- Provocation Provocation can be distinguished from diminished responsibility which recognises a reduction in culpability because the defendant does not have the capacity to choose whether to break the law or not. The defence of provocation was based on the argument that a person who was so provoked as to completely lose their self-control should not be punished in the same way as those who murder wilfully. The defence was available under common law where the accused was provoked to lose his self-control. Provocation could be caused by things done or things the accused heard or said himself. The jury then decided whether the provocation would have been sufficient to cause a reasonable man to lose his self-control. If so, the charge could be reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter. The accused needed adduce only prima facie evidence of provocation. It was then up to the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not provoked. Two conditions had to be satisfied: Subjective condition. For the jury to find provocation, they had to be satisfied that the accused was actually provoked and lost self-control (R v Duffy [1949]). This was a subjective test based solely on the actual effect the behaviour of the victim had on the accused. Objective condition. The jury had also to find that the reasonable person would have done as the defendant did (R v Duffy [1949]). It was thus possible for a person to have been subjectively provoked but not objectively provoked (e.g. a particularly sensitive person) or to have been objectively provoked but not subjectively provoked (e.g. a particular insensitive person). It was also possible for the provocation to have been built up over a period of time, provided that the outburst was sudden and temporary (R v Ahluwalia [1992]). Section 3 of the Act made "the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did" the jury's responsibility. Previously this decision could be withdrawn from the jury by the judge. In 2004 the Law Commission recommended substantial revision to this defence in their report on Partial Defences to Murder. Section 3 was repealed on 4 October 2010 by section 56(2)(a) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Suicide pact Parliament's intention in section 4 was to show some compassion for those who had been involved in a suicide pact but failed to die. The reason