deal with Ploisy Ravine beyond Missy Ravine. The 2nd Division would have to struggle with two arms of Vierzy Ravine, one of which cut completely across their sector. This meant that both the 1st and 2nd Divisions would have to contend with at least one ravine before the Moroccan 1st Division encountered the Chazelle-Léchelle Ravine. Preparation Foch's desire was to achieve surprise of time and place. In order to achieve this, unusual precautions were taken limiting all information regarding the attack to the high command. On 14 July Fayolle issued a memorandum ordering the entire Group of Armies of the Reserve not to trust anyone not personally known to be reliable, move only at night, light no fires, and to report anything and anyone suspicious. In order to confuse the Germans as to his intentions Mangin chose to keep his artillery far back from the German forward areas in what the Germans considered a defensive posture - within range of the German front lines but unable to slow the arrival of enemy replacements or reinforcements. In order to keep the Germans off guard Mangin planned to have the two American divisions rush forward to the front just before the hour of attack. The 1st and 2nd Divisions were in need of replacements after their engagements at Cantigny and Château-Thierry – Belleau Wood, respectively. Both divisions were brought to full strength with men from the 41st Division in early July. On 12 July, less than six days before the start of the attack, both the 1st and 2nd Divisions were assigned to the newly formed American III Corps which was attached to the French Sixth Army in the same order. Fayolle's Chief of Staff, General , sent a telegram two days later attaching both divisions to Mangin's Tenth Army. At 11am on 16 July, Fayolle sent a telegram to the French General Headquarters stating that Mangin recommended there be no preparatory barrage prior to the attack of the French Tenth Army so as to achieve complete surprise. The telegram further recommended the attack begin at 4:35am behind a rolling barrage. The French Sixth Army, just to the south, would require a preparation barrage lasting one half hour. Fayolle left the start time of the barrage to General Jean Marie Degoutte, commander of the French Sixth Army, with the caveat the barrage not precede the French Tenth Army jump-off. At noon on