two remaining 635th and 334th Battalions of the 320th Regiments and executed two ambushes: the first on November 20 at the north side and the second on November 24 on the south side of the Ia Drang River. On November 26, with no further contact, the ARVN withdrew from the area. A 1966 PAVN Central Highlands Front report claimed that in five major engagements with U.S. forces, PAVN forces suffered 559 soldiers killed and 669 wounded. PAVN histories claim the United States suffered 1,500 to 1,700 casualties during the Ia Drang Campaign. The official PAVN history claimed that the Plei Me Campaign, which included Ia Drang eliminated 1,700 U.S and 1,270 ARVN and shot down 59 helicopters and destroyed 89 vehicles. The U.S. military confirmed 305 killed and 524 wounded (including 234 killed and 242 wounded between November 14 and 18, 1965), and claimed 3,561 PAVN were killed and more than 1,000 were wounded during engagements with the 1st Cavalry Division troops. According to ARVN intelligence sources, each of the three PAVN regiments' initial strength was 2,200 soldiers: 1st Battalion-500, 2nd Battalion-500, 3rd Battalion-500, Mortar Company-150, Anti-Aircraft Company-150, Signal Company-120, Transportation Company-150, Medical Company-40, Engineer Company-60, Recon Company-50. ARVN's II Corps Command recapitulates the losses of the PAVN from 18 October to 26 November as follows: KIA (body count) 4,254, KIA (estimated) 2,270, WIA 1293, captured 179, weapons (crew served) 169, (individual) 1,027. PAVN casualty figures advanced by II Corps Command relied especially on PAVN regimental command posts' own loss reports (as indicated by Maj. Gen. Kinnard), intercepted by ARVN radio listening stations. Furthermore, they include PAVN troop casualties caused by the 5-day Arc Light airstrike that the PAVN and U.S. sides fail to take into account. As the outcome of the entire campaign, the ARVN claimed that the PAVN were unable to achieve their objectives of overrunning the camp and destroying the relief column at Plei Me, which is confirmed in the B3 Front commander's account, as well as that the entire B3 Field Force strength had been wiped out and the survivors pushed over the Cambodian border. This battle can be seen as a blueprint for tactics by both sides. The Americans used air mobility, artillery fire and close air support to accomplish battlefield objectives. The PAVN learned that they could neutralize that firepower by quickly engaging American forces at very close range. PAVN Col. Nguyễn Hữu An