or absence of functional air and naval force essential to any cross-strait military operation. Although Chiang Kai-shek had retreated to Taiwan by the time of the negotiation of the treaty, the KMT still maintained air and naval superiority over the PLA, which put the PLA in a disadvantageous position. A reflection of that was PLA’s defeat in the battle of Guningtou, where wooden boats of the CCP were met with well-equipped KMT armoured warships, and landing troops had to fight without air cover. The lack of air force capable of interception led to frequent and unimpeded KMT airstrikes against industrial targets following the seizures of large cities by the CCP, which elevated the importance of Soviet support in building a national air force and navy. In the early stage of the negotiation, Zhu De proposed buying 100 aircraft, 100-200 helicopters 40-80 bombers as well as training 1,000 Chinese pilots and 300 personnel at the Soviet Union. Mao also expressed his hope in Soviet air support for the planned attack on Taiwan but was rejected by Stalin for it would give the US an excuse to intervene. Leaning to One Side In his “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” published on July 1, 1949, Mao articulated the “leaning to one side” foreign policy directive, in which he framed a world divided between the confrontational Socialist and imperialist camps and that “sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.” Thus, faced with the bleak situation and threats from both within and without, consolidating the communist rule under the cold war framework of the mid-20th century Mao saw the necessity and benefits in firmly siding with the Soviet Union and joining the socialist camp. He perceived the cooperation within the socialist camp as goodwill and sincere assistance in countries' development in contrast to the Marshall plan, which Mao considered a pretense of exploitation and the US agenda to exert political influence into the recipient countries. For China, materializing rapid industrialization through economic assistance was one of the primary goals, which rendered the need for Soviet economic and technological assistance the driving force behind the 1950 treaty. Ideology When faced with the choice between the “imperialist” western bloc and the Soviet-led socialist camp, Mao chose to side with the Soviet Union because of ideological proximity. In contrast to the Marshall plan bearing “imperialist” and “interventionist” connotations, Soviet aid was framed