that it might end up being unnecessarily bureaucratic. It also asserted that such an upper House might potentially be detrimental to social cohesion. This issue was also considered by the Wee Chong Jin Commission, which rejected it on similar grounds. The PCMR's power to review and block the passage of Bills is regarded by some as an indication of its potential as a second chamber. The council's functional design, however, makes it only a very weak legislative review mechanism. The council has no power to investigate alleged breaches of minority rights. The general public has also no right of making their views or complaints known to the Chamber. In addition, the lack of a veto power means that currently the most the council can do is delay the passage of bills and prompt further parliamentary deliberation of the bills in question. But it has yet to do even this much. On those occasions where the Council might have rightly drawn attention to differentiating measures in proposed Bills, the legislature has pre-empted this by inserting "notwithstanding clauses" in the Constitution. Such clauses declare that laws that contravene a constitutional provision are nevertheless valid. An alternative view is that it is not the formal structure of the council – which in theory is capable of exercising judicial, legislative and review functions – but the presence of a practically single-party Parliament that drastically undermines the PCMR's powers, restricting it solely to an advisory capacity. This may not be the case if a strong Opposition exists in Parliament to obstruct the mustering of the required two-thirds voting majority required to push through legislation without the endorsement of the council. Besides being criticized for its limited powers, there is also some concern that the council's responsibilities may go too far. By taking up the function of scrutinizing existing and prospective legislation for differentiating measures and inconsistencies with fundamental liberties, the Council may be encroaching on the functions of constitutional interpretation, which is traditionally the function of courts. Even though the council has the additional advantage of identifying potentially unconstitutional legislation at an early stage, thereby preventing unnecessary litigation in the future, there is doubt as to the ability of the council to take on such a task. Given that constitutional interpretation is traditionally the function of lawyers and the courts, the task may be best carried out by the legally trained members of the PCMR.