them claimed that the crew missed to set their altimeters correctly in accordance with the ATC's instruction. Crash investigation proved that the altimeters were set correctly, since the altimeter found at the crash scene had QFE pressure set at 981. Even if the crew was mistakenly descending having QNH in mind, collision with the terrain below the airport elevation (approx. 350 m Above Mean Sea Level) shouldn't have happened. Second theory claimed the possibility that the crew confused altitude in meters for altitude in feet. However, the crew confirmed approved altitude several times, in meters. It is hard to imagine that two experienced pilots, with thousands of flying hours on the aircraft, would make such a mistake. The inhabitants of Suchdol promoted another theory, based on alleged testimonies of survivors, that the crew mistakenly took illuminated railway track and road, under the Suchdol's gorge, for the airport. They based this theory on statements that passengers near the cockpit, shortly before the impact, have heard the pilot announcing visual contact with the runway and starting to land. If this was the case, it could be assumed that the pilot misinterpreted road/railway lights as the runway threshold lights and started landing prematurely. This theory is questionable, though spatial disorientation was a factor contributing to the crash, since an experienced crew, flying under IMC, should restrain from looking out from the cockpit (Visual Flight Rules flight) and must rely solely on their instruments (Instrument Flight Rules flight). However, bearing in mind that ILS and PAR were inoperative, it can happen that the crew was intensively looking out for a visual contact and thus missed to monitor the aircraft's altimeters and correlate read altitude to the ATC's instruction and airport's elevation. The official report states that, during the inspection of the cockpit wreckage, it was found that "Both radio compasses on board the aircraft were set to only one beacon - PR". This fact does not explain the non-compliance with the altitude, but explains the horizontal deviation from the glide path, and testifies about the crew's acts and cooperation before the crash. On a non-precision approach, when using two beacons, the crew should have set both frequencies, so that the correct course can be followed. This is the reason why the crew did not detect, in the final approach, that they continuously deviate from glide path over PR NDB and L NDB to the