to break through, a development best emphasized by MacDonald's attack at Wagram. The Armée d'Allemagne did not have the qualitative edge of the Grande Armée partly because raw conscripts replaced many of the veterans of Austerlitz and Jena, eroding tactical flexibility. Napoleon's armies were increasingly composed of non-French contingents, undermining morale. Although Napoleon's manoeuvers were successful, as evidenced by overturning the awful initial French position, the growing size of his armies made military strategies more difficult to manage. The scale of warfare grew too large for Napoleon to fully manage, which became evident during the next Napoleonic war, the French invasion of Russia in 1812. Englund describes the war as "the first modern war" for the use of "symmetrical conscript armies of singularly large size," that were divided into corps and commanded decentralized in theatres. He concludes that "it was a war of magnitude and maneuver more than before and the decisive factor was attrition more than dramatic one-(or two-)day pitched battles." Notes References Bibliography Further reading 19th-century conflicts Conflicts in 1809 Coalition, 5th 1809 in Europe Coalition Wars Francis II, Holy Roman Emperor