the island in Maleme, Rethymno and Heraklion. After seven days of fighting and tough resistance, Allied commanders decided that the cause was hopeless and ordered a withdrawal from Sfakia. During the night of 24 May, George II and his government were evacuated from Crete to Egypt. By 1 June 1941, the evacuation was complete and the island was under German occupation. In light of the heavy casualties suffered by the elite 7th Fliegerdivision, Hitler forbade further large-scale airborne operations. General Kurt Student would dub Crete "the graveyard of the German paratroopers" and a "disastrous victory." Assessments The Greek campaign ended with a complete German and Italian victory. The British did not have the military resources to carry out large simultaneous operations in both North Africa and the Balkans. Even if they had been able to block the Axis advance, they would have been unable to exploit the situation by a counter-thrust across the Balkans. The British came very near to holding Crete and perhaps other islands that would have provided air support for naval operations throughout the eastern Mediterranean. In enumerating the reasons for the complete Axis victory in Greece, the following factors were of greatest significance: German superiority in ground forces and equipment; The bulk of the Greek army was occupied fighting the Italians on the Albanian front. German air supremacy combined with the inability of the Greeks to provide the RAF with adequate airfields; Inadequacy of British expeditionary forces, since the force available was small; Poor condition of the Hellenic Army and its shortages of modern equipment; Inadequate port, road and railway facilities; Absence of a unified command and lack of cooperation between the British, Greek and Yugoslav forces; Turkey's strict neutrality; and The early collapse of Yugoslav resistance. Criticism of British actions After the Allies' defeat, the decision to send British forces into Greece faced fierce criticism in Britain. Field Marshal Alan Brooke, (who became Chief of the Imperial General Staff in December 1941), considered intervention in Greece to be "a definite strategic blunder", as it denied Wavell the necessary reserves to complete the conquest of Italian Libya, or to withstand Rommel's Afrika Korps March offensive. It prolonged the North African campaign, which might have been concluded during 1941. In 1947, de Guingand asked the British government to recognise its mistaken strategy in Greece. Buckley countered that if Britain had not honoured its 1939 commitment to Greece,