the Grand Army the next day, and to retire instead to the prepared line of defense at Kaluga. The mainly French and Italian forces won a victory on the day, but Napoleon might have realized that "unless with a new Borodino" the way through Kaluga and Medyn was closed. This allowed Kutuzov to fulfill his strategic plans to force Napoleon on the way of retreat in the north, through Mozhaisk and Smolensk, the route of his advance that he had wished to avoid. French casualties were about 6,000–8,000, while the Russians lost about 8,000 men killed and wounded. Kutuzov's strategy On the 25 October 1812 at about two in the morning after the battle Kutuzov retired his army in perfect order southwards away from the French army behind the rivulet of Koricza to secure the road to Kaluga. The British general Wilson who wanted Napoleon to be attacked protested against this strategy. Kutuzov replied to him, here simplified for a better understanding: "I am by no means sure that the total destruction of the Emperor Napoleon and his army would be such a benefit to Russia; his succession would fall to the United Kingdom whose domination would then be intolerable." Aftermath The immediate result of the battle of Maloyaroslavets on the 24th had been a strange French tactical victory: the French army had secured a bridgehead, the Russian army had retreated but Napoleon did not follow them. The long-term result of the battle became a Russian strategic victory as they had disturbed Napoleon's ability to wage a war. On the 25th, at daybreak, Napoleon nearly was caught by a Cossack regiment but was saved by a corps of grenadiers. Since the 25th Napoleon carried a bag containing a lethal poison using a string around his neck. On the 26th, Napoleon decided to retreat over Mozhaisk and Borodino to Smolensk for reasons unknown resulting in the strange detour in the attached map of Napoleon's invasion of Russia at Maloyaroslavets. On the 26th Napoleon again set out for Maloyaroslavets,...he ordered the retreat of his own army by Mozhaisk on Smolensk. Before Napoleon could come to such a conclusion he must have been very conscious of the extreme weakness of his army, for the march he now decided on undertaking was one of two hundred and sixty miles through a devastated country, whose towns, sacked and burnt, offered no shelter or supply against