John Merryman (August 9, 1824 – November 15, 1881) of Baltimore County, Maryland, was arrested in May 1861 and held prisoner in Fort McHenry in Baltimore and was the petitioner in the case "Ex parte Merryman" which was one of the best known habeas corpus cases of the American Civil War (1861–1865). Merryman was arrested for his involvement in the mob in Baltimore, specifically for his leadership in the destruction of telegraph lines, but was not charged, a right normally ensured by the writ of habeas corpus. The case was taken up by the federal circuit court and its current presiding judge who happened to be Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, a Democrat-leaning Marylander. The reading of Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution was in question. Taney believed that the phrase “when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it” applied solely to Congress because of its location in Article 1. In Ex parte Merryman, Chief Justice Taney writes, “If the high power over the liberty of the citizens now claimed was intended to be conferred on the President, it would undoubtedly be found in plain words in this article (Article I of the Constitution) … He certainly does not faithfully execute the laws if he takes upon himself legislative power by suspending the writ of habeas corpus.” Lincoln asserted that his "war powers" gave him authority to act on this power to preserve the Union, especially since Congress could not be in session to suspend the writ. Lincoln completely ignored Taney's ruling thereby invoking nonacquiescence, and later asked Congress when they reconvened for a special session on July 4, 1861, “Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” Had the destruction of public property been allowed to continue in Maryland, Lincoln would have had to fight an insurrection in the north as well as the seceding states' armies. Thus, he concludes that suspending the writ of habeas corpus was essential to preserving the government. The executive branch could not enforce laws if people were damaging its infrastructure. The case never reached the Supreme Court, partly because in 1861 Congress passed a law which "approved and in all respects legalized and made valid ... all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States respecting the army and navy