legislatures. In 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment changed the system so that senators were popularly elected in staggered statewide races. Judicial power – In the United States, judge(s) have the power to rule unconstitutional any law or regulation, even if duly approved by the legislature and signed by the president. Judges are appointed (not elected) for life with a high threshold for removal, which makes them independent. Dahl feels that the judiciary has used its rather unconstrained authority to essentially make national policy through judicial fiat. Limitations on Congressional power – As interpreted by the judiciary, the Constitution reserves sovereignty in many domains of regulation to the states. The powers of Congress are limited to a specific list. From 1895 until the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified in 1913, court interpretations of constitutional requirements for "direct" taxes made a federal income tax impracticable, limiting the revenue available to the federal government. During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court interpreted the economic powers of Congress very narrowly, giving the federal government very little power to affect the economy. Modern judicial interpretation has allowed the federal government to have a much greater influence over the economy. What kind of constitution is best? Dahl considers the question of whether the details of the American Constitution, as amended and practiced in modern times, are superior or inferior to the constitutional systems of other stable democracies. His criteria for evaluation are: Political stability (that is, remaining democratic) Effective protection of democratic rights Democratic fairness Fosters consensus building Promotes effective problem solving Maintaining stability Dahl supposes that there are certain conditions which make it easier to maintain a democracy in a given country. He writes that these seem to include "the effective control by elected leaders over the military and police, a political culture supportive of democratic beliefs, and a relatively well-functioning economic order, among others." Dahl proposes that highly unfavorable circumstances cause instability, no matter the constitutional systems. Under highly favorable circumstances, a country may remain democratic given a range of possible constitutional arrangements, whether or not the system is the best kind for promoting stability. In mixed conditions, he postulates, the details of a country's constitution may tip the balance between stability and undesirable changes, such as conversion to dictatorship. Dahl points out that the superiority of presidential vs. parliamentary systems in this regard is disputed*, and that correlation between breakdown and presidential systems in the