divisions operating in the Ardennes, but this number would swell to an estimated 25 divisions, with 600 tanks and 1,000 aircraft. The 106th Division, located in the most exposed positions along the corps line, and the 28th Division took the brunt of the attack. Middleton, headquartered in Bastogne, was awakened by a guard and could hear the guns from there. Throughout the day, the 106th was able to hold its position, but additional German units poured in during the night. Much of the 106th was on the German side of the Our River in an area known as the Schnee Eifel. The division's commander, Major General Alan Jones, called Middleton, concerned about his two regiments east of the river. The conversation was interrupted by another call, and then resumed. At the end of the conversation Middleton told an aide that he had given his approval to have the two regiments pull back to the west side of the river. Jones, on the other hand was convinced that Middleton had directed these units to stay, and was further convinced of this based on a written order from earlier in the day, but just received. As a result of the miscommunication, the pullback did not occur, and the two regiments were ultimately surrounded with most of the men captured on 17 December. While two of the 28th Division's regiments survived the German onslaught intact, the 110th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Hurley Fuller, was directly in the path of the massive advance. On 17 December Fuller counterattacked, but his lone regiment was up against three German divisions, and when Fuller's command post was attacked his escape was thwarted and he was taken prisoner. Middleton next heard from him in April when he was released. Though the 110th Regiment was shattered, the stubborn resistance given by them and other VIII Corps units greatly slowed down the German timetable. The city of Bastogne, Belgium was a hub of several major roads and became a prime target for the Germans, seeing its capture as necessary to their advance. Middleton was in continuous communication with Bradley at 12th Army Group headquarters in Luxembourg, and maintained that though Bastogne could soon be surrounded, it should be held. As the Germans advanced on Bastogne, both Bradley and First Army commander Hodges recognized the threat to Middleton and had him move his headquarters. He was supposed to leave Bastogne