crew size on these ships: the Zumwalt-class destroyer's minimum complement is 130, less than half that of similar warships. Smaller crews reduce a significant component of operating costs. Ammunition, food, and other stores are all mounted in containers able to be struck below to magazine/storage areas by an automated cargo handling system. Water spray or mist systems are proposed for deployment in the Zumwalt-class destroyer, but the electronic spaces remain problematic to the designers. Halon/nitrogen dump systems are preferred but do not work when space has been compromised by a hull breach. The GAO has noted this system as a potential problem yet to be addressed. Computer network The Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure (TSCEI) is based on General Electric Fanuc Embedded Systems' PPC7A and PPC7D single-board computers running LynuxWorks' LynxOS RTOS. These are contained in 16 shock, vibration, and electromagnetic protected Electronic Modular Enclosures. Zumwalt carries 16 pre-assembled IBM blade servers. The network allows seamless integration of all onboard systems, e.g., sensor fusion and easing operation and mission planning. Criticism An April 2018 GAO report said the total cost of the three Zumwalt destroyers, including research and development, was $24.5 billion—an average of about $8 billion per ship. Lawmakers and others questioned whether the Zumwalt class costs too much and whether it provides the capabilities that the military needs. In 2005, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the acquisition cost of a DD(X) at $3.8 billion to $4 billion in 2007 dollars, $1.1 billion more than the Navy's estimate. The National Defense Authorization Act For the Fiscal Year 2007 (Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 5122 Together With Additional And Dissenting Views) stated: Mike Fredenburg analyzed the program for National Review after Zumwalt broke down in the Panama Canal in November 2016. He concluded that the ship's problems "are emblematic of a defense procurement system that is rapidly losing its ability to meet our national security needs." Fredenburg went on to detail problems relating to the skyrocketing costs, lack of accountability, unrealistic goals, a flawed concept of operations, the perils of designing a warship around stealth, and the failure of the Advanced Gun System. He concludes: Ballistic missile/air defense capability In January 2005, John Young, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, was so confident of the DD(X)'s improved air defense over the Arleigh Burke class that between its new radar