line in preparation for Anvil. Virtually all of the material needed for the assault was on hand, on the way, or promised because of Devers's efforts to preserve the stockpile of Anvil stores and supplies even when the operation was in doubt. To command the assault, he created a special headquarters on Corsica called Advanced Detachment AFHQ, with Devers in command. Devers sent a cable to Marshall on 1 July proposing for an army group to be formed, with himself as commander. Eisenhower concurred with this on 12 July. It would have been easy enough to add the Seventh Army to Bradley's 12th Army Group, but that would have meant that Eisenhower would have to deal with the French, and after his experience in Operation Torch, Eisenhower preferred to let Devers do so. Marshall made the appointment on 16 July. Thus, Devers wore four "hats" for the operation: Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Commanding General NATOUSA; Commander, Advanced Detachment AFHQ, which was activated on 29 July; and Commanding General, 6th Army Group, which Devers activated on 1 August. France and Germany 1944–1945 Operation Dragoon was a crushing success. In a few short weeks, the French and American forces drove the Germans from southeastern France and captured major ports, including Marseille, on 28 August. On 15 September 1944, the 6th Army Group became operational and assumed control of Patch's Seventh Army and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny's French First Army, as it became on 19 September. The French First Army was the largest French force that was ever amassed under a foreign military leader. Eisenhower's SHAEF assumed operational control of the 6th Army Group although Devers retained his own logistical system via the Mediterranean. The campaign was not without cost, and concurrent combat in Normandy and Italy created a shortage of replacements, especially infantry, which left VI Corps about 5,200 men short. Devers remained in command of NATOUSA and so he sent Clark a message on 19 October suggesting for units to be rested to keep casualties down. Devers had written to McNair on 4 February 1944 and noted that when divisions were left in the line for more than 30 to 40 days, fatigue, carelessness, and exposure resulted in increased casualty and sickness rates. Clark replied that "your radio indicates a lack of appreciation of our tactical situation, the terrain, enemy resistance, and my mission." Devers noted in