for Active implantable medical devices, and IEC 62304 for medical software. The US FDA also published a series of guidances for industry regarding this topic against 21 CFR 820 Subchapter H—Medical Devices. Subpart B includes quality system requirements, an important component of which are design controls (21 CFR 820.30). To meet the demands of these industry regulation standards, a growing number of medical device distributors are putting the complaint management process at the forefront of their quality management practices. This approach further mitigates risks and increases visibility of quality issues. Starting in the late 1980s the FDA increased its involvement in reviewing the development of medical device software. The precipitant for change was a radiation therapy device (Therac-25) that overdosed patients because of software coding errors. FDA is now focused on regulatory oversight on medical device software development process and system-level testing. A 2011 study by Dr. Diana Zuckerman and Paul Brown of the National Center for Health Research, and Dr. Steven Nissen of the Cleveland Clinic, published in the Archives of Internal Medicine, showed that most medical devices recalled in the last five years for "serious health problems or death" had been previously approved by the FDA using the less stringent, and cheaper, 510(k) process. In a few cases, the devices had been deemed so low-risk that they did not they did not undergo any FDA regulatory review. Of the 113 devices recalled, 35 were for cardiovascular issues. This study was the topic of Congressional hearings re-evaluating FDA procedures and oversight. A 2014 study by Dr. Diana Zuckerman, Paul Brown, and Dr. Aditi Das of the National Center for Health Research, published in JAMA Internal Medicine, examined the scientific evidence that is publicly available about medical implants that were cleared by the FDA 510(k) process from 2008 to 2012. They found that scientific evidence supporting "substantial equivalence" to other devices already on the market was required by law to be publicly available, but the information was available for only 16% of the randomly selected implants, and only 10% provided clinical data. Of the more than 1,100 predicate implants that the new implants were substantially equivalent to, only 3% had any publicly available scientific evidence, and only 1% had clinical evidence of safety or effectiveness. The researchers concluded that publicly available scientific evidence on implants was needed to protect the public health. In 2014-2015 a new international agreement, the Medical