behalf of victims. Other crimes against the Serbian Orthodox Church In addition to forced conversions, Tomasevich describes other elements of the "Ustaše massive attack against the Serbian Orthodox Church". The Ustaše killed 157 Orthodox priests, among them 3 Serb Orthodox bishops (cutting the throat of the bishop of Banja Luka and killing the archbishop of Sarajevo), while they jailed and tortured the Orthodox archbishop of Zagreb, Dositej Vasić. The Ustaše expelled to Serbia 327 Orthodox priests and one bishop, while 2 other bishops and 12 priests left on their own. Thus 85% of the Orthodox priests in the Independent State of Croatia were either killed or expelled by the Ustaše, in order to "leave the Orthodox population without spiritual leadership so the Ustašas' policy of forced or fear-induced conversions to Catholicism would be easier to carry out". The Ustaše destroyed and desecrated numerous Orthodox Churches, forbade the Cyrillic script and Julian calendar (both used in the Orthodox Church), even prohibited the term "Serbian Orthodox Church". Orthodox schools were shut down, and the Church was prohibited from collecting contributions from believers, robbing it of income. Orthodox Church properties were confiscated by the Ustaše, some turned over to the Croatian Catholic Church. Finally, to destroy the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Ustaše tried to create its own, alternative Croatian Orthodox Church, with an imported Russian priest. but failed to gain adherents. Tomasevich states that this massive Ustaše attack on the Serbian Orthodox Church "was approved and supported by many Croatian Catholic priests", and that the Croatian Roman Catholic Church hierarchy and the Vatican "regarded Ustaše policies against the Serbs and Serbian Orthodox Church as advantageous to Roman Catholicism". Overall assessments of Stepinac's actions during WWII Tomasevich assesses Stepinac's wartime words and deeds in three categories: (1) Private actions to help certain individuals and groups, where he states Stepinac "deserves highest praise, although his actions were not always successful", (2) Proclamations of general human rights, expressed in his sermons at first "occasionally and mildly", but more strongly after 1943 (after the Ustashe had already perpetrated most of the genocides, and it was clear the Nazis and Ustashe would be defeated), also deserve praise, and (3) Statements dealing with overall Church policy toward the wartime Croatian state. Here Tomasevich states "there are serious shortcomings in Stepinac's statements and actions toward the Ustashe regime and its genocidal actions against the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church".