they thought the disease had not been inflicted within the meaning of the word "inflict" in section 20. Mathew J said that he agreed with Stephen. Stephen said that he had been informed that Grantham J agreed with him. Huddleston B said that he thoroughly agreed with Stephen. Lord Coleridge CJ said that he agreed with all or almost all of what Wills and Stephen said. Hawkins J specifically said that he thought it had been inflicted within the meaning of the word "inflict" in section 20. Wills J said (footnotes have been included in the body of the text, indicated by "(1)"): Stephen J said: A. L. Smith J said "it appears to me that this offence cannot be committed unless an assault has in fact been committed, and indeed this has been so held". Hawkins J said that he thought that the contention that bodily harm cannot be legally said to be "inflicted" unless it has been brought about by some act amounting to an assault was untenable. Maliciously In R v Mowatt Lord Diplock said: Therefore, the defendant must at least be reckless as to whether some harm, albeit not necessarily serious harm, is likely to be caused (see R v Savage, DPP v Parmenter), but a mere intention to frighten is not enough (see R v Sullivan). In R v Sullivan [1981] Crim LR 46, CA, the appellant was tried on charges of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and inflicting grievous bodily harm. The victim said that the appellant and a companion were drunk. He said that while he was in a street that was eight feet wide and had a narrow pavement, the appellant drove a car through that street at twenty-five to thirty miles an hour, mounted the pavement and injured him. The appellant denied that he was the driver of the car in a written statement to the police and said he could add nothing to that statement in an unsworn statement from the dock. However, during his closing speech, counsel for the defence suggested that all the appellant intended to do was frighten the victim and no more. The jury were directed that if there was an intention to frighten, and injury took place as a result, the appellant was guilty of an offence under section 20. The appellant was acquitted of the offence under section 18, but convicted of offences