revoke the Polish guarantee that summer went beyond even Horace Wilson's, and it seems doubtful whether he was willing to fight Hitler over Poland at all. Patrick Cosgrave argues, "Butler did not merely go along with appeasement he waxed hard, long and enthusiastic for it, and there is very little evidence... he took the slightest interest in the rearmament programme to which he devotes such emphasis in his memoirs". Jago concludes that Butler "distorted the facts" and "grossly misrepresented his responsibility and attitudes in 1938". Although not the direct cause of his defeats [for the party leadership] in 1957 or 1963 "it was... always there, the blemish that he could not quite reason away". Phoney War On 20 October 1939, after the Fall of Poland, Butler was, according to Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky, still open to a compromise peace and agreement to restore Germany's colonies if it was guaranteed by all the powers, including the Americans and the Soviets. He dismissed as an "absurdity" any suggestion for Germany first to be required to withdraw from Poland. Butler disapproved of Churchill, the new First Lord of the Admiralty who publicly opposed to any hint of compromise peace. Butler was quicker than many to realise the social change which war would bring. He spoke to Robert Barrington-Ward of The Times (12 February 1940) of "the new social revolution that is making its way, and how to anticipate and meet it". With Chamberlain's position untenable after the Norway Debate, Butler tried on 10 May 1940 to persuade Halifax to accept appointment as Prime Minister, but he later stated that he was out at the dentist, and Churchill was appointed instead. Butler wrote to Chamberlain on 11 May to urge him to carry on as a member of the government in the hope of achieving a negotiated peace and was reappointed to the Foreign Office on 15 May. Butler later grew to respect Churchill after serving under him. Under Churchill and Prytz Affair On 17 June 1940, the day that Marshal Philippe Petain asked for an armistice, Butler met informally with a Swedish envoy, Björn Prytz. Prytz later reported to Stockholm that Butler had declared British policy must be determined by "common sense not bravado" and that had "assured me that no opportunity for reaching a compromise (peace) would be neglected" if there were reasonable conditions. Churchill was furious when he found out, probably