good care lack of necessary equipment insufficient understanding of the challenges staff experienced by senior managers and board members insufficient supervision for newly qualified paramedics from senior colleagues failure to review major incident procedures, which are supposed to be reviewed annually, or to ensure all staff were aware of them On 23 May 2018, LAS was taken out of special measures by the CQC, being rated good overall and outstanding in patient care. The report noted that the trust needed to focus on ensuring safe staffing levels of the control room, diversity amongst staff and improvements in management of mental health. 7/7 bombings Concerns were raised in internal LAS documents over the performance of radios and communication equipment used in the emergency operations after the 7/7 attacks. Again, the sheer volume of emergency calls received made radio communications difficult and put pressure on staff in the ambulance control room. Staff were also hampered in their use of mobile phones as the mobile phone networks were temporarily brought down during the day. In July 2009, the new radio system recommended after the bombings was rolled out. Despite the changes after 7/7, the LAS was criticised in 2010 for failures to provide fully working radios to its frontline staff. Health and safety inspections found that some radios failed during heavy rain and staff sometimes had to do without. Crews also raised concerns that the panic buttons on their radios did not work properly. Innovation In 1974, the LAS commissioned a computer-aided despatch system that remained unused for 13years because union members refused to operate it. A replacement system failed acceptance tests in 1990 and a further replacement system was designed and ordered. On 26 October 1992, the LAS started to use the new computer-assisted dispatch (CAD) system, known as LASCAD. Poorly designed and implemented, its introduction led to significant delays in the assigning of ambulances, with anecdotal reports of 11-hour waits. A subsequent enquiry found no evidence to support union claims that up to 30 people may have died as a result of the crash. The crash coincided with hundreds of control room exceptions messages related to alerts that crews responding to emergencies had not reported mobile, and the ambulance had not moved within 3minutes of despatch. The then-chief executive, John Wilby, resigned shortly afterwards. This failure is often cited in case studies of poor engineering management. A software upgrade in July