(1988) have shown that if only at-will contracts are enforceable, then the parties have insufficient incentives to make relationship-specific investments. Subsequently, several authors such as Aghion et al. (1994) have shown that the underinvestment problem (sometimes called the hold-up problem) can be solved if specific performance contracts are feasible. However, these conclusions rely on the assumption that there are no information asymmetries. Schmitz (2022) has pointed out that if the seller may gain an informational advantage over the buyer after the contract has been signed, then at-will contracts may sometimes be preferable from an economic efficiency point-of-view. See also Damages Equitable remedy Tort Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) no specific performance on employment contracts Beswick v Beswick Tamplin v James References Sources A Kronman, ‘Specific Performance’ (1978) 45 University of Chicago LR 351 S Schwartz, ‘The Case for Specific Performance’ (1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 271 I Macneil, ‘Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky’ (1982) 68 Virginia LR 947 External links Guide to specific performance in property contracts Contract law Equity (law) Judicial remedies