possible truth. This contingency is usually described by the statement "there is a possible world in which Sherlock Holmes exists". The possibilist argues that apparent existential claims such as this (that "there are" possible worlds of various sorts) ought to be taken more or less at face value: as stating the existence of two or more worlds, only one of which (at the most) can be the actual one. Hence, they argue, there are innumerably many possible worlds other than our own, which exist just as much as ours does. Most actualists will be happy to grant the interpretation of "Sherlock Holmes' existence is possible" in terms of possible worlds. But they argue that the possibilist goes wrong in taking this as a sign that there exist other worlds that are just like ours, except for the fact that we are not actually in them. The actualist argues, instead, that when we claim "possible worlds" exist we are making claims that things exist in our own actual world which can serve as possible worlds for the interpretation of modal claims: that many ways the world could be (actually) exist, but not that any worlds which are those ways exist other than the actual world around us. Viewpoints From an actualist point of view, such as Adams', possible worlds are nothing more than fictions created within the actual world. Possible worlds are mere descriptions of ways this world (the actual one) might have been, and nothing else. Thus, as modal constructions, they come in as a handy heuristic device to use with modal logic; as it helps our modal reasoning to imagine ways the world might have been. Thus, the actualist interpretation of "◊p" sees the modality (i.e., "the way" in which it is true) as being de dicto and not entailing any ontological commitment. So, from this point of view, what distinguishes the actual world from other possible worlds is what distinguishes reality from a description of a simulation of reality, this world from Sherlock Holmes': the former exists and is not a product of imagination and the latter does not exist and is a product of the imagination set in a modal construction. From a modal realist's point of view, such as Lewis', the proposition "◊p" means that p obtains in at least one other, distinct world that is as real as the one we are in. If a