interpretations of the second part have been provided by Miller (1986), Meinwald (1991), Sayre (1996), Allen (1997), Turnbull (1998), Scolnicov (2003), and Rickless (2007). It is difficult to offer even a preliminary characterisation, since commentators disagree even on some of the more rudimentary features of any interpretation. Benjamin Jowett did maintain in the introduction to his translation of the book that the dialogue was certainly not a Platonic refutation of the Eleatic doctrine. In fact, it could well be an Eleatic assessment of the theory of Forms. It might even mean that the Eleatic monist doctrine wins over the pluralistic contention of Plato. The discussion, at the very least, concerns itself with topics close to Plato's heart in many of the later dialogues, such as Being, Sameness, Difference, and Unity; but any attempt to extract a moral from these passages invites contention. The structure of the remainder of the dialogue: The Fourth Deduction 159b–160b The Fifth Deduction 160b–163b The Sixth Deduction 163b–164b The Seventh Deduction 164b–165e The Eighth Deduction 165e–166c Third man argument Plato's theory of Forms, as it is presented in such dialogues as the Phaedo, Republic and the first part of the Parmenides, seems committed to the following principles: "F" stands for any Form ("appearance, property")—forma is a Boethian translation for εἶδος (eidos), which is the word that Plato used. Plato, in the Parmenides, uses the example "greatness" (μέγεθος) for "F-ness"; Aristotle uses the example "man". One-over-many: For any plurality of F things, there is a form of F-ness by virtue of partaking of which each member of that plurality is F. Self-predication: Every form of F-ness is itself F. Non-self-partaking: No form partakes of itself. Uniqueness: For any property F, there is exactly one form of F-ness. Purity: No form can have contrary properties. One/many: The property of being one and the property of being many are contraries. Oneness: Every form is one. However, the TMA shows that these principles are mutually contradictory, as long as there is a plurality of things that are F: (In what follows, μέγας [megas; "great"] is used as an example; however, the argumentation holds for any F.) Begin, then, with the assumption that there is a plurality of great things, say (A, B, C). By one-over-many, there is a form of greatness (say, G1) by virtue of partaking of which A, B, and C are great. By self-predication, G1 is great.