reasonably continuous electric service to her home, and that the electric company's termination of service for alleged nonpayment, an action allowed by a provision of the company's general tariff approved by the PUC, constituted state action that deprived her of property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court granted Metropolitan Edison's motion to dismiss the complaint of Jackson on the ground that the termination of service was not state action, and hence was not subject to judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court, noting similar decision regarding terminations by other public utility companies, granted certiorari to review the judgment. Opinion of the Court The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist held that the termination of electric service by the public utility did not constitute state action that subjected the termination to judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion compared the regulation of the utility to the factual situation in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). In Burton, state action was found when a state had leased part of a government-owned parking facility to a restaurant that practiced racial segregation because the court found that the state had entangled itself in the business. However, the business in Moose Lodge No. 107 was subject to some state regulation and was privately owned, and the court found that the state regulation did not turn the lodge's acts into state action. In the Jackson case, although tightly regulated, the electric company was privately owned. The court held that the fact that the electric company was at least a partial monopoly in its service territory or that it was subject to extensive state regulation did not turn its termination practices into state action. Three justices wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Douglas stated that he would have found under the reasoning from Burton that there was state action in the termination of electric service under the lax regulation of the public utility by the state. Justice Brennan in his dissent noted that the electric service had been in the name of a third party, Dobson, rather than the plaintiff Jackson, so there was no live controversy between Jackson and the electric company. Without such a controversy, the Supreme