give it a quick diving firing-burst, then dive away to regroup, climb, and attack again. Cactus pilots constantly refined their tactics and techniques, relying on teamwork in dogfights, improving their gunnery to remain effective against the Zero pilots. Because of the Zero's maneuverability, American pilots quickly adapted hit-and-run tactics similar to those used by the American Flying Tigers in China and Burma. They also used a two-plane flight section, a technique developed by the U.S. Navy fighter pilots John Thach and Edward O'Hare, and dubbed the "Thach Weave." The two aircraft remained in the same general area, and, if Zeroes showed up, they had a better chance of engaging the aircraft on the tails of their wingmen. According to one American pilot, "One Zero against one Grumman is not an even fight, but with mutual support, two Grummans are worth four or five Zeros." The Wildcat had merits. It was well-protected compared to the lightly armored Zero, had a self-sealing fuel tank, and possessed adequate firepower with six .50-caliber M-2 Browning machine guns. U.S. Marine pilots, skeptical since the Battle of Midway, placed a great deal of confidence in their aircraft. Because they could not effectively dogfight the Zeroes, Henderson Field's defenders could not gain air superiority to thwart Japanese attacks. They realized the best thing they could do was disrupt up each day's raid, whittle down the Japanese, then break-off to fight another day. With this in mind, their primary targets became the bombers rather than the fighters, and many of the tactics introduced were devised by Marine Major John L. Smith. The American pilots always sought to begin their attack at least above the Japanese formations, and they concentrated their attacks on trailing aircraft. This gave them good angles to shoot at the exposed fuel tanks of the Japanese bombers, and it presented a difficult gunnery problem for the bombers, since the high overhead passes of the American fighters put them into the blindspots of the Japanese gunners. This tactic also caused the escorting Japanese fighters to climb and burn more of their fuel, thus reducing their limited time over Guadalcanal. 3 September to 4 November 1942, the Cactus Air Force claimed 268 Japanese planes downed in aerial combat, and the damage inflicted on others is estimated to be as great. Coastwatchers Because of the limited number of aircraft and fuel available during the early stages of the