mostly excerpts from treatises written between 1579 and 1589. The book's full title translates to English as, "Psychology: that is, on the perfection of man, his mind, and especially its origin, the comments and discussions of certain theologians & philosophers of our time who are shown on the turned page." Here, the term psychology refers to both a subject of inquiry ("the perfection of man, his mind, and especially its origin") and the inquiry itself ("the comments and discussions of certain theologians & philosophers of our time"). In the 17th century, Goclenius' Psychologia was read and quoted by scholars like Robert Burton, Daniel Sennert and Jakob Thomasius. Goclenius himself returned to his Psychologia in a textbook on natural science of 1604 and in some philosophical disputations. Logic Goclenius' crowning achievement is his original contribution made to term logic, called the Goclenian Sorites. In the words of the British logician Carveth Read: "It is the shining merit of Goclenius to have restored the Premises of the Sorites to the usual order of Fig. I.: whereby he has raised to himself a monument more durable than brass, and secured indeed the very cheapest immortality. How expensive, compared with this, was the method of the Ephesian incendiary!" An example for the use of sorites in an argumentative context is presented by Goclenius in his "Dissertatio De Ortu Animi" which concludes the first edition of the Psychologia. Contrary to Carveth Read's assessment, however, Dr. Rudolph Goclenius did not invent the Goclenian Sorites: St. Thomas Aquinas did: "[A] second demonstration takes as its starting point the conclusion of a first demonstration, whose terms are understood to contain the middle term which was the starting point of the first demonstration. Thus the second demonstration will proceed from four terms the first from three only, the third from five, and the fourth from six; so that each demonstration adds one term. Thus it is clear that first demonstrations are included in subsequent ones, as when this first demonstration—every B is A, every C is B, therefore every C is A—is included in this demonstration—every C is A, every D is C, therefore every D is A; and this again is included in the demonstration whose conclusion is that every E is A, so that for this final conclusion there seems to be one syllogism composed of several syllogisms having several middle terms. This may be expressed thus: