to the United States Constitution, a person accused of a crime and facing a criminal prosecution, is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. Various state constitutions also guarantee this right. The Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 operates to implement an accused person's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Factors considered by the courts within the Speedy Trial Act are: Whether the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would be a miscarriage of justice. Whether the trial is so complex, the gathering of witnesses and evidence so burdensome, or the fact situation so unusual that a continuance should be granted. The arrest precedes the indictment or the fact situation is complex. The failure to grant such a continuance in a case is enough to deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, or effective preparation. The result of this law has been that many continuances previously issued have been denied. Unless the defendant consents in writing to the contrary, a trial may not commence less than 30 days from the date when the defendant first appears through counsel or expressly waives counsel or elects to proceed pro se (without a lawyer). Case law of the Speedy Trial Act is found in 16 ALR 4th p. 1283 et seq. A defendant's rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment are triggered by "either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding (imprisonment) to answer a criminal charge." In the 1972 Barker v. Wingo case, the United States Supreme Court set out a four-factor test for determining whether delay between the initiation of criminal proceedings and the beginning of a trial violates the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The court must consider: The length of delay. The cause of the delay. The defendant's assertion of his rights to a speedy trial. The presence or absence of prejudice resulting from the delay. Appeal Courts routinely reject Sixth Amendment challenges to a speedy trial, after a criminal conviction. The case of United States v. Loud Hawk did not consider a 90-month delay in trial excessive. In that case, there had been a series of motions consuming a great deal of time. In the 1992 case of Doggett v. United States, the United States Supreme Court considered an 8½ year delay between indictment and criminal trial excessive. Continuance because of excessive