the administration of President Jimmy Carter had the effect of extending an 'invitation' to the class members to come to this country and concomitantly effected limitations on administrative discretion sufficient to create a protectable liberty interest in securing a parole hearing." The District Court had outlined the requirements of the hearing due each plaintiff, some of which the government found objectionable. The Circuit Court said that the Cubans in question were "excludable aliens", considered by law not yet in the United States. But the lower court found their status was somewhat different from typical "excludable aliens" in that they had been allowed to "journey to and disembark in this country without meeting the usual documentary requirements imposed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." The Circuit Court was uncertain on this question, but turned to other criteria for determining whether to grant the Attorney General's request to stay the District Court's orders. It found the Cubans would suffer substantially without the relief offered by the District Court and the public interest was not at risk from hearings, but also that the government would be injured by having to hold hearings when the government has a reasonable chance of persuading the court that these hearings are not required. The Circuit Court ordered the government to present plans for hearings as the District Court had ordered, but it stayed that court's order that hearings be held pending further consideration of the merits of the case, that is, whether actions of the executive branch had created a liberty interest that the Cubans could assert. Opinion After full briefing, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion by Judge Clarence W. Allgood on April 23, 1986. It found the Cubans had not demonstrated the sort of executive branch actions that are normally associated with the establishment of a liberty interest, that "they fail to demonstrate the existence of the particularized standards of review that yield a protected liberty interest". It noted in particular that the 1980 Refugee Education Assistance Act Act created a special status for them "only for the purpose of providing social welfare benefits", not for any other recognition of their status with respect to immigration. It found they had no claims under international law. In sum, Judge Allgood wrote: "the Mariels have failed to demonstrate the existence of any significant restrictions on the discretion of Executive actors." The decision reversed the lower court's finding