Pseudoskepticism (also spelled as pseudoscepticism) is a philosophical or scientific position that appears to be that of skepticism or scientific skepticism but in reality is a form of dogmatism. Nineteenth and early twentieth centuries An early use of the word was in self-denigration: on 31 August 1869, Swiss philosopher Henri-Frédéric Amiel wrote in his diary: It soon acquired its usual meaning where a claimed skeptic is accused of excessive sureness in turning initial doubts into certainties. In 1908 Henry Louis Mencken wrote on Friedrich Nietzsche's criticism of philosopher David Strauss that: Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Frederick L. Will used the term "pseudo-skepticism" in 1942. Alasdair MacIntyre writes: Notre Dame Professor of English, John E. Sitter used the term in 1977 in a discussion of Alexander Pope: "Pope's intent, I believe, is to chasten the reader's skepticism — the pseudo-skepticism of the overly confident 'you' ... " Truzzi In 1987, Marcello Truzzi revived the term specifically for arguments which use scientific-sounding language to disparage or refute given beliefs, theories, or claims, but which in fact fail to follow the precepts of conventional scientific skepticism. He argued that scientific skepticism is agnostic to new ideas, making no claims about them but waiting for them to satisfy a burden of proof before granting them validity. Pseudoskepticism, by contrast, involves "negative hypotheses"—theoretical assertions that some belief, theory, or claim is factually wrong—without satisfying the burden of proof that such negative theoretical assertions would require. In 1987, while working as a professor of sociology at Eastern Michigan University, Truzzi gave the following description of pseudoskeptics in the journal Zetetic Scholar (which he founded): Truzzi attributed the following characteristics to pseudoskeptics: Denying, when only doubt has been established Double standards in the application of criticism The tendency to discredit rather than investigate Presenting insufficient evidence or proof Assuming criticism requires no burden of proof Making unsubstantiated counter-claims Counter-claims based on plausibility rather than empirical evidence Suggesting that unconvincing evidence provides grounds for completely dismissing a claim He characterized true skepticism as: Acceptance of doubt when neither assertion nor denial has been established No burden of proof to take an agnostic position Agreement that the corpus of established knowledge must be based on what is proved, but recognising its incompleteness Even-handedness in requirement for proofs, whatever their implication Accepting that a failure of a proof in itself proves nothing Continuing examination of the