Jonathan George Crowe (born 1979) is an Australian legal philosopher. He is Professor of Law at Bond University. Crowe is recognised internationally for his work on legal philosophy, ethics and public law. He is a proponent of natural law theory in jurisprudence and ethics. He is known in Australia for his advocacy on behalf of survivors of sexual violence. Career Crowe commenced his academic career at the University of Queensland, before taking up a full professorship at Bond University. He has held visiting positions at the University of Texas at Austin and Georgetown University. He holds a PhD in law and philosophy from the University of Queensland. Crowe is an Honorary Life Member of the Australasian Society of Legal Philosophy, having served as its president from 2014 to 2018 (succeeding Jeffrey Goldsworthy). He is also a former President of the Australian Dispute Resolution Research Network. He co-edits the Journal of Legal Philosophy with Raff Donelson and Hillary Nye. Scholarship Crowe is best known internationally for his writings on legal philosophy and ethics, particularly his interpretation of the natural law tradition. He has also produced significant bodies of work on constitutional law, rape and sexual assault law, international humanitarian law and dispute resolution. Natural law theory Crowe's book Natural Law and the Nature of Law argues against traditional ideas of natural law as timeless and unchanging. Rather, he proposes a ‘diachronic’ conception of natural law as evolving over time. Crowe describes natural law as ‘socially embodied, historically extended and dependent on facts about human nature.’ Natural law, on this view, is shaped by both inherent human qualities and the natural and social environments of human communities. It reflects ‘the ongoing human quest to work out how best to live flourishing, fulfilling lives given the nature we have and the social worlds we inhabit.’ Artifact theory of law Crowe defends a theory of the nature of law that focuses on law's character as a human artifact. He argues that artifacts are defined primarily by reference to their functions. Law's function is ‘to serve as a deontic marker by creating a sense of social obligation’. Crowe contends that a law that is poorly suited to perform this function is defective, while a purported legal enactment that is incapable of performing this function fails to qualify as law. A law that is so unjust that it is incapable of creating a sense of social