ways. Eric Oberheim and Paul Hoyningen-Huene argue that realist and anti-realist philosophies of science are also incommensurable, thus scientific theories themselves may be meta-incommensurable. Similarly, Nicholas Best describes a different type of incommensurability between philosophical theories of meaning. He argues that if the meaning of a first-order scientific theory depends on its second-order theory of meaning, then two first order theories will be meta-incommensurable if they depend on substantially different theories of meaning. Whereas Kuhn and Feyerabend's concepts of incommensurability do not imply complete incomparability of scientific concepts, this incommensurability of meaning does. Notes Bibliography Primary bibliography Secondary bibliography External links Bibliography on Inconmensurabilidad – Leibniz Universität Hannover (in English) Incommensurability Online – Volume of Abstracts – Leibniz Universität Hannover (in English) An article by Errol Morris critiquing Kuhn's ideas of incommensurability. (in English) The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Philosophy of science