In Hamilton's illustration the four categorical propositions that can occur in a syllogism as symbolized by the drawings A, E, I and O are: A: The Universal Affirmative, Example: "All metals are elements". E: The Universal Negative, Example: "No metals are compound substances". I: The Particular Affirmative, Example: "Some metals are brittle". O: The Particular Negative, Example: "Some metals are not brittle". In his 1881 Symbolic Logic Chapter V "Diagrammatic Representation", John Venn (1834–1923) comments on the remarkable prevalence of the Euler diagram: "...of the first sixty logical treatises, published during the last century or so, which were consulted for this purpose:-somewhat at random, as they happened to be most accessible :-it appeared that thirty four appealed to the aid of diagrams, nearly all of these making use of the Eulerian Scheme." (Footnote 1 page 100) But nevertheless, he contended, "the inapplicability of this scheme for the purposes of a really general Logic" (page 100) and on page 101 observed that, "It fits in but badly even with the four propositions of the common Logic to which it is normally applied." Venn ends his chapter with the observation illustrated in the examples below—that their use is based on practice and intuition, not on a strict algorithmic practice: “In fact ... those diagrams not only do not fit in with the ordinary scheme of propositions which they are employed to illustrate, but do not seem to have any recognized scheme of propositions to which they could be consistently affiliated.” (pp. 124–125) Finally, in his Chapter XX HISTORIC NOTES Venn gets to a crucial criticism (italicized in the quote below); observe in Hamilton's illustration that the O (Particular Negative) and I (Particular Affirmative) are simply rotated: "We now come to Euler's well-known circles which were first described in his Lettres a une Princesse d'Allemagne (Letters 102–105). The weak point about these consists in the fact that they only illustrate in strictness the actual relations of classes to one another, rather than the imperfect knowledge of these relations which we may possess, or wish to convey, by means of the proposition. Accordingly they will not fit in with the propositions of common logic, but demand the constitution of a new group of appropriate elementary propositions.... This defect must have been noticed from the first in the case of the particular affirmative and negative, for the same diagram is commonly employed to stand for