Makin v Attorney General for New South Wales is a famous decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council where the modern common law rule of similar fact evidence originated. Background A husband and wife, John and Sarah Makin, were baby farmers and a one month old child died within 2 days after being given to them. They were charged with murdering the child and burying it in their backyard. During their trial evidence of twelve other babies found buried in the backyards of their previous residences was offered as evidence. On 9 March 1893 both were convicted, and recommended that Sarah Makin be shown mercy. The trial judge stated a special case for the opinion of a Full Court of the Supreme Court of NSW which heard the appeal on 23 March and handed down their decision on 30 March 1893, holding that the similar fact evidence was properly admitted. Immediately following the Full Court's decision, Stephen J sentenced both John and Sarah Makin to death by hanging. Sarah Makin's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment before the appeal to the Privy Council. The appeal to the Privy Council was based on whether this evidence was admissible or whether it was unfairly prejudicial to their defence. Opinion of the Court At the close of arguments on 22 July 1893 the Privy Council announced that its advice was that the appeal should be dismissed, and its reasons were published on 12 December 1893. Lord Herschell held that the evidence, in this case, was admissible, however, as a general rule evidence of a past similar event should not be admissible unless there are exceptional circumstances. It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to show the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, or