heaviest hit. The 1st Field Regiment commenced counter-battery fire at 02:50. As the artillery locating radar was suspected of being faulty, the enemy firing position was located manually using compass bearings on sound and flash. With the likely firing point plotted, 240 rounds were fired that made the mortaring cease. The Australians remained alert in case of a ground assault, but this did not occur. The Australian artillery continued to shell suspected VC firing positions and withdrawal routes until 04:10. Although the VC were expected to have withdrawn, several company patrols were dispatched the following morning to search the area east of Nui Dat in response. Pursuing the Vietcong Townsend ordered B Company under Major Noel Ford to prepare for a patrol to locate the firing points which were believed to be in the area between the abandoned villages of Long Tân, Long Phước, and the Nui Dat 2 feature. Having done so, it was to establish the direction of the VC withdrawal. Meanwhile, a platoon from C Company mounted in armoured personnel carriers was to investigate a suspected mortar location south-west of Nui Dat. A Company would continue its patrol in the vicinity of Nui Dat 2, while 7 Platoon, C Company, already conducting a night ambush on the southern edge of the TAOR, would search some sites as it returned that morning. No SAS patrols were deployed as a result of the attack, although several previously had been planned to the north between Bình Ba and the Courtenay plantation in preparation for upcoming operations went ahead. Another patrol was inserted near the Song Rai, north-east of Nui Dat, on the morning of 17 August. The patrol located several tracks about six hours old and headed in a westerly direction that were possibly made by a VC logistics unit. Radio interference and faulty equipment meant that the company was unable to report the information until extraction two days later. Australian intelligence continued to assess a ground attack against Nui Dat as unlikely, with the bombardment an indicator of further offensive action against 1 ATF, Jackson felt he would be unable to adequately respond with only one battalion. 5 RAR was therefore ordered to return to Nui Dat, and was expected back by 18 August. Although SIGINT had earlier alerted Jackson to the possible presence of a strong VC force in the vicinity of Nui Dat 2, patrols of the