was so depleted that after the occupation of the wood, it was reorganised into a composite battalion. The divisional commander Major-General Charles Barter had urged Lieutenant-General William Pulteney, the III Corps commander, to cancel the attempt to use tanks in the wood as a substitute for artillery but had been over-ruled. The failure of the tanks was considered by the 47th (1/2nd London) Division to have been the main cause of the large number of casualties in the division but Barter was sacked on 28 September, for "wanton waste of men". Peter Liddle wrote that beyond imposing a delay, the German policy of unyielding defence and counter-attack failed and ought to be judged on the same terms as British and French methods. Haig and Joffre were right to believe that a serious German collapse was possible until late July and no convincing alternative to attrition, in the circumstances of late July to early September, has been proposed. Analysis of captured documents and prisoner interrogations indicated the strain being imposed on the German army. William Philpott criticised the weeks of costly, small, narrow-front attacks against a skilful and determined defence by the Germans, yet Gallwitz "had no better tactical method", which reduced operations to a battle of wills. In the Fourth Army area from counter-attacks were made against attacks, exposing German infantry to similar costly and frustrating failures. German artillery and air inferiority was a great disadvantage and led to constant losses. Sheldon also wrote that Allied aerial dominance in August put the Germans at a serious tactical disadvantage, that some troops began to avoid the remaining dugouts and that much of the Allied artillery was used constantly to bombard targets deep behind German lines. J. P.Harris wrote that on the German side, conditions were worse and the British improved the accuracy of their artillery-fire, with the help of aircraft observation. At the end of August, Falkenhayn was dismissed, partly due to disagreements over his conduct of the defence of the Somme. Prior and Wilson analysed the British on the Somme from which included the fighting for High Wood. In the first sixty days of the offensive, thirty-two British divisions had engaged and had suffered 126,000 casualties. The British were bogged down, having advanced on a front. On fifty days in the period, an average of eight divisions were in the line but fewer than six battalions attacked and only twice