early U.S. naturalization statute: "All of which foregoing discussion may seem wholly out of place in a reasoned legal opinion as to the construction of a statute, except as illustrating the Serbonian bog into which a court or judge will plunge that attempts to make the words 'white persons' conform to any racial classification." United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo used it in a dissenting opinion, stating:"The attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog." Justice Dimmick used it in his dissenting opinion in State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983). "In Crenshaw we began the odyssey. Today's majority opinion now leads us further into the Serbonian bog. The Cardozo statement was echoed by another Supreme Court Justice, Sandra Day O'Connor:"We recognise that any standard requiring Courts to distinguish causes that are "accidents" from causes that are "occurrences" requires drawing a line, and we realise that "reasonable [people] may differ widely as to the place where the line should fall"... We draw this line today only because the language of Article 17 and 18 requires it, and not because of any desire to plunge into the "Serbonian Bog" that accompanies attempts to distinguish between causes that are accidents and injuries that are accidents... Until Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention is changed by the signatories, it cannot be stretched to impose carrier liability for injuries that are not caused by accidents." United States District Court Judge Joseph E. Irenas stated in another opinion:Tipping the scales at nearly 157 pages, the complaint hardly comports with the principles of brevity......In addition to being overly long, the complaint is inconsistent and confusing, causing this Court to expend much valuable time in an effort to discern its meaning......There is a strong argument that portions of the complaint fail to comply with the strictures of Fed. R. Civ. and might afford this Court a sufficient basis for dismissal. However, a dismissal without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) would only lead to a new filing and needlessly increase the amount of time and money already expended. Thus, the Court will plunge into the complaint's "Serbonian Bog" and deal with the pending Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions on the merits. Justice Breyer used it in a dissenting opinion in Texas v. Cobb'', 532 U.S. 162, 186 (2001). Judge William H.