stability of the status quo system of governance under the CCP. This includes political censorship as well as censorship of content deemed obscene and harmful to public morality, although the latter justification can be used as a means to censor political topics as well. The more specific reasoning and logic of censorship is not publicized by the state, however; scholars outside of China generally tend to take two overarching views of its purpose: first, censorship primarily targets unauthorized criticisms of the party-state; and/or second, censorship primarily targets expression of sentiment that is conducive to organization of collective action (whether or not it is critical of the party-state). In 2013, Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts published research based on large-scale sampling of posts on a variety of Chinese social media, arguing that the primary motive for censorship is to quash potential for collective action, and not prevent criticism of the government per se. Through regular, automated sampling of extant posts, the authors were able to analyze which were deleted over time. While drawing only from Internet-based sources, King et al. argued their data demonstrated that "despite widespread censorship of social media, we find that when the Chinese people write scathing criticisms of their government and its leaders, the probability that their post will be censored does not increase. Instead, we find that the purpose of the censorship program is to reduce the probability of collective action by clipping social ties whenever any collective movements are in evidence or expected." Further experiments conducted by King et al. (2014) demonstrated and recreated mechanisms of censorship of social media. The authors created social media accounts to publish text online, tracking what was and was not deleted, and additionally obtained social media censorship software used by private corporations to comply with government regulations. King et el. again argued their work offered "rigorous support for the recent hypothesis that criticisms of the state, its leaders, and their policies are published, whereas posts about real-world events with collective action potential are censored." In 2019, however, Dimitar Gueorguiev and Edmund Malesky published an analysis of the data gathered in King, Pan & Roberts (2013), arguing that the sample included critical posts garnered through state-led consultation campaigns, wherein the Chinese government specifically solicited public comment on certain proposals, laws and regulations. Gueorguiev and Malesky subsequently concluded that controlling for such condoned criticism, the "strong" thesis of