by local boats and United States Navy personnel. However, a male Indonesian passenger was reported missing after the evacuation. Three days of searching failed to locate the missing passenger seated at 23A, and the investigating commission requested a verification search of the airplane. On 1 October 2018, experienced Japanese divers located the passenger between partially submerged seat rows 22 and 23, in the vicinity of a fuselage fracture. The one dead passenger had not been wearing a seatbelt. Air Niugini had previously stated that the deceased passenger had been seen by other passengers evacuating the aircraft. Nine people were taken to hospital. Six passengers were seriously injured. Some of the injured sustained broken bones. It was reported that there were thunderstorms in the vicinity of the airport at the time of the accident. The aircraft subsequently sank in of water. Investigation The Papua New Guinea Accident Investigation Commission opened an investigation into the accident. The Department of Transportation, Communications & Infrastructure in the Federated States of Micronesia opened an investigation. A preliminary report was issued on October 26. It stated that the body of the deceased passenger was recovered from the aircraft. Pathological analysis found that the passenger had succumbed to injuries within 3 minutes of the impact. An autopsy determined that there was a lack of trauma around the waist and hips, indicating that the passenger "was not wearing a seat-belt" at the time of the crash, "which allowed his body to become a projectile sustaining traumatic head and facial injuries". On 18 July 2019, the Papua New Guinea Accident Investigation Commission issued its final report: the flight crew did not comply with Air Niugini Standard Operating Procedures, nor the approach or pre-landing checklists, and did not adequately brief the approach. The flight path became unstable after autopilot disconnect. The Precision Approach Path Indicator was showing three white lights just before entering Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). The rate of descent significantly exceeded in IMC. The glideslope deviated from half dot low to two dots high within nine seconds after passing the Minimum Descent Altitude. The flight crew heard, but disregarded, thirteen Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) aural alerts (Glideslope and Sink Rate) and flew a 4.5° average glideslope. EGPWS showed a visual PULL UP warning on the Primary Flight Display. The pilots lost situational awareness. The approach was unstabilised, but the captain did not execute a missed approach.