On 5 November 2010, JS Air Flight 201, a Beechcraft 1900 passenger aircraft on a charter service from Karachi to the Bhit Shah gas field in Sindh, Pakistan, crashed near Karachi's Jinnah International Airport, after suffering an engine malfunction at take-off. All 21 people on board were killed. The investigation by Pakistan's Civil Aviation Authority concluded that the primary cause of the accident was the "inappropriate skill level" of the captain in dealing with the malfunction, and more generally the flight crew's non-adherence to the procedures prescribed by the aircraft manufacturer in such abnormal circumstances. Accident The aircraft had been chartered to fly 17 personnel of Italian oil and gas company Eni from Jinnah International Airport in Karachi to the Bhit Shah gas field. Three crew members and one airport security guard were also on board. At 01:55 UTC, the flight crew contacted Karachi Ground for take off. The Karachi Ground Controller replied "copied JS-201 start up approved runway two five left" and this was acknowledged by cockpit crew. The Captain cleared the area towards left side and began start up procedure for Engine No 1. Following this the crew contacted Karachi Ground requesting taxi instructions which were given. Having received this the pilots conducted the pre-take off checklist. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data shows that the right engine propeller feathering system was checked as being in manual position. As per procedure, run up checks are supposed to be carried out and the feathering function of both engines is to be checked simultaneously. However, the pilots in this case only checked No 2 engine's feathering mechanism serviceability manually, contrary to the documented procedures. At 02:03 UTC, the aircraft was cleared for takeoff and left the runway. Shortly thereafter the right engine flamed out, and the airspeed started to decrease slightly. The First Officer then put the failed engine into feathered position. At this stage, it is considered likely that the pilot monitoring (PM) may have observed only partial feathering. Having made the Pilot Flying (PF) aware of this, the PM made further attempts to fully feather engine number two. This both wasted precious time and, despite being authorised by the captain, was contrary to the documented procedures that no remedial action be taken below above ground level. Both airmen are recorded discussing the issue pertaining to Engine No 2, despite this the captain goes on to request the First Officer