the group are encouraged to follow. Shared information and views are discussed more often than novel and unshared information within a group, therefore a norm is established where the majority views are perpetuated and others silenced. This norm is fluid and changing according to different contexts, but those within the group who want to keep up with the majority views in all matters have to keep an active role in affirming the views of the in-group in contest to out-groups. Evolution of in-groups Formation of cultural groups Studies have shown that in-group favoritism arises endogenously, through the formation of cultural groups. Symbolic markers in certain conditions can result in trivial groupings developing into cultural groups. The formation of such cultural groups then results in a higher degree of in-group favoritism. Efferson, Lalive and Fehr published such a study in 2008, utilizing a series of coordination games to mimic cooperation between individuals. The study found that cultural groups were able to form endogenously through creation of a linkage between a payoff-relevant behavior and a payoff-irrelevant marker. Subsequently, in-group favoritism occurred in ensuing social interactions. Participants were first divided into one of several populations of 10 people, and then further divided into subpopulations of 5. Each group had different payoff for coordinating on one of 2 choices, behavior A or behavior B. In group 1, participants were awarded 41 points for coordinating (choosing A themselves and choosing another participant who also chose A) on A and 21 for coordinating on B. The payoffs were switched in the 2nd group. In both groups participants were awarded just 1 point for mis-coordinating. During each turn participants were also allowed to choose a payoff-irrelevant marker (circle or triangle). Players from both subpopulations were mixed to create a coordination problem, and every turn, an unidentified player from each subpopulation would be randomly switched. The experiment created a situation in which participants were strongly incentivized to develop a sense of expected behaviors in his or her subpopulation, but occasionally would find themselves in a totally new situation in which their behaviors were not in-line with social norms. The results showed that players generally developed an inclination to pair behavior with a marker, especially if it had resulted in a positive payoff. As linkages at an individual level increase, covariation (of marker and behavior) at an aggregate level also increases. In the experiment, there was a significant increase