plan to Ruzyně Airport. ATC contacted the crew again, while the aircraft was at an altitude of approaching PG NDB (beacon) from the southeast, and instructed the crew to continue to PG NDB then to PR NDB, and make a published, standard turn. ATC approved descent to (communication was in metres, not feet) and provided QFE pressure of 981. ATC's instruction was correctly read back by the JP450's crew. After passing overhead PR NDB the crew entered a published landing procedure. However, somewhere above the village of Vodochody the crew inadvertently missed to start the published right turn and continued in a broader turn over villages of Veliká Ves and Kojetice. (See Fig. 2). After executing a wider-than-published right turn, the crew entered the final approach for runway 25 (later known as runway 24) in IMC conditions (fog). Without the ILS and PAR support the crew was placed in a challenging and stressful situation during the final approach. Stress hormones level found, post mortem, in the body of the First Officer proves the emotional stress the crew was exposed to. In addition, while executing a non-standard right turn the crew positioned the aircraft to the south (left) of the published glide path for the final approach. This horizontal deviation from the glide path continued to increase and at the place of the impact it was approximately . (see Fig. 3) During the turn, ATC again alerted the crew to an ILS outage, repeated the information about the QFE pressure at the airport, and required confirmation of the approach over two NDBs - "JP450, confirm approach over PR beacon and L beacon". At 09:18 JP450 confirmed - "I understand, PR and L beacons". This was the last transmission received from the JP450. During this communication the crew continued to descend below the altitude approved by the ATC and deviate horizontally from the glide path, flying directly towards a Suchdol’s gorge, cut by the Vltava river, and well below the airport's elevation. Unfortunately, there are no publicly available Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) or Flight Data Recorder (FDR) recordings, to credibly reconstruct the cockpit communication and actions of the crew. Moreover, some sources6,7 cited the official report that the CVR stopped recording some 15 minutes before the crash due to a short magnetic tape, so there is no data regarding cockpit communication in this critical part of the flight. The crew, most probably,