courts however, noting that the language and structure of the FSIA and particularly § 1603(b) appear to contemplate that entities and not individuals are covered by the "agency or instrumentality" definition, had concluded that individuals are not entitled to immunity under the FSIA. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that former Somalian government official is not covered by, and therefore entitled to immunity under the FSIA and remanding to District Court to determine whether defendant is entitled to common law immunity). However, the Supreme Court in 2010 decided that the Act does not extend immunity to a government official acting on behalf of a state. In the case of Samantar v. Yousuf decided in June 2010, the Supreme Court found that there is nothing to suggest that "foreign state" within the FSIA should be read to include an official acting on behalf of that state. Justice Stevens, with the unanimous support of the Supreme Court, made the decision into common law with his many paragraphs on the court case. This helped define what is considered to be a foreign state, which now included state officials acting within their jurisdiction. Moreover, the potential of the FSIA to undermine foreign policy goals of the executive branch has been an ongoing concern. Commercial activity exception The most important exception to sovereign immunity is the commercial activity exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). That section provides three bases on which a plaintiff can sue a foreign state: When the plaintiff's claim is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state. When the plaintiff's claim is based upon an act by the foreign state which is performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity outside the United States. When the plaintiff's claim is based upon an act by the foreign state which is performed outside the United States in connection with commercial activity outside the United States and which causes a direct effect in the United States. In determining whether the Foreign State's activities are commercial, the FSIA requires that courts look to the nature of the act itself, rather than the purpose for which the foreign sovereign engaged in the act (28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)). For example, the operation of a fee-based transportation system would likely be a commercial act, while imposing fines for parking tickets would be a public act,