than" 2,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, while Muntaner asserts that it comprised 700 knights and 24,000 infantry, the latter mostly Greek. Modern scholars consider these numbers to be exaggerated, but they do suggest that the Athenian army had numerical superiority over the Catalans. Faced with a numerically superior but less experienced enemy, the Company assumed a defensive position, taking care to select a battleground that favoured them. The Catalans chose a naturally strong position, protected by a swamp which, according to Gregoras, they enhanced by digging trenches and inundating them with water diverted from the nearby river. The Catalans took up positions on dry ground behind the swamp, arranging themselves in a solid line but the sources give no further details as to their dispositions. The Athenian army assembled at Zetouni (modern Lamia). On 10 March 1311, Walter of Brienne composed his testament there and led his army forth. The presence of the Frankish army at Zetouni at this time is a further testimony in favour of locating the battle at Halmyros, as Zetouni lies north of the Cephissus but southwest of Halmyros. For Muntaner's and Gregoras' accounts to be correct, the Catalans would have to be behind the Duke's army; Gregoras furthermore writes that the Catalans passed through the Thermopylae to arrive in Boeotia, which is extremely unlikely given the presence of strong Frankish garrisons at Zetouni and Bodonitsa. On the eve of battle, the 500 Catalans in the Duke's service, stricken by conscience, went to him and asked for leave to rejoin their old comrades-in-arms, saying they would rather die than fight against them. Walter reportedly gave them permission to leave, replying that they were welcome to die with the others. The Turkish auxiliaries took up a separate position nearby, thinking the quarrel was a pretext arranged by the Company and the Duke of Athens to exterminate them. Walter was reputed for his bravery, bordering on recklessness, and was confident of success, as evidenced by his haughty reply to the 500 mercenaries. Walter's pride and arrogance, combined with his numerical advantage and his innate belief in the superiority of heavy noble cavalry over infantry, led him to fatally underestimate the Catalans and order a charge, even though the terrain was adverse to cavalry. Impatient for action, according to Muntaner, Walter formed a cavalry line of 200 Frankish knights "with golden spurs", followed by the infantry, and placed himself