their capability, but they need you to continue building on that success, preparing them for the fight today and the long hard fight for their future. They need your skill. They need your experience." Foreign internal defense policymaking has subsequently aided in Iraqi successes in reclaiming Tikrit, Baiji, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Recent evaluations of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan have yielded mixed results. A comprehensive study by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction concluded that "the U.S. government greatly overestimated its ability" to use COIN and stabilization tactics for long-term success. The report found that "successes in stabilizing Afghan districts rarely lasted longer than the physical presence of coalition troops and civilians." These findings are corroborated by scholarly studies of U.S. counterinsurgency activities in Afghanistan, which determined that backlashes by insurgents and the local population were common. See also General: Civilian casualty ratio Collective punishment Death squad Divide and rule Eizenstat and closing gaps False flag Foreign internal defence Fourth generation warfare Gladio Guerrilla warfare Grey-zone (international relations) Human rights violations Internally displaced people Irregular Warfare Kilcullen's Pillars Logical line of operation Low intensity conflict Counter-IED efforts COIN (board game) Specific: Anti-partisan operations in World War II Bandenbekämpfung Clear and hold Counter Insurgency Force Counter-insurgency operations during the Second Chechen War Pacification of Manchukuo Strategic Hamlet Fireforce U.S. specific: SEAL Team Six Special Forces Special Activities Division Delta Force 24th Special Tactics Squadron COINTELPRO Police adaptations: C3 policing References Notes Further reading Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), . Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "Tunnel at the End of the Light: A Critique of U.S. Counter-terrorist Grand Strategy," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2002), pp. 549–563. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How to Lose a War on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of a Counterinsurgency Success and Failure", in Jan Ångström and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Eds., Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War. (London: Frank Cass, 2007). Callwell, C. E., Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice. (Lincoln, Nebraska: Bison Books, 1996), . Cassidy, Robert M. Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). Catignani, Sergio. Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the two Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army. (London: Routledge, 2008), . Corum, James. Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency. (Minneapolis, MN: