. Hill to trap the Federals he expected to be driven east by Longstreet and A.P. Hill. He soon received instructions from General Lee that informed him of the current situation and he began to prepare his command to assault the main Federal line. Faulty staff work prevented his men from moving forward for over an hour. While Jackson rode back and forth distractedly, his chaplain and chief of staff, Maj. Robert L. Dabney, took the initiative to find the divisions of Brig. Gens. William H. C. Whiting and Charles S. Winder and corrected the garbled instructions they had received. Lee met with Jackson on Telegraph Road and expressed his annoyance at the delay in getting to the battlefield by telling him "General, I am glad to see you and I only wish I could have been with you sooner." Jackson muttered a reply that was inaudible under the noise of the battle. Lee then asked Jackson if his troops could stand the heavy enemy fire. "They can stand anything, they can stand that," Jackson replied. Lee's assault at 7 p.m. was conducted by 16 brigades, about 32,100 men. Porter had about 34,000 men to defend the line, but many of these were worn out from the previous attacks and command cohesion was hampered by feeding isolated reinforcements into the line to fill gaps. Nevertheless, they had the advantages of good defensible terrain and superiority in artillery. The Confederates were not able to advance simultaneously in a neat battle line over the 2.25-mile front, but