failed to draw French reserves away from the British. The fourth offensive, Gneisenau, was an attempt by the Germans to straighten the line from Noyon to Montdidier between the two large salients created by the first three offensives. This would free men and materiel enabling a final thrust to end the war. A second objective of the offensive was to gain control of the Compiegne-Reims rail line to ease logistical problems in supplying their armies in the Marne salient. While the Germans in the center of the attack were able to cross the Matz River (about from their starting point), the attack failed to achieve either of the two main objectives. The fifth and final spring offensive, Marneschutz-Reims, was two-pronged, aimed at capturing Reims and its rail center, giving the Germans complete control of the Reims-Soissons rail line. This would ease a logistics crisis the Germans were facing in the Marne salient. While the Germans crossed the Marne west of Reims, the attack east of Reims was completely stopped by the evening of the first day. Faced with complete failure, the Germans called off the attack by the evening of the second day. By the end of the Spring Offensive the German Army had occupied two vast salients on the Western Front. One salient was in the British sector between Arras on the Scarpe River and La Fère on the Oise River. The second was in the French sector from just west of Reims in the east to Noyon in the west and south to Château-Thierry. Building and Training the American Army When the American Army entered the war in 1917, it was in a woeful state of unpreparedness. It had approximately 285,000 Springfield rifles on hand, about 400 light field guns, 150 heavy field guns, and fewer than 1,500 machine guns of four non-interchangeable types. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-chief of the British forces in France, said there was enough American ammunition to support a regimental attack for about nine hours. In the aviation section there were 55 training airplanes all obsolete. Of the 65 officers and about 1000 men there were 35 officers who could fly, five of whom were combat ready. Because America never recovered from the great loss in ships during its Civil War, it lacked the tonnage to transport men and materiel across the Atlantic in sufficient quantities to alter the course of the