On 8 March 1985, a car bomb exploded between 9 and 45 metres from the house of Shia cleric Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah in Beirut, Lebanon, in a failed assassination attempt by a Lebanese counter-terrorism unit linked to the Central Intelligence Agency. The bombing killed 80 people and injured 200, almost all civilians. Beirut experienced three other deadly car bombs in following months on 22 May, 14 August and 18 August 1985. The blast The bomb explosion, estimated to have been equivalent to 200 kg (440 lbs) of dynamite, occurred in the western Beirut suburb of Bir al-Abed, outside an apartment building. It killed worshippers, mostly women and girls, leaving Friday prayer services at an adjacent mosque, and destroyed two 7-story apartment buildings and a cinema. While several of Fadlallah's bodyguards were killed in the attack, the cleric escaped injury as he was attending Friday prayers at a nearby mosque. Locals fired guns in the air, following the blast, trying to clear the roads to allow ambulances to pass. A banner was strung across the blast site by locals, reading "Made in USA." Historical context In 1976, Gerald Ford became the first U.S. president to forbid political assassination, in the wake of the Church Commission, issuing Executive Order 11905. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan strengthened the policy with Executive Order 12333, which decreed that "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." This Executive Order remains in effect today. The Beirut car bombing occurred "within the continuously evolving framework of an American 'preemption' counterterror program". Following the 1983 United States embassy bombing, 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, and the 1984 U.S. embassy annex bombing, the U.S. military considered a range of retaliatory options, but it was unclear that these would have any deterrent value. On 14 November 1983, Then-president Ronald Reagan authorized a retaliatory strike, but Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger did not authorize U.S. aircraft to take off for reasons that have not been disclosed. CIA director William Casey, along with CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin, favored the use of preemptive counter-terrorism practices in Lebanon; others, including Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John N. McMahon, did not approve of the strategy, concerned that it would violate Executive Order 12333. Responsibility In June 1985, the Washington Post reported that a CIA supported counter terrorism unit, made up