1st Guards Mechanized Corps and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps. While these Armies were preparing for the imminent offensive, the 17th Air Army was busy flying reconnaissance missions, although they could not report on much due to excellent German camouflage. Because of the serious tank losses of January–February along the Margit line, Marshal Tolbukhin ordered that no Front/Army level counter-attacks were to take place, and local tactical attacks should be very limited; the only objective was to hold the Front and grind down the German offensive. The two tanks Corps would remain under the 26th and 27th Armies to be utilized only in dire need. The defensive strategy of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was one of anti-tank defense as this was what the Germans were going to use. On average for every kilometer of Front, 700+ anti-tank and 600+ anti-infantry mines were placed, with these numbers rising to 2,700 and 2,900 respectively in the 26th Army's sector. Between the 4th Guards Army and 26th Guards Army, 66 anti-tank zones were created whose depth reached 30–35 km. Each anti-tank position had 8-16 artillery guns and a similar number of anti-tank guns. A prime example of the scale of defensive installments can be seen in the 26th Army's 135th Rifle Corps. Between 18 February and 3 March the 233rd Rifle Division had dug 27 kilometers of trenches, 130 gun and mortar positions, 113 dugouts, 70 command posts and observation points, and laid 4,249 antitank and 5,058 antipersonnel mines, all this on a frontage of 5 kilometers. Although there were no tanks in this defensive zone, there was an average of 17 anti-tank guns per kilometer forming 23 tank killing grounds. Overarching Soviet military structure The Soviet Forces, contrary to the Germans, did not have such odd structural complications as the Soviet Armies could make independent decisions while the Stavka could intervene when asked or if necessary; a much more straight forward military structure with clear boundaries. This is an example of a de-centralized command. It was not uncommon for the Soviets to actually search out and exploit the boundaries between the OKW and OKH as they knew these areas would suffer from poorer military command; the advance to Budapest is an example. Order of battle for 6 - 15 March, 1945 These are the main units that were a part of the Army Groups/Front which saw combat in Operation Spring Awakening. Please