known as the Pentagon Papers, revealed that the US government had known from an early point in the conflict that it could not win the Vietnam War, and further showed that each administration since Eisenhower, and especially the Johnson administration, had "systematically lied, not only to the public but also to Congress" about the conduct of the war. To keep the publication of the Pentagon Papers going, Alperovitz developed a strategy to hand off portions of the report to one news publication at a time beginning with The Washington Post—which helped to create an ongoing media spectacle and to keep public interest in the contents of the papers alive for several weeks. With Ellsberg in hiding, Alperovitz handled the logistics of handing off the papers to the press, adopting the moniker "Mr. Boston" when speaking to journalists and exercising great caution in planning elaborate handoffs. In an interview with The New Yorker, Ellsberg said that "Alperovitz, in particular, was critical to the way this thing worked out … it was Alperovitz who devised the strategy of distributing the papers to as many news organizations as possible, including [to Ben Bagdikian at] The Washington Post, an approach that later proved to be crucial from both a legal and a public-relations standpoint. And it was Alperovitz who came up with the elaborate techniques for slipping the documents to reporters while evading the authorities." Works Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam In this work, Alperovitz investigates the role of the atomic bomb in shaping the formation of the U.S relationship with the Soviet Union and the makeup of the postwar international political order. Alperovitz provides evidence that once the atomic bomb had successfully been tested, the U.S policy towards the Soviet Union under the Truman Administration shifted from "conciliatory" to "tough" and he argues that Truman used the U.S possession of the atomic bomb as a diplomatic tool to force "Soviet acquiescence to American plans" for postwar Europe as the two powers negotiated at the Potsdam Conference." In this work, Alperovitz also presents substantive, although not definitive, evidence suggesting that top-level American civilian and military leaders knew the atomic bomb was not necessary to end World War II, but still used it to demonstrate strength vis-á-vis the Soviet Union. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb Drawing upon a host of new evidence that had been declassified since the publication of Atomic Diplomacy, such