passenger on 3801 had applied a handbrake on the third carriage, and that this, combined with the heavy load, the steep grade and the curvature of the line, had prevented the steam train from restarting. No fault was found with the signalling system, although the coroner recommended that it be upgraded as soon as possible. Contributing factors Contributing factors include: AC track circuits, which are less sensitive at detecting rail vehicles. Sand on the rails insulated the train's wheels and prevented the track circuit from detecting it - the train effectively became invisible to the signalling system. The signalling system was two-aspect colour light - a three aspect colour light may have provided the driver of the following train with more warning. No sand removal system fitted to 3801. No mechanism (at the time) for train-to-train or train-to-signalman communication (communication with signal boxes was only possible by track-side phones). It is believed that the handbrakes on one of the carriages may have been applied as a stunt. Consequences An interim ban was placed on the use of steam locomotives on the NSW railway system. The ban was lifted 9 months later. Operators were required to use one State Rail employee on each train Operators were required to carry insurance cover of $10 million. The government agreed to underwrite any claims exceeding that amount. See also Glenbrook rail accident References Railway accidents and incidents in New South Wales 1990 in Australia Railway accidents in 1990 1990s in New South Wales Train collisions in Australia 1990 disasters in Australia May 1990 events in Australia