record of the ADA "fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled." The Supreme Court stated that the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the ADA law failed the congruence and proportionality test despite the hardship exception to the accommodation requirement: "The ADA does except employers from the 'reasonable accommodatio[n]' requirement where the employer 'can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.' § 12112(b)(5)(A). However, even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an 'undue burden' upon the employer. The Act also makes it the employer's duty to prove that it would suffer such a burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate reasonable bases for the employer’s decision. See ibid." The Supreme Court called disability discrimination rational in that hiring non-disabled employees would conserve scarce financial resources by avoiding the need for costly reasonable accommodations: "whereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to 'mak[e] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.'" Thus, states have rational reasons for violating the part of the ADA law banning policies that have a disparate impact on the disabled. Even in cases of racial discrimination in which the courts apply a different standard of scrutiny to government action from rational basis review, evidence of disparate impact is insufficient: "The ADA also forbids 'utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration' that disparately impact the disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis. § 12112(b)(3)(A). Although disparate impact may be relevant evidence of racial discrimination, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976), such evidence alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny." The Supreme Court had held in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. (1977) that disparate impact was not proof of discrimination based on "race, color or national origin," which would trigger strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court considered the burden of proof to be on those who