below). It claims that free will does not exist, and God has absolute control over a person's actions. Hard theological determinism is similar in implication to hard determinism, although it does not invalidate compatibilist free will. Hard theological determinism is a form of theological incompatibilism (see figure, top left). Weak theological determinism is either compatible or incompatible with metaphysical libertarian free will depending upon one's philosophical interpretation of omniscience - and as such is interpreted as either a form of hard theological determinism (known as theological fatalism), or as soft theological determinism (terminology used for clarity only). Soft theological determinism claims that humans (or all organisms as per Jainism, because, otherwise they will never evolve out of their primary existence in the absence of a creator or director of the universe as per an argument similar to free will theorem) have free will to choose their actions, holding that God, whilst knowing their actions before they happen, does not affect the outcome. The belief is that their God's providence is "compatible" with voluntary choice. Soft theological determinism is known as theological compatibilism (see figure, top right). This view is held by Jainism. A rejection of theological determinism (or divine foreknowledge) is classified as theological incompatibilism also (see figure, bottom), and is relevant to a more general discussion of free will. The basic argument for theological fatalism in the case of weak theological determinism is as follows; Assume divine foreknowledge or omniscience Infallible foreknowledge implies destiny (it is known for certain what one will do) Destiny eliminates alternate possibility (one cannot do otherwise) Assert incompatibility with metaphysical libertarian free will This argument is very often accepted as a basis for theological incompatibilism: denying either libertarian free will or divine foreknowledge (omniscience) and therefore theological determinism. On the other hand, theological compatibilism must attempt to find problems with it. The formal version of the argument rests on a number of premises, many of which have received some degree of contention. Theological compatibilist responses have included; Deny the truth value of future contingents, as proposed for example by Aristotle (although this denies foreknowledge and, therefore, theological determinism). Assert differences in non-temporal knowledge (space-time independence), an approach taken for example by Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, and C. S. Lewis. Deny the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: "If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely". For example, a human observer