unit, the British Legion, had established a fierce reputation as formidable pursuers, being used to great effect at Waxhaws and Camden, but had an uncertain reputation when facing determined opposition. Morgan's plan Morgan turned to his advantage the terrain of Cowpens, the varying reliability of his troops, his expectations of his opponent, and the time available before Tarleton's arrival. He knew that untrained militiamen, which comprised a large portion of his force, were generally unreliable in a pitched battle, and in the past had routed at the first hint of defeat and abandoned the regulars. For instance, the Battle of Camden had ended in disaster when the militia, which comprised half of the American force, broke and ran as soon as the fighting started, leaving the American flank exposed. To eliminate that possibility, he defied convention by placing his army between the Broad and Pacolet rivers, thus making escape impossible if the army was routed. Selecting a low hill as the center of his position, he placed his Continental infantry on it, deliberately leaving his flanks exposed to his opponent. With a ravine on their right flank and a creek on their left flank, Morgan reasoned his forces were sufficiently protected against possible British flanking maneuvers at the beginning of the battle. Morgan surmised that Tarleton would be highly confident and attack him head-on, without pausing to devise a more subtle plan. He therefore arranged his forces to encourage this presupposed impetuosity of his opponent by establishing three lines of soldiers: one of sharpshooters, one of militia, and a main line of regulars and experienced militia. The first line was composed of 150 select riflemen from North Carolina (Major McDowell) and Georgia (Major Cunningham). The second line consisted of 300 militiamen under the command of Colonel Andrew Pickens. The effect was the conspicuous placement of weak militia in the center-front in order to encourage Tarleton to attack there. The skirmishers and militia would screen the veteran Continental regulars, while inflicting casualties as the British advanced. Morgan asked the militia to fire two volleys, something they could do, and then withdraw to the left and re-form in the rear behind the third line, under the cover of reserve light dragoons commanded by Colonel William Washington and James McCall. The withdrawal of the militia was, in effect, a feigned retreat which would further embolden Tarleton. The third line, on the hill, was