War Plan Orange (commonly known as Plan Orange or just Orange) is a series of United States Joint Army and Navy Board war plans for dealing with a possible war with Japan during the years between the First and Second World Wars. It failed to foresee the significance of the technological changes to naval warfare, including the submarine, air support and aircraft carriers, and although the Battle of Midway was important, and the US Navy did "island-hop" to regain lost territory, there was no culminating "showdown" battle as anticipated by Plan Orange. Development Informal studies as early as 1906 covered a number of possibilities, from basing at Gibraltar or Singapore (an idea revived by the British before World War II) to "a quick trans-Atlantic dash" to the Pacific. The plan eventually adopted was conceived by Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers in 1911. 19 Dec 1919: Strategy of the Pacific (JB 325, Serial 28) 7 Jul 1923: Estimate of the Situation, Orange (JB 325, Serial 207) 15 Aug 1924: Joint Basic War Plan - Orange (JB 325, Serial 228) 10 Jan 1929: Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (JB 325, Serial 280) 20 Jun 1934: Inadequacy of Present Military and Naval Forces Philippine Area to Carry Out Assigned Missions in Event of an ORANGE War (JB 325, Serial 533) 8 May 1935: Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange (JB 325, Serial 546) 19 May 1935: Revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange (JB 325, Serial 570) 14 Oct 1936: Revision of Joint Orange Estimate of the Situation (JB 325, Serial 589) 9 Dec 1936: Changes in Joint Basic War Plan Orange (JB 325, Serial 594) 19 Feb 1938: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (1938) (JB 325, Serials 617 & 618) The plan was formally adopted by the Joint Army and Navy Board beginning in 1924. Predating the Rainbow plans, which presumed the assistance of allies, Orange assumed that the United States would fight Japan alone. Strategy As originally conceived, it anticipated a blockade of the Philippines and other U.S. outposts in the Western Pacific. They were expected to hold out on their own while the Pacific Fleet marshaled its strength at bases in California and Hawaii and guarded against attacks on the Panama Canal. After mobilization (the ships maintained only half of their crews in