action holding to the appearances, without beliefs in accord with the ordinary regimen of life based on: the guidance of nature, by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought the compulsion of the passions by which hunger drives us to food and thirst makes us drink the handing down of customs and laws by which we accept that piety in the conduct of life is good and impiety bad instruction in techne Skeptic sayings The Pyrrhonists devised several sayings (Greek ΦΩΝΩΝ) to help practitioners bring their minds to suspend judgment. Among these are: Not more, nothing more (a saying attributed to Democritus) Non-assertion (aphasia) Perhaps, it is possible, maybe I withhold assent I determine nothing (Montaigne created a variant of this as his own personal motto, "Que sçay-je?" – "what do I know?") Everything is indeterminate Everything is non-apprehensible I do not apprehend To every argument an equal argument is opposed Texts Except for the works of Sextus Empiricus, the texts of ancient Pyrrhonism have been lost. There is a summary of the Pyrrhonian Discourses by Aenesidemus, preserved by Photius, and a brief summary of Pyrrho's teaching by Aristocles, quoting Pyrrho's student Timon preserved by Eusebius: 'The things themselves are equally indifferent, and unstable, and indeterminate, and therefore neither our senses nor our opinions are either true or false. For this reason then we must not trust them, but be without opinions, and without bias, and without wavering, saying of every single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not. Influence In Ancient Greek philosophy Pyrrhonism is often contrasted with Academic skepticism, a similar but distinct form of Hellenistic philosophical skepticism. While early Academic skepticism was influenced in part by Pyrrho, it grew more and more dogmatic until Aenesidemus broke with the Academics to revive Pyrrhonism in the first century BCE, denouncing the Academy as "Stoics fighting against Stoics." Some later Pyrrhonists, such as Sextus Empiricus, go so far as to claim that Pyrrhonists are the only real skeptics, dividing all philosophy into the dogmatists, the Academics, and the skeptics. Dogmatists claim to have knowledge, Academic skeptics claim that knowledge is impossible, while Pyrrhonists assent to neither proposition, suspending judgment on both. The second century Roman historian Aulus Gellius describes the distinction as "...the Academics apprehend (in some sense) the very fact that nothing can