on the use of autogyros for field artillery targeting and indirect fire observation, which anticipated the use of helicopters in modern warfare. In January 1937, McNair was promoted to brigadier general. Brigade command In March 1937, McNair was assigned to command of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, a unit of the 2nd Infantry Division, then based at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The Army continued to experiment with equipment, weapons, and organizational design as it moved towards mechanization and modernization; the Army Chief of Staff directed tests of the triangular division concept (as opposed to the square division of World War I) through creation of a Proposed Infantry Division (PID). The 2nd Infantry Division was selected to conduct the tests, and McNair performed additional duty as the PID's chief of staff. In this position, he managed and supervised the PID's design, field tests, after-action reviews, and reports and recommendations to the War Department. The triangular division model was adopted, and became the Army's standard design for infantry divisions in World War II. In his annual performance appraisal, his division commander, Major General James K. Parsons, rated McNair as superior, and recommended him for assignment as a corps or army chief of staff. On the question of how McNair compared to his peers (unique to the appraisals of general officers), Parsons rated McNair second of the 40 generals personally known to him. McNair remained in command of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade until March 1939, when he was appointed to serve as commandant of the Command and General Staff College. Command and General Staff College The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Malin Craig, selected McNair to command the Command and General Staff College because he believed its teaching methods needed to be updated, and that the combat unit planning and reporting processes it taught needed to be streamlined. Craig felt that McNair's background made him ideally suited to lead this effort; in addition, Craig's deputy, Brigadier General George Marshall, believed that the Command and General Staff College program of instruction was too rigid and too focused on a staff process geared towards leadership of Regular Army units. In Marshall's view, the curriculum needed to be overhauled to reflect the likely needs of the World War II army, including faster, more flexible methods for planning and execution of large scale mobilizations, and incorporation of processes for training draftees and members of