could be incorporated into the escort scheme. Changes to the initial corvette design had been made in the United Kingdom, but had yet to be instituted in Canadian construction. This, the lack of essential equipment and lack of training were reasons for the Canadians not to accept the request. However, on 23 May, the first Canadian warships left Halifax, Nova Scotia for St. John's. This was the establishment of the Newfoundland Escort Force. Commodore Leonard W. Murray arrived on 13 June to command the NEF, which was under the overall command of Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches in the United Kingdom. However, Murray had complete autonomy over his zone and with Royal Canadian Navy ships at its core, would incorporate the warships of several navies. This was the first foreign operational command the Royal Canadian Navy ever took. Under the NEF, convoys would sail from Halifax under local escort until reaching the point where the NEF escort groups would take over. The local escorts would leave to refuel at St. John's before returning to Halifax. The NEF escorts would escort the convoy to Iceland, where they would turn it over to British-based escorts. The NEF escorts would refuel at Iceland and return to St. John's with a westbound convoy. Composition As a subordinate command of the Western Approaches Command, NEF used their tactics. The NEF was a series of escort groups usually composed of up to four ships with two to three corvettes and one destroyer. The groups were given numeric designations between 14 and 25. As part of its creation, the United Kingdom agreed to return Canadian destroyers operating in European waters. Also augmenting Canadian vessels were ten Royal Navy corvettes that were handed over to the Royal Canadian Navy for use in the NEF, and additional Royal Navy s. The senior officer in the escort group automatically became the Senior Officer Escort and took charge of convoy defence along with commanding his own ship. The command was planned to have sixty or more units at its disposal. However, the command never operated with more than roughly 50. This led to a further lack of training and deterioration of vessels. The missing vessels were mainly destroyers, which were the most capable of escorts. Their places in the convoy escort groups were often filled by corvettes, the weakest. The lack of properly equipped and trained vessels rotating through the command led to