ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore the following course of action is suggested: A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore B. Make an arrangement with the Netherlands for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific[,] in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war. Reception of the Eight Actions The memo was read and appended by Captain Knox, who, despite being seemingly reluctant to "precipitate anything in the Orient", ultimately concurs. Specifically, he wrote (p. 6): It is unquestionably to our interest that Britain be not licked – just now she has a stalemate and probably can't do better. We ought to make certain that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably need from us substantial further destroyers and air-reinforcements to England. We should not precipitate anything in the Orient that would hamper our ability to do this – so long as probability continues. If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic is also protection to her and us in the Orient. However, I concur in your courses of action. We must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough to care for both. Stinnett writes that while "no specific record has been found by the author indicating whether [Anderson] or Roosevelt actually ever saw it [...] a series of secret presidential routing logs plus collateral intelligence information in the Navy files offer conclusive evidence that they did see it". His evidence of "secret presidential routing logs" is