changing the decision making process within the Council of Ministers from unanimity to a qualified majority in six policy areas, that the potential creation of a European Court of First Instance would be an unlawful delegation of the judicial power of the state, that by the addition of four new policy objectives to the Treaty of Rome fell outside the authorisation provided in the Third Amendment, and that powers granted to the Council of Ministers in the area of provision of services and concerning the working environment, health and safety of workers were outside the original Constitutional authorisation and could encroach upon rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court rejected all of these arguments. They noted that the Treaty of Rome provided for moving from unanimous voting to qualified majority and concluded that: The Court ruled further that the "new" policy areas fell within the original objectives of the Treaty of Rome, that the creation of a new court would not increase the judicial power already delegated to the European institutions, and that the Plaintiff had failed to show how the new powers to be granted to the Council of Ministers could threaten constitutional rights. Part III of the Single European Act Walsh and Henchy JJ. gave separate judgements with which Hederman J. concurred. They ruled that were Ireland to ratify Part III it would amount to unconstitutional delegation of the state's external sovereignty. They rejected the argument that the constitutionality of a treaty could only be questioned when it was incorporated into law by a statute and ruled that the courts had the power to interfere in the government's exercise of foreign affairs in the case of there being a "clear disregard by the government of the powers and duties conferred on it by the Constitution." The Court's dissenting members argued that the courts had no jurisdiction to question the constitutionality of a treaty which had not been incorporated into the law of the state. While they agreed with the majority that the courts could interfere with the government's exercise of the state's foreign affairs in the case of a clear disregard of the Constitution, they did not agree that the government had shown any such disregard. Walsh J. Henchy J. Hederman J Finlay CJ Griffin J Further reading Bradley, Kieran St C., "The referendum on the Single European Act" (1987) European Law Review 301 Hogan, G. W., "The