from canal leading to the Kankakee River, discharge to cooling canal leading to Dresden Cooling Lake, discharged from lake through return cooling canal that eventually discharges into the Illinois River. Use of the cooling towers for supplemental cooling of canal system water is usually necessary during this mode of operation. Closed-cycle mode: Intake from return cooling canal leading back from Dresden Cooling Lake, discharge to cooling canal leading to Dresden Cooling Lake. Use of the cooling towers for supplemental cooling of canal system water is usually not necessary during this mode of operation. It also has cooling towers Electricity Production Incidents Between the 1970s and 1996, Dresden was fined $1.6 million for 25 incidents. June 5, 1970: A false high pressure signal due to instrument failure on the Dresden II reactor pressure control system caused turbine valves to dump steam (a "turbine trip"), which in turn automatically initiated a SCRAM. Void collapse in the reactor water caused the reactor water level to drop, which resulted in an automatic increase in feedwater flow. The feedwater pumps then tripped on low suction pressure. One pump turned back on automatically when the low suction pressure signal reset, feeding water rapidly into the now lower-pressure reactor vessel. Water level in the reactor rose rapidly until water entered the main steam lines. At this point, the false high pressure signal disappeared. The turbine dump valves closed, increasing back pressure in the reactor vessel and slowing the feedwater inlet flow. Cooling reactor water temperature caused further void collapse. Reactor water level began to rapidly lower once again. This again automatically caused the feedwater system to increase the flow rate into the vessel, and began to raise reactor water level. As cooler feedwater was again rapidly pumped into the reactor, void collapse caused water level to lower. The feedwater system responded by increasing feedwater flow. However, the indicator needle on the water level recorder stuck, which caused the operator to assume level had stopped rising in the reactor. The operator began increasing feedwater flow in order to raise water level in the reactor, manually overriding the automatic control system. The operator never checked a second indicator that showed the increasing level. Reactor water level continued rising and flooded the main steam lines. Two minutes later, the operator tapped on the water level recorder and the water level needle became unstuck, at which point the operator began reacting