German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop outlined a plan where the countries would agree to nonintervention in the others' affairs and would renounce measures aimed at the others' vital interests and that "there was no problem between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us." The Germans discussed prior hostilities between the countries in the 1930s. They addressed their common ground of anti-capitalism, stating "there is one common element in the ideology of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies," "neither we nor Italy have anything in common with the capitalist west" and "it seems to us rather unnatural that a socialist state would stand on the side of the western democracies." The Germans explained that their prior hostility toward Soviet Bolshevism had subsided with the changes in the Comintern and the Soviet renunciation of a world revolution. Astakhov characterized the conversation as "extremely important." As Germany scheduled its invasion of Poland for August 25 and prepared for war with France, German war planners in August estimated that, with an expected British naval blockade and the hostile Soviet Union, Germany would fall short of its war mobilization requirements by 9.9 million tons of oil and 260,000 tons of manganese. At that time, Germany was still importing 20% of foodstuffs, 66% of oil and 80% of rubber. It possessed only two to three months of rubber and three to six months of oil supplies. Because of the expected naval blockade, the Soviet Union would become the only supplier for many items. On August 5, Soviet officials stated that the completion of the trading credit agreement was crucial for further political talks. Hitler himself telephoned to interrupt economic talks, pushing for a settlement. By August 10, the countries worked out the last minor technical details, but the Soviets delayed signing the economic agreement for almost ten days until they were sure that they had also reached a political agreement. The Soviet ambassador explained that the Soviets had begun their British negotiations "without much enthusiasm" at a time when they felt Germany would not "come to an understanding," and the parallel talks with the British could not be simply broken off when they had been initiated after "mature consideration." Meanwhile, every internal German military and economic study had argued that Germany was doomed to defeat without at least Soviet neutrality. The